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Abstract 
Business angels are widely acknowledged as being a key source of risk finance for growth-
oriented enterprises. Their importance has become even more significant since the onset of 
the financial crisis. Research on business angels goes back some 30 years, focusing primarily 
on two themes: (i) their characteristics and (ii) the investment process. 
It has become clear that business angels are not a homogeneous population. Various studies 
have sought to develop typologies of business angels based on their personal characteristics, 
competence, motivations, investment approach and types of investment made. However, this 
stream of research remains limited and has not progressed beyond establishing typologies. 
Moreover, the possibility that typologies are dynamic, with angels shifting between 
categories over time remains largely unexplored. Neither has it been considered how 
different types of business angels approach the process of making investment decisions or 
managing the post-investment relationship. The aim of this research is to further develop 
this line of research on angel typologies to explore differences between types of angel 
investors in terms of their approach to investment, looking in particular, at their decision-
making criteria.  
This dissertation starts by questioning the methodologies used in research on business angel 
decision making. In particular, how comparable are results that arise from different 
methodologies. Using a sample of 51 business angels (21 gatekeepers and 30 individual 
investors), the findings indicate that the results are methodologically dependent. The next 
stage used data collected through an online survey with 472 investment decisions made by 
238 angel investors. These data were used in the subsequent analysis. Firstly, a two-step 
cluster analysis procedure was conducted to cluster the investment decisions by the criteria 
weights. Three clusters were identified. The investment experience and the level of influence 
of others are both helpful in explaining the differences across groups. Secondly, the cluster 
membership was used to evaluate if angel investors change their investment criteria. A 
logistic model was developed. The results indicate that the likelihood of a business angel’s 
change the investment criteria depend on three key areas: investment specific area (ISA), 
angel specific area (ASA) and group specific area (GSA). 
 
 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurial finance, business angels, investment decision making, 
investment criteria, heterogeneity, typology, 
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Chapter 1. Introduction – sources of entrepreneurial finance 
 
Ever since Wetzel’s (1981) pioneering study put business angels on the scholarly ‘map’ the 
topic has been the target of scholars’ attention. The aim of this chapter is to set the context 
for the study that will follow. First, the discussion will take a step back and look at the entire 
funding agents in the entrepreneurial finance context. Then the debate will divide the funding 
environment in two groups: (i) non-business angels (ii) business angels. This will help to set 
the focus on business angels. Thenceforth, definitional and measurement issues will be 
raised. The focus of this section is to evaluate if the conventional definition of a business 
angels is still valid. The subsequent subsection will focus on identifying trends in the angel 
market and highlighting the importance of these changes in terms of research. A brief review 
of the initial business angels’ studies is then presented with a specific focus on the decision 
making literature. This will help to direct the discussion to the specific area of the thesis. 
The final sections will review the overall purpose of the thesis and provide an overview of 
the succeeding chapters.   
 
1.1 The relevance of entrepreneurial finance 
 
Understanding external finance is extremely important to any entrepreneur attempting to 
exploit an opportunity. Developing a venture from a simple idea to a growing business needs 
time and resources. Most likely, at different stages of development, entrepreneurs will need 
to obtain financial resources from various set of investors. This journey is classically known 
as the “funding escalator” (Harding and Cowling, 2006; Mason et al., 2013).  Harrison 
(2013) describes a pre-2008 version of the funding escalator, including the: 5F’s (family, 
friends, founders, fans and fools), grants, bank loans, business angels, venture capital and 
private equity. However, this understanding has changed over the years. The period post 
2008 brought other sources of finance into the market which require to be incorporated to 
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the model, e.g. accelerators, crowdfunding and so on. Additionally, scholars have identified 
variations in the funding escalator across geographic regions (Gregson et al., 2013). Neck et 
al. (2004) highlight the importance of capital sources as a necessary element for the 
development of an entrepreneurial ecosystem. However, this literature does not ask if all 
sources of capital are equally important, neither will this research. Nevertheless it is 
important to definite an entrepreneurial ecosystem to help in the contextualization of this 
thesis. Stam and Spigel (2016, pag 1) define entrepreneurial ecosystem as: 
”a set of interdependent actors and factors coordinated in such a way that they enable 
productive entrepreneurship within a particular territory”. 
Much of the research conducted to evaluate the importance of different sources of capital 
has taken a supply side perspective. Two key reasons can be offered to justify this approach. 
First, these source of capital are not suitable to all firms looking for funding (Mitter and 
Kraus, 2011). Second, there is no directory that allows scholars to easily identify firms that 
have used a specific external sources of funding. However, the research conducted on the 
demand side provides clear evidence on the key source of capital for SMEs. These studies 
conclude that, in the UK, the most significant external source of funding for SMEs are banks, 
in particular overdrafts (Harvey et al., 2012; Hughes, 1997). Other studies have shown that 
not all SMEs receive external finance, with the intention of high growth playing an important 
role on the likelihood of using external finance (Heffernan, 2006; Riding et al., 2012; Vos et 
al., 2007). However, the 2008 economic recession had important implications in terms of 
the accessibility of bank finance for SMEs (Jones-Evans, 2015). 
 
The studies that focused on the supply of finance have highlighted the importance of 
business angels as the key source of external capital at seed and early stage (some examples: 
Mason and Harrison, 2000a; Sohl, 2003b; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000; Wiltbank 
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et al., 2009). This significance is not just a UK phenomenon: research in the USA, Canada, 
Sweden, Germany, Norway, amongst others (Brettel, 2002; Landström, 1993; Månsson and 
Landström, 2006; Reitan and Sorheim, 2000; Riding, 2005; Sohl, 2012a) also shown the 
importance of business angels. As a result, this has prompted, policy makers across the world 
(OECD, 2011) to focus their attention on designing policies to increase the levels of angel 
investing (Mason, 2009; OECD, 2011). However, business angels are not the only source of 
equity available to entrepreneurs. Hence, it is important to review two other key sources: (i) 
crowdfunding and (ii) venture capital. The following subsection will present a review of the 
significance of these sources of capital in the alternative finance market.  
1.2 Crowdfunding  
 
Crowdfunding is not a new phenomenon. It has been used at different moments in time. An 
early example of such a practice can be found in the summer of 1885 - the funding of granite 
plinth for the statue of liberty (Cumming and Johan, 2013). However, the financial 
constraints generated by the post global financial crises and the technological opportunities 
opened up by the internet have contributed to the rise of crowdfunding as a popular source 
of external capital (Harrison, 2013). Mollick (2014) defines crowdfunding as a distinctive 
type of capital source which derives directly from concepts such as crowdsourcing and 
micro-finance. But what is crowdfunding? The definition of crowdfunding has evolved from 
crowdsourcing (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012) to reflect the financial nature of the 
activity. Belleflamme et al. (2010, p. 5) define crowdfunding as:  
“an open call, essentially through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either 
in form of donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights”. 
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This definition highlights a particularity of crowdfunding – the different types of 
“compensations” received by investors. There are several variations within the 
crowdfunding business models. De Buysere et al. (2012) suggest that it is possible to 
represent the different business models into four types of crowdfunding: donation, reward, 
lending and equity. These four types are different on a range of dimensions: investment 
motivations, amount invested, type of funding, etc. (Agrawal et al., 2014). To benchmark 
crowdfunding to business angels as sources of capital it is necessary to use class of 
investments. With this in mind, the comparison will evaluate the importance of equity 
crowdfunding. Two arguments can support this decision. First, the investor 
motivations/form of return differs across the four types of crowdfunding (Collins and 
Pierrakis, 2012). In terms of returns, Kirby and Worner (2014) propose that the four models 
could be grouped by the nature of the expected return: community crowdfunding (donation 
and reward) and financial return crowdfunding (lending and equity).  The returns in the 
community crowdfunding represent more intangible benefit and/or products while in the 
financial return crowdfunding are associated to capital gains or interest. Hence, the choice 
should rely on looking to financial return crowdfunding (lending and equity).  Second, what 
is the type of instrument used in the investment? Angel investors provide loans to their 
investee companies (Prowse, 1998) although the most typical type of investment is in the 
form of equity – notably common stocks (Morrissette, 2007). For these reasons, the type of 
crowdfunding chosen to evaluate its importance is the equity model since it is the most 
similar to business angels.  
 
The size of the equity crowdfunding market and its importance varies across countries. Much 
of these differences have been the result of regulatory issues that have delayed the 
introduction of such mechanisms. An example of this is the equity crowdfunding market in 
the USA. When compared with Ireland, UK, France the USA market showed lower volumes 
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than its European counterparts due to the late approval of legislation allowing the use of such 
a financial instrument (Ahlers et al., 2015). The UK has been recognized as the leading 
country in terms of level of practices and instruments used (Wardrop et al., 2015). It also 
leads in terms of levels of amount raised. In 2014, the UK equity crowdfunding market raised 
more funds than all other European countries1 combined (Wardrop et al., 2015).  
 
In the UK, from all the different types of crowdfunding, the equity market is the model with 
the highest average growth (410%) in the period of 2012 to 2014 (Baeck et al., 2014).  This 
represents a growing trend when compared with the average for the period between 2011 
and 2013 of 371% (Collins et al., 2013). However, recent figures show that there has been a 
decline of the growth rate. In 2015, the growth rate has decreased to 295% with the amount 
invested totalizing £331.64 million with 720 business being funded through equity 
crowdfunding (Zhang et al., 2016). Similar growth can also be found in terms of average 
deal size. In 2014, the average deal size was of £199,095 (Baeck et al., 2014) while in 2015 
this value increased to £523,987 (Zhang et al., 2016) which represents a growth of 163%. In 
2014, 46% of the firms that successfully raised this type of external capital were at seed stage 
or early sage (Baeck et al., 2014). Therefore, it is possible to understand that in 2014, equity 
crowdfunding contributed to seed and early stage with £38.64 million. The relative 
importance of this source of external capital has also increased through time. The weight of 
equity crowdfunding deals in the overall number of funded opportunities has increased from 
0.3% in 2011 to 15.6% in 2015, representing an average growth rate of 236% in the period 
(Zhang et al., 2016). Hence, equity crowdfunding is of growing significance for UK 
entrepreneurs in their venture’s early stages.  
                                                          
1 111 million euros in the UK while the remaining European countries raised 82.6 million euros 
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1.3 Venture Capital 
 
Another very important source of external equity is venture capital funds. Although there is 
some evidence to challenge their importance (Rosenbusch et al., 2013), typically, scholars 
have recognized their financial and non-financial contributions as vital to enhance the 
entrepreneurial process (for example: Amit et al., 1998; Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Cumming 
et al., 2007; Faber et al., 2016; Kong et al., 2016). Contrary to what has happened in the 
crowdfunding industry, the leading country for venture capital funds has been the USA. This 
is a very established industry with the first example of a venture capital firms, the American 
Research and Development founded in 1946 (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Cumming (2012, 
p. 70) defines venture capital funds as: 
“Pools of capital established to make early to late stage investments in private equity…VC 
funds invest in small private entrepreneurial companies with the expectation of capital gains 
after an exit outcome such as an IPO or acquisition, often carried out within three to five 
years after the initial investment.” 
 
Typically, in the USA, venture capital firms just invest a small amount of their funds in seed, 
start-up and early stage (Parhankangas, 2012). In 2015, expansion (37%) and later stage 
(27%) were the key stages chosen by USA venture capital firms (Thomson Reuters, 2016). 
Similar results can be found in the UK (Mason and Harrison, 2002b). Scholars have 
acknowledged that the existence of a venture capital market is fundamental to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem (Cohen, 2006; Malecki, 1997). Their investment in firms like 
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Starbucks among several others impact the everyday life of the 
great majority of world population (Kedrosky, 2009). This type of investor is typically 
concentrated in a small number of financial centres and technologically driven regions 
(Mason, 2007b). However, this does not necessarily represents a significant problem since 
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much of the investments are not constraint by geographic proximity (Griffith et al., 2007; 
Mäkelä and Maula, 2005). For example, in 2012 only 47% of the investments conducted by 
UK venture capital funds were within national boarders (BVCA, 2013). A very similar result 
can be found across other European countries. An European Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Association (EVCA) report (2015) shows that European venture capital firms 
invested €1.102 billion cross-border (within and outside Europe) versus the €2.473 billion 
of domestic investments. A slightly different situation occurs in the USA market where the 
vast majority of funds invest within the nation’s borders (Thomson Reuters, 2016).  Cross 
border differences in the venture capital industry do not come as a surprise. One could state 
that this is a normal pattern with alternative sources of funding, as the crowdfunding industry 
can easily illustrate (for example: Bertoni et al., 2015; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Ooghe et 
al., 1991). Hence, to evaluate the importance of such source of capital it will be necessary to 
focus in a single country. As in the Crowdfunding example the UK market will be taken as 
the benchmark for the analysis.  
 
The UK is the second most significant venture capital market in the world, behind the USA 
(Denny, 2000). In terms of importance, venture capital has played a key role in the 
development of new ventures in the UK (Mason and Harrison, 2002b; Mason and Pierrakis, 
2013). Mason and Pierrakis (2013) noticed that, in the UK, since the technological crash of 
2000, venture capital investments in early stage has been highly volatile. The authors 
highlight the recovery in terms of amounts invested by venture capitalists in early stages, 
albeit a decrease of the weight of this type of investments in the total portfolio. Recent figures 
show even smaller levels of early stage investments have been made by venture capital firms. 
Table 1-1 shows a decreasing trend in terms of amount invested in early stages and the 
weight of this type of investments in the whole portfolio. Three key points can be 
highlighted. First, the amount invested by venture capital in early stage investments has 
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decreased from £703 million to £293 million. Second, over the period, early stage 
investments do not count for more than 11% of the venture capital portfolio. Third, the 
average number of ventures receiving venture capital funding in the early stages is 422. This 
indicates that although venture capital firms are investing smaller amounts in early stage 
these resources are still covering a reasonable amount of ventures.  In the period from 2011 
to 2014, in the UK, venture capital firms have invested £1.281billion in early stage2 
investments versus just £117.6 million by equity crowdfunding platforms (Zhang et al., 
2016). However, this trend might change in a near future with two factors strongly 
contributing to this transformation. First, is the decline of the venture capital industry which 
is seen by the smaller amounts invested at early stages. Second, is the fast growth of equity 
crowdfunding (Salomon, 2016). But without a shadow of a doubt, venture capital funds have 
been an important driver for new ventures in the UK and across the globe.  
Table 1-1: UK venture capital early stage investments, 2000 to 2014 
  Total early stage 
(£, millions) 
Total early 
stage (n) 
Average size of early stage 
investment (£, thousands) 
% of early stage investment 
in the portfolio   
2000 703 409 1719 11.00% 
2001 390 408 956 8.20% 
2002 295 398 741 6.60% 
2003 263 427 616 6.50% 
2004 284 454 626 4.20% 
2005 382 493 775 5.60% 
2006 946 500 1892 9.30% 
2007 434 502 865 3.60% 
2008 359 455 789 4.10% 
2009 454 365 1244 9.48% 
2010 313 397 788 3.76% 
2011 347 405 857 5.30% 
2012 343 431 796 5.95% 
2013 298 375 795 7.07% 
2014 293 320 916 6.21% 
     
     
                                                          
2 BVCA classification of early stage includes: Seed, Start-up, Early Stage and Later stage VC. 
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1.4 Business Angels 
 
Business angel investors are a further possible funding sources for early stage new 
businesses, with their importance in the seed and start-up stage being commonly 
acknowledged by the academic and practitioner community (Sohl, 2015b). In the USA 
business angels are recognized as the key source of early stage capital making ten times more 
investments than venture capital funds (Sohl, 2012a). The recent financial crisis has created 
greater credit constraints for entrepreneurs. The business angel community has shown clear 
signals of being less sensitive to economic cycles, increasing the levels of investment activity 
since the global financial crisis (European Business Angels Network (EBAN), 2016; Mason 
and Harrison, 2015; National Angel Capital Organization (NACO), 2015; Sohl, 2012b). 
Therefore the scarcity of resources associated with a crisis makes it crucial for entrepreneurs 
to engage with the angel community in the best way possible.  
 
1.4.1 Defining a Business Angel  
 
But who are these business angels? In recent years several definitions have been presented. 
Wetzel (1981) offered the first definition of business angels: 
“Investors who provide risk capital other than small business investment corporations, 
venture capital, other institutional investors, and public equity markets; those with high net 
worth and financially sophisticated; excludes family, friends and debt instruments”. 
From this point onwards the definition has been the subject of debate and change. The first 
concern is the time frame. Some authors restrict the definition to a period of time. So, for 
example, only active investors who had at least completed one investment in say the last 
three years should be considered to be a business angel (Fiet, 1995a; Van Osnabrugge, 
1998a). Second, family and friend investments were included in some definitions (Gaston, 
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1989; Haar et al., 1988; Lumme et al., 1996; Tymes and Krasner, 1983). Third, some of the 
subsequent research included a broader set of financial instruments. The authors of these 
studies (Aram, 1989; Sullivan and Miller, 1990) added the possibility of investments through 
debt not only done with equity. The definition that will be used throughout this research 
builds up on the one presented by (Mason, 2007a).  
Business angels are high net worth individuals who invest their own resources, financial and 
non-financial, in unquoted companies in which they have no close relation, motivated by the 
possible financial return resulting from value added activities.  
 
Looking in detail at this definition six points need to be highlighted. The first is high net 
worth individuals. Gaston (1989, p. 14) observes that “the median net worth of the typical 
Angel is $750,000”. Coveney and Moore (1998) identify that UK business angels invest on 
average £113,000. To be able to invest and bear the risk associated with these early ventures, 
angel investors need to have large amounts of available financial resources. This is consistent 
with the definition of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (Friend and Blume, 1975), that is, 
agents are willing to take more risk as their level of wealth is higher. Secondly, the 
investment of financial resources is made using personal assets, contrary to venture capital 
funds which invest other people’s money. Even though governments have been more 
actively involved in the creation of incentive schemes (Aernoudt, 2005; Mason, 2009), 
business angels always have to invest their own finance and bear the corresponding risk.  
 
Thirdly, angel investing includes the investment of non-financial resources, this comprises 
all non-monetary resources that a business angel can provide to an investment, e.g., time, 
energy, knowledge, contacts, etc. However, these resources are not always invested in every 
investment, particularly in the case of investments done within syndicates where angels can 
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have a more passive role. Although some of these resources can also be provided by 
consultants and mentors, business angels have a much more important role. Previous 
research has showed that angel investors had an extended involvement in the activities of 
the invested venture and serving as mentors to the entrepreneurs (Amatucci and Sohl, 2004; 
Mason and Harrison, 1996a). Politis (2008) identifies ‘four different value added roles’ 
angels can have. Mentoring is just one of four roles that they can undertake3.  
 
Fourthly, business angels do not invest in publicly traded companies. Rather they choose to 
make investments in unquoted companies that will be illiquid for several years. Why do they 
prefer this liquidity constraint instead of investing in the stock market? Several scholars have 
presented empirical evidence that business angels are former successful entrepreneurs or at 
least have some entrepreneurial experience (Brettel, 2003; Gaston, 1989; Hindle and Lee, 
2002; Landström, 1993; Mason et al., 1991; Suomi and Lumme, 1994; Tashiro, 1999; 
Wetzel, 1981). They use angel investing to derive psychic income by experiencing the 
emotions of being involved in an entrepreneurial context. Additionally, business angels 
consider their investment as a very specific asset class that has a unique risk/return 
combination. 
 
Fifthly, typically, business angels invest motivated by the possibility of financial gains 
unlike family and friends who want to support a loved one. Helping relatives and friends 
was not very significant for angel investors (Brettel, 2003). Hence, investments in ventures 
from which the investee has a close relation with the entrepreneur are not considered 
business angels investments. Lastly, angels expect to be able to influence the value of their 
                                                          
3 Sounding board/strategic role, supervision and monitoring role, resource acquisition role and mentoring 
role. 
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investments as a result of their value added activities. Several authors (Ardichvili et al., 2002; 
Freear et al., 1995; Harrison and Mason, 1992b; Lumme et al., 1998; Mason and Harrison, 
1996a; Stevenson and Coveney, 1994; Tashiro, 1999) show that angel investors add value 
via the numerous roles they can undertake in a venture.  
 
This discussion has contributed to an evaluation of the suitability of the suggested definition 
of business angels. However, two points should be added to the debate. First, the alternative 
finance industry has changed since the 2008 crisis forcing business angels to adapt (Mason 
and Harrison, 2015). But how does this change impacts the definition of business angels? 
Similarly, to ask, is this definition still valid? How up to date is this characterization? 
Second, the angel population is known by its lack of homogeneity (for example: 
Avdeitchikova, 2008) which can have significant repercussions on the appropriateness of 
the definition. Do all angels fit this definition? The next two subsections will address these 
two issues.  
 
1.4.2 Has the definition stood the test of time? 
 
This thesis is suggesting a definition of business angels. However, the financial markets 
are constantly evolving, especially following the financial crisis. The next two subsections 
will identify recent trends within the angel market and then evaluate the importance of 
business angels as an external source of capital. The overall purpose of these subsections is 
to evaluate if alterations in the marketplace could represent significant implications in 
terms of the way business angels are defined.  
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1.4.2.1 Trends 
 
Since Wetzel’s (1981) early studies, the angel market has changed considerably across the 
world. From a very individualistic and under the radar approach to a more collective and 
visible style, business angels have changed the way they are seen (some examples: Gregson 
et al., 2013; May, 2002; May and O'Halloran, 2003; Preston, 2011). Would Wetzel envisage 
business angels to be so popular that they would have a television show focusing on their 
investment activity, e.g. Dragon’s Den or Shark Tail? Most likely, the pioneer of angel 
research would not have expected this outcome. However, the trends in the angel market go 
beyond the rise of groups. Issues of market size and scale as well as investment practices 
(such as: yield rates, exits, sectors and so on) should also be discussed to provide a clear 
view of trends in the angel market. This discussion is important to help evaluate if business 
angels still behave in the same way. However, this is not the only reason to have this debate. 
The evolution of the angel market adds new dimensions to angel research creating new 
questions to be addressed by scholars. This subsection will focus on the first part of the 
discussion. 
 
The original angel groups were founded in the early 1990s. The first record of an angel group 
is Archangels, which was founded in 1992 in Scotland (Gregson et al., 2013). In the USA, 
California angel group (Sohl, 2012a) represents the oldest group in the country. However, 
angel groups are not the only form of collective behaviour of informal investors. Sohl (2007) 
defines six types of angel portals: (1) matching networks; (2) facilitators; (3) informal angel 
groups; (4) formal angel alliances; (5) electronic networks; and (6) collection of individual 
angels. The author highlights that the six types of angel portals are quite diverse in terms of 
process, visibility, objectives, etc. Figure 1-1 depicts the two extremes in terms of formality, 
size, goals and effectiveness.  
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Figure 1-1: Angel portals 
Low Formality High 
1 Size 3 up to 300 
Individualistic Goals Collectivistic 
Low Effectiveness High 
Individuals  
Facilitators Formal angel 
alliances - 
Angel 
groups 
Informal collections of business angels 
Matching networks 
Electronic networks 
 
This has been a global phenomenon with similar examples in Europe, Australia and so on 
(OECD, 2011). Three immediate questions that can be raised about this market development: 
(i) Why did business angels started to invest within groups? (2) What are the implications of 
this trend? (3) What is the impact on the definition? The discussion will look at angel groups 
specifically, since all the data collected in this thesis had the support of such organizations.  
 
The most significant type of portal are angel groups. Five reasons can justify the proliferation 
of angel groups across the world. Firstly, they have deeper pockets (Gregson et al., 2013). 
By investing together business angels are able to raise bigger amounts than if they were 
investing individually. Secondly, they can undertake better due-diligence (Paul et al., 2007). 
Angel groups allow members to have access to opportunities that have been reviewed by 
several investors – enhancing sector specific expertise. Thirdly, angel groups have reduced 
costs (Mason et al., 2013). By investing together, business angels are able to enjoy 
economies of scale that otherwise would not be possible. This is particularly true in terms of 
contracting. Fourthly, groups attract enhanced deal follow (Mason and Harrison, 2002a). On 
the one hand, the visibility of angel groups facilitates entrepreneurs to make their opportunity 
noticed. On the other hand, angel investors have their own network, which generates 
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investment opportunities. Being part of an angel group enables investors to share these 
opportunities across the group. Lastly, groups offer the ability to share risk through greater 
diversification (Paul et al., 2007). When investing as part of a group, business angels can 
spread their finance across different opportunities resulting in a greater portfolio 
diversification. All of these factors have largely contributed to the proliferation of angel 
groups as the most common type of angel portal.  
  
The emergence of angel groups has definitional repercussions. The first, is the appearance 
of a new player, the gatekeeper. Paul and Whittam (2010, pag 252) define the gatekeeper as: 
“The key individuals who operate at the core of angel syndicates and link the internal 
resources of the syndicate to its external environment”. 
Paul and Whittam (2010) notice that there are two types of gatekeepers: member gatekeepers 
and manager gatekeepers. Figure 1-2 depicts the typical organizational structure associated 
to these types of gatekeepers. The authors relate these two types of gatekeepers with the 
stage of development of the angel group. While the member gatekeepers are associated with 
earlier stages of the angel group, the manager gatekeepers are linked to later and more 
demanding stages of the group development.  
Figure 1-2: Types of gatekeepers (member and manager gatekeepers) 
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Typically, the decision of allowing entrepreneurs to have access to the group will come as 
an outcome of the gatekeeper’s screening (Mason et al., 2013). The group members then 
make their own evaluation (Paul and Whittam, 2010). The existence of a gatekeeper 
therefore does not seem to affect the suggested definition of a business angel. The roles 
undertaken by the gatekeeper do not change the nature of angel investing. The gatekeeper 
can be seen as an additional screening layer in the investment process. Second, typically, at 
the post-investment stage angel groups nominate one of their members to be a non-executive 
director on the board of the invested venture (Paul and Whittam, 2010). However, the 
gatekeeper can also take this role to facilitate the communication between the venture and 
members of the group. At the first glance, this seems to have implications to Mason’s 
(2007a) definition in terms of the value added activities. Although, not all investors will be 
able to contribute with value added activities, there is at least one group member that will 
provide non-monetary support. Hence, it is possible to state that market trends do not impact 
Mason’s (2007a) business angel definition which means it is still valid. 
 
However, this does not mean that the emergence of angel groups has no research 
implications. The contextual change involving the rise of angel groups might be expected to 
add a collective dimension to angel investing. On one hand, it is probable that this market 
transition will have a direct impact on the investment process, particularly in terms of 
investment decision making. On the other hand, it could be envisaged that the interactions 
between group members to have an impact on individual behaviour. Hence, it important to 
outline the possible impacts of recent market trend which can go beyond definitional 
implications.   
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Starting at the macro level, that is, at the group level, investing with others might generate a 
feeling of group identity from which can emerge common practices arising from the shared 
interests and investment motivations. This in turn can generate: (i) mutual engagement 
between members; (ii) a feeling of joint enterprise and (iii) a shared repertoire. Wenger 
(1998) defines these three sources of practice as the pillars of a community. Hence, a possible 
outcome of the rise of angels groups is the origination of communities of practice. Lave and 
Wenger (1991, p. 98) define community of practice, as: 
“A system of relationships between people, activities, and the world; developing with time, 
and in relation to other tangential and overlapping communities of practice”. 
 
Also at a macro level, it is possible that angel groups will have a considerable impact in 
terms of group thinking. Wenger (1998, page 125) noticed that one of the characteristics of 
communities of practice is the “shared discourse reflecting a certain perspective on the 
world”. This shared view can be associated with a common way of thinking. Angel groups 
will provide its members with the opportunity to work together sharing their ideas allowing 
collective thinking to occur. Ringer (2007, page 135) defines collective thinking as:  
“The meeting of minds where each person retains his/her individuality and at the same time 
contributes to a lively and diverse group-level conversation”. 
 
Mason and Botelho (2014) observed that the size of angel groups in the UK varies from 3 
members to a couple of hundred investors. Additionally, the authors highlighted that under 
this settings, personal differences can occurs within an angels group. In particular, it might 
allow for situations where strong characters can impact other investors with repercussions 
to the group dynamics.  Wenger (1998) noticed that in communities of practice, members 
can have harmonious or conflictual relationships. This can create situations where some 
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individuals will be more susceptible to be influenced by others, specifically in terms of the 
investment decision. Hence, at the micro level, that is, at the individual level, investment 
decisions might be influenced by others when investing alongside others. This has been 
defined in the finance literature as herd behaviour (Cont and Bouchaud, 2000). Gale (1996, 
page 618) defines herd behaviour as the action that occurs when:  
“Agents ‘ignore’ their own information and imitate the behaviour of other, supposedly better 
informed, agents”.  
 
Therefore, scholars need to acknowledge that the context of angel investing has changed, 
which opens the field to a new body of theory that includes the effect of others. Theory needs 
to reflect this new context by allowing external influence, beyond the entrepreneur, to impact 
the investment decision of a business angel, notably the gatekeeper or others investors. One 
of the aims of this thesis is therefore to evaluate to which these theoretical frameworks have 
become important to represent the investment decision making of business angels. With this 
is mind, the discussion can move to the how important are angel investors in the alternative 
finance context.  
 
1.4.2.2 Importance 
 
Since it first attracted their attention, scholars have sought to understand the importance of 
business angels. This has been challenging because of data limitations. Estimating the size 
of the angel market is not an easy task. However, the lack of precise data has not stopped 
scholars from seeking to evaluate how relevant business angels are to the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. Some of these attempts have looked at what is known from the visible market 
(i.e. portals) and then tried to extrapolate the size of the invisible market assuming a fixed 
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relation between both (Mason and Harrison, 2000a). However, qualitative evaluations can 
also help us to understand the importance of business angels. First is the popularization of 
the concept. In the last decade business angel activity has attracted growing interest from the 
media with the extreme example of this being television shows such as Dragon’s Den and 
Shark Tail. Second, policy makers have focused their attention on creating incentives to 
increase the number of angel investors across the world (some examples: Lerner, 1998; 
Mason and Harrison, 2002a; Morrissette, 2007; OECD, 2011). In the UK a very renowned 
example of such type of intervention is the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS)4 (Gregson 
et al., 2013; Mason and Pierrakis, 2013). Another perceptible example of government efforts 
are the public sector co-investment schemes (Harrison et al., 2010a; Mason, 2009). These 
qualitative observations are helpful to signal the importance, however, a review of 
quantitative approaches is fundamental to allow for a better evaluation of the importance of 
angel investors. 
 
Without a shadow of a doubt, business angels play a very important role in the financing of 
new ventures. There are two quantitative approaches that can be taken to evaluate this 
importance. The first compares business angels with other sources of funding, e.g. venture 
capital funds or crowdfunding platforms.  Although it is impossible to precisely define the 
values invested by business angels there is a body of literature that has sought to compare 
the importance of different investors. Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of 
business angels when compared with venture capital firms (Pierrakis and Mason, 2008; Sohl, 
2008). In the USA it is believed that almost 80% of seed and start-up investments in high 
tech firms are made by business angels (Sohl et al., 2000). Their significance is not exclusive 
to the USA. Studies in the UK have noticed a very similar relation between the angel market 
                                                          
4 Another tax-incentive is the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS), it was implemented to complement 
the existent Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS). 
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and the venture capital industry. It has been estimated that business angels annually invest 
between two to five times more than venture capital firms (Wiltbank, 2009; Don and 
Harrison, 2006). The differences can also be noticed in terms of the number of companies 
funded. A USA study stated an even higher relationship: for each venture capital backed 
opportunity there were six financed by angel investors (Fenn and Liang, 1998). In the UK, 
in 2014 venture capital firms supported 320 ventures while the visible angel market 
supported 535 ventures (EBAN, 2016). This significance can also be noticed in terms of the 
number of jobs created. For example, in the USA, in 2007 it is estimated that two hundred 
thousand new jobs were created as a result of angel investments (Sohl, 2008).  
 
The second indicator evaluates the total amounts invested by the angel market. As previously 
mentioned this does not come without limitations. However, this approach provides an 
objective measure of the financial commitment of business angels. An OECD report (2011) 
estimated the size of the angel market in four different regions (see table 1-2 for more 
details). Although these figures can be seen as out of date, they help to illustrate that in terms 
of size, the angel market is much in line with venture capital funds. The 2015 figures on the 
USA show a total market size of $24.6 billion, which represents a yearly growth of 1.9% 
(Sohl, 2015a). The most recent statistics compendium from EBAN estimated that the total 
size of the angel market in Europe to be €6,1 billion (EBAN, 2016). The same report 
highlighted that the total size of the European early stage investment was €8,6 billion. This 
indicates that in Europe, business angels are responsible for 71% of the total early stage 
finance, with the UK being the leading country in terms of amount invested (€960 million). 
Although these values should be questioned, there are no other reliable alternatives to these 
estimations. Hence, it is clear that no matter what is the relative position business angels play 
in terms of the funding escalator, they are a very important source of external capital for new 
ventures. 
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Table 1-2: Total size of the angel and venture capital market. 
USD millions 
  Estimated size of the 
total angel market 
Total venture capital 
market in 2009 
United States 17,700 18,275 
Europe 5,557 5,309 
United Kingdom 624 1087 
Canada 388 393 
Source: OECD (2011). 
 
1.4.3 Are business angels homogenous?  
 
Angel research has a number of well acknowledged limitations. However, one of the least 
explored is the heterogeneous nature of the angel population (Mason and Harrison, 2002a). 
This lack of homogeneity is reflected in a set of dimensions where angel investors differ, 
e.g. levels of familiarity with techniques of investing to the entrepreneurial experience or 
even the motivation to invest. One solution for this last limitation is to apply a cluster 
analysis, also known as market segmentation. This technique is largely used in the field of 
marketing and consists of creating homogeneous subsets of a bigger heterogeneous set. Peter 
and Olson (1987) used this method to divide similar consumers in a particular market. This 
practice is particularly robust and can be used with a wide range of units of analysis/criteria, 
i.e. demographic, age, gender, volume and so on.  
 
From Gaston’s (1989) early study onwards, a series of articles have categorized business 
angels using different units of analysis (investor, investments) and distinctive clustering 
rules (investment experience, investment motivations, contributions to the project, time 
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spent with the opportunity and so on) (some examples: Avdeitchikova, 2008; Lahti, 2011; 
Sullivan and Miller, 1996). This will be further developed in the fifth chapter of this thesis 
with a discussion of this body of literature. But at this point it is imperative to highlight the 
heterogeneity of business angels and consider the definitional implications of such 
characteristic. Scholars have put their best efforts to understanding the relevance of this 
problem and to reach to an analysis that satisfactorily explains the differences in the angel 
population. However, as scholars change the units of analysis, new classifications appear, 
adding novel questions. Hence, it is urgent to have a robust answer that could unify all of 
these previous works and bring a more suitable answer to this problem.  
 
Previous categorization studies reinforce two key ideas. The first is that scholars cannot 
assume that business angels can be seen as a whole one population without any discrepancies 
between them. The second is that a business angel definition needs to be broad enough to 
incorporate all of these subsets of the angel population. Hence, the suggested definition can 
be considered as comprehensive since it does not try to explain the variations across the 
angel population.  
 
This last subsection provides an answer to the second question, evaluating how 
comprehensive the definition suggested in this thesis is. With this, the debate on the 
definition of a business angels is closed, which allows the thesis to move to debate what is 
known about business angels and then how they make their investment decisions. These two 
sections should enable the reader to understand the evolution of this area of research as well 
as understand the position of this thesis within two bodies of literature: (i) investment 
decision; (ii) categorization studies.  
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1.4.4 What do we know about Business Angels? 
 
The next two sections will review the literature on: (i) first and second generation of business 
angel research; (ii) investment decision making process. The aim of these two sections is to 
provide a very general overview of what is known about business angels and how they make 
investment decisions. These short reviews of the literature will take a chronological 
perspective to illustrate how angel research has developed and to help to position the thesis 
in terms of the gaps identified in the literature.  
 
1.4.4.1 First and second generation studies 
 
To understand business angel research we have to go back to the early 1980s, to the first 
ABC-study (attitudes, behaviours, characteristics) conducted by Wetzel (1983) in New 
England. This work offered the first insights about business angels. Subsequent research has 
sought to broaden the perspective, conducting efforts internationally; studies were taken in: 
UK (Mason et al., 1991), Canada (Riding and Short, 1988), Sweden (Landström, 1993), 
Germany (Brettel, 2003; Stedler and Peters, 2003), among others. These studies were 
classified as first generation studies. Their focus was on the demographic aspects of business 
angels (Mason and Harrison, 2000b). This could instead be defined as the ‘profiles of private 
investors’. The focus of these studies was to determine the characteristics of business angels 
and to identify their activities and roles.  
 
The great majority of business angels are male. Although the proportion changes among 
studies (some present less than 95% of men whilst others reaching 95% of the business 
angels being men (Gaston, 1989) there is a common view that women represent just a small 
part of the business angel population. The lack of women with experience in senior business 
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positions and lack of entrepreneurial expertise can justify this point. In terms of age, the 
representative business angel is middle aged in the 45-60 years age group. Gaston (1989, p. 
17) states that the median value is 47 years old. He defends that “angels are generally about 
20 years older than the entrepreneurs they finance.” This is justifiable because business 
angels need to accumulate resources, financial and non-financial, which takes time. 
Although the length of time required to generate this stock of resources is not constant among 
business angels, it is clear that it is a ‘necessary evil’. This length is not constant and it can 
depend on external factors, e.g., country where business angels are based (Landström, 1993).  
 
Gaston (1989) emphasizes the fact that 83% of the business angels had entrepreneurial 
experience. Bygrave (2009, p. 172) also supports this idea “Most of them are wealthy 
entrepreneurs; some are still running their businesses, while others are retired.” This 
entrepreneurial experience is what makes angel investors almost a unique tool for 
entrepreneurs. Freear et al. (1992) reinforce this idea stating that the expertise gathered by 
them in previous ventures as entrepreneurs makes them aware of how to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of an investment and how to add value to these investments. Most of the 
time, personal friends and business acquaintances are the first source to point to potential 
investment opportunities (Gaston, 1989; Riding and Short, 1988). Business angels think that 
they are the most reliable information source and as a result they are also the most frequently 
used reference. 
  
These studies were very important because they called attention to these risk taking agents 
(business angels) and enabled scholars to establish the fundamental foundations for what 
would come next. Hence, this first generation of angel research can be understood as 
fundamental – without it scholars would be still clueless about this type of investor. Second 
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generation studies could rely on the previous work and aim to clarify the missing pieces. 
Now scholars could put their efforts on going beyond understanding business angels, with 
more rigorous research designs that sought to improve the quality of the data collected using 
more robust methodologies that would enable more valid and reliable results.   
  
Second generation studies of business angels shifted the attention in the direction of how the 
informal venture capital market operates. This new collection of studies looked deeper into 
the investment process and the topics under discussion became broader. After the first 
generation of research it was time to move onwards and understand their process in detail. 
 
Mason and Harrison (2000a) suggest that these studies can be separated into three distinctive 
groups. The first collection of papers reports on a new series of topics trying to identify the 
practical processes of the informal venture capital market. The second group concentrated 
on policy issues, that is, how governments could help the informal venture market to grow. 
The last set of papers introduced a new theoretical perception to the field. The first group of 
papers looked into business angels’ investment process. It is possible to segment these 
studies by the following areas: personal portfolio allocation (Mason and Harrison, 2000a), 
the investment decision making process (Clark, 2008; Feeney et al., 1999; Haines et al., 
2003; Landström, 1998; Mason and Harrison, 1996a, 2003; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; 
Mason and Stark, 2004; Paul et al., 2007; Riding et al., 1993; Sullivan, 1994; Van 
Osnabrugge, 2000), negotiation and contracting (Kelly and Hay, 2003; Mason and Harrison, 
1996b), post investment relationships (Avdeitchikova, 2008; Ehrlich et al., 1994; Freear et 
al., 1995; Harrison and Mason, 1992b; Kelly and Hay, 2003; Landström, 1992; Madill et al., 
2005; Mason and Harrison, 1996b), returns (Lumme et al., 1996, 1998; Mason and Harrison, 
2002b, 2004) and a more general area (Freear et al., 1995; Mason and Harrison, 1996b, 
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2002a). The emphasis of these papers was to understand the what, the why and the how 
business angels made their investment decisions. One point from these works should be 
highlighted. For example, in the initial stage of the investment decision making process, 
scholars identified a high rate of rejection of investment proposals being considered. The 
reasons for these can range from the inability of the entrepreneur to sell him/her and their 
project. Clearly, from all of the five stages (Haines et al., 2003; Riding et al., 1993) of the 
investment process the initial stage was the one that got the most attention from scholars.  
 
In the second group of papers, policy issues, some areas can be underlined, e.g., incentive 
policy options (Lumme et al., 1998; Mason and Harrison, 1995; Wetzel, 1987; Wetzel and 
Freear, 1996), business angels networks (Blatt and Riding, 1996; Harrison and Mason, 
1996a, 1996b). Kelly (2007) noticed that policy literature helped governments to understand 
that they should use tax reliefs as a tool to incentivize angel investments. The author noted 
that this was particularly the UK case with the work of Harrison and Mason. These articles 
depict a positive outcome to business angels from networking that would improve 
substantially the informal venture capital market. Another very interesting result is that 
although governments encourage business angel’s investments it seems that it has low effect 
since the problem is on the demand-side with a majority of low quality opportunities.  
 
The last group of papers brought a theoretical approach that was not common in this research 
area. Until this innovative cohort of articles just a few scholars had presented theoretic 
support to their research. All of these papers tried to explain the relation between the 
entrepreneur and the business angel. It is important to notice that some authors explored this 
relationship from different theoretical viewpoints, e.g., conceptual decision making process, 
agency theory, social capital and signalling theory. The first theoretical viewpoint was 
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discussed by Landström (1995) that defined a set of hypotheses applying elements of 
decision theory to explain the decision making process. Feeney et al.’s (1999) work follows 
the same theoretical viewpoint but looking in detail at the acceptance and rejection criteria 
used by business angels.  
 
The main approach has been the application of agency theory to explain the relation between 
the angel investor and the entrepreneur. For this it is important to bear in mind that contracts 
are incomplete and are structured in a world with asymmetric information. This economic 
theory focuses on the relationship between a principal (angel investor) and the agent (the 
entrepreneur) and how they both will act rationally, each trying to maximize their own utility 
function. The principal will have to align incentives to ensure that the agent will act in the 
principals` best interest and for this he/she will incur agency costs.  
 
Landström (1992, 1993) tested this theoretical approach with firms that had received angel 
investment. Constructing a set of hypothesis the author reaches the conclusion that agency 
theory is not the best approach to explain this association. He defends this result with the 
lack of capacity that this approach has to explain trust based relations and proximity between 
agents. Fiet (1995a, 1995b) analysed both agency risk and market risk, comparing venture 
capitalists and business angels. The author concludes that venture capitalists and business 
angels rank these risks in different ways. Venture capitalists are more concerned about 
market risk whilst angel investors rely on the entrepreneur to minimize this risk. 
Consequently, business angels will be more concerned with agency risk since they depend 
on the entrepreneur for the success of the venture. This result can be explained by the 
different levels of control that each type of investor requires. Fiet (1995a) noticed that 
venture capital funds have gained the experience in designing contractual obligations that 
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can protect them from agency risks while angels cannot. Van Osnabrugge (2000) calls 
attention to the fact that contracts are incomplete implying a higher involvement from the 
business angel. This level of involvement will help align the agent interests to those of the 
principal. Kelly and Hay (2003) surveyed 106 UK-based business angels with completed 
deals and conclude that agency theory is relevant. The authors emphasize the positive 
relation between the amounts of resources invested and how concerned will be the investor. 
The authors also support Landström (1992) evidence that interpersonal ties and trust can 
offset the economic reasons.  
 
The next set of articles present social capital as the theoretical framework. This framework 
has clear links with this research area. Both entrepreneurs and business angels have to create 
and maintain their network. This will make them better professionals enabling them to 
develop their venture and investments correspondingly the best way possible. Kelly and Hay 
(2000) discuss the nature of the search process for an investor and how they rely on their 
network to find the best investments. This paper emphasizes how important is the network 
for an investor eager for a good deal.  
 
Politis and Landström (2002) look at the business angel’s career. The first stage of this career 
would be as an entrepreneur. This stage would allow the future potential business angel to 
start developing the necessary expertise and network needed in the future. Sørheim (2003) 
disaggregates social capital into its structural, relational and cognitive dimensions. This 
paper analyses the pre-investment behaviour of experienced business angels in Norway. The 
author concludes that the business angel’s track record will define the ways he/she operates 
in the market. This is clear when looking geographically. Typically a business angel will 
invest in a region where they have acquired most of their experience. Based on the interviews 
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done with five angel investors Sørheim suggests that business angels think it is fundamental 
to create a ‘common ground’ with the entrepreneur. This ‘common ground’ is fundamental 
to create trust that consequently will help to build long term relation.  
 
Sætre (2003) underlines the importance of previous experience and network that the business 
angel has to the investee venture. This research looks from the entrepreneur perspective and 
suggests the use of the term ‘relevant’ capital. This concept defines the 'added value' capital 
that a business angel can deliver to the venture that received his/her investment. Carter et al. 
(2003) use this theoretical structure to explain the likelihood of raising equity. This study 
highlights the importance of a social network for a female entrepreneur.  
  
An alternative theoretical approach was offered by Prasad et al. (2000). This paper explores 
the idea that both the entrepreneur and the business angel will provide signals. These signals 
will provide the counterparty with information. This information could be about the 
entrepreneur or about the project. The authors discuss the signal that the entrepreneur can 
provide to the business angel given the proportion of his wealth invested in the venture. This 
signal will inform the business angel about the commitment of the entrepreneur and the 
quality of the project. 
 
The claims for the use of strong theoretical frameworks made by scholars assume that the 
first two generations of angel research were able to depict a clear picture of the investors and 
of the investment procedures. However, this is a very simplistic view since it ignores the 
market dynamics and the transformations that can occur in the marketplace. Moreover, the 
early studies always looked at the investor in a static way not allowing for any alteration in 
partners and behaviours. Hence, it is important to acknowledge that although some areas of 
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angel research are fully developed and have less propensity to generate new knowledge, 
there are others that are more likely to change with the market dynamics, notably the 
investment decision making process. The next subsection will review this body of literature.  
 
 
1.4.4.2 Initial thoughts on investment decision making of business angels 
 
There is a substantial body of literature that has tried to understand the decision-making 
process and the criteria used by angels. It is fundamental to comprehend the process and the 
reasons ‘why’ angel investors decide to support a particular venture. The decision whether 
to invest or not is based on a specific set of investment criteria. Angel investors invest their 
own money on their own behalf facing the full consequence of these decisions. A key focus 
for research has been to understand the criteria used by angel investors. Studies with this 
particular focus can be organized into three groups: process studies, criteria studies and 
comparative studies with other types of investors.  
  
Several models have described the investment process both for business angels (Haines et 
al., 2003; Riding et al., 1993) and for venture capital funds (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Tyebjee 
and Bruno, 1984) as being a five or six stage process model. Although the models are 
relatively similar, Van Osnabrugge (2000) highlights that the investment models of these 
two types of investors should not be seen as equal. The second chapter will review this 
literature in detail highlighting the differences. Applying agency theory the author shows the 
differences between them. Supported by these differences the author concludes that the 
decision-making process and the criteria are most likely to be different. These decision 
making models defend that both types of investors make their decisions through several 
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stages of the process. This brings into question the possibility of the decision-making process 
changing during the process.   
 
 The first stage of the investment process is Deal Origination where the business angel 
becomes aware of the investment opportunity. According to the model suggested by Riding 
et al. (2007), business angels make a quick assessment of the opportunity, what is seen as an 
initial screening. The typical outcome of these initial stages is not positive for the 
entrepreneur. Riding et al. (1993) show that the average rate of rejection in this first stage is 
of 70%. One of the reasons for high rejection rate is how the angel got to know this 
investment opportunity. There are several ways business angels can reach out to these 
business proposals. Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) present ten possible ways for 
entrepreneurs to find business angels. As mentioned before, business angels trust some 
sources of information more than others (Gaston, 1989; Riding and Short, 1988). Therefore, 
business angels will be more receptive to proposals from some sources. Riding et al. (1997) 
show that proposals referred by ‘better’ sources of information have lower rejection rates. 
Rejection seems to be the most common outcome in this process Riding et al. (1993) 
documented that Canadian private investors had high rejection rates, with approximately 
90% of the projects rejected by business angels when analysing the first two stages of the 
investment process. These two initial stages are the ones that were deeply researched and 
are the ones with the highest rejections rates. 
 
Angels are very sceptical when they start assessing a business proposal. The first 
consideration is to test how much the proposal suits their investment criteria. Mason and 
Rogers (1997) stress some of the possible factors that will be taken into account by business 
angels, i.e., location, nature of the business, amount needed and so on. The authors also 
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emphasize that business angels will want to know if they know the industry, market or 
technology and if they can add value to the project. Hence, business proposals will have to 
satisfy a set of conditions. Mason and Rogers (1996, 1997) define this approach as ‘three 
strikes and you are out’. This is a clear sign that angel investors are looking for reasons to 
reject the business proposition instead of looking for its strengths. Moreover, the authors 
identify that business angels evaluate business proposals with a ‘negative mind set’. This 
was corroborated by Mason and Harrison (1994) researching an investor syndicate which 
rejected the majority of investment proposals; only two were not rejected after the syndicate 
conducted its own evaluation.  All of these studies support the conclusion that usually 
investment proposals are rejected at an early stage due to a cumulative number of 
deficiencies. 
 
By this point it becomes clear that business angels have a very negative approach in the first 
stages of the investment decision process. But, do they use the same criteria to reject and to 
accept? And is there any variability of criteria as the investment process develops? The first 
question is answered by Mason and Harrison (1996a, 1996b) research. Their researhc 
provide some evidence that the criteria are not the same. On the one hand, in their 1996b 
work, they reached to the conclusion that business angels looked in detail at the 
characteristics of the entrepreneur and the market-product aspects of the business to finance 
a project. On the other hand, in their 1996a article they noted that ‘the most common deal 
rejection factors are associated with entrepreneur/management team, marketing and 
finance5, hence it seems that the rejection factors are broader than the acceptance factors. 
Feeney et al. (1999) explored this discussion in more depth. First, they confirmed that the 
overall business opportunity and the principals of the company are the key investment 
                                                          
5 Riding et al. (1997) also mentioned that if Business angels notice any shortcoming in Management Team of 
the business opportunity provoked the majority of refusals 
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criteria. Second, the authors found that what stimulates business angels to reject business 
proposals is not the converse of what stimulates them to invest. 
 
Mason and Harrison (1996a) work also answers the second question. The authors confirm 
that the decision criteria changes through the different stages of the decision process. At the 
initial review stage the criteria tended to be on the basis of the accumulation of a number of 
deficiencies rather than just for a single reason. Business angels would reject an opportunity 
after further research when they found out a single deficiency, what the authors called a 
‘single deal killer’. Riding et al. (1997) also support this finding. They go deeper in the 
analysis concluding that business angels use criteria that gives different weights across 
stages. Also, the importance of the entrepreneur and of the financial return increases as the 
process unwinds6. A large number of articles answer the second question. For example, 
Harrison and Mason (2002), Fiet (1995a) and Van Osnabrugge (2000) show that angel 
investors accentuate the entrepreneur/management team characteristics more than the 
product or service itself. Some authors also call attention to the importance of trust in the 
decision process; Manigart et al. (2002) and Kelly and Hay (2003) show that trust needs to 
be built up during the process.  
 
Some scholars also compared the investment decision process among several types of 
investors. One of the most cited papers is the one conducted by Mason and Stark (2004). 
The authors match the decision making process of bankers, venture capitalists and business 
angels. The authors conclude that business angels are the ones that give more importance to 
‘investor fit’ and to the entrepreneur. Bankers are more worried about the financial issues. 
                                                          
6 Maxwell et al., (2011) present some evidence that contradicts this finding; they show that Business 
Angels use Elimination-by-aspects (EBA) to trim the set of business opportunities looking for investment. 
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Venture capitalists could be considered somehow in the middle of both, since they are 
concerned with financial issues but also with the entrepreneur and ‘investor fit’. Clark (2008) 
reinforces that the entrepreneur is one of the most important factors assessed by business 
angels. This paper discusses the relevance of a good oral pitch presentation to enable external 
finance. Therefore, the entrepreneur needs to be aware of how important are his 
presentational capabilities.  
 
The heterogeneity of business angel represents a considerable challenge to researchers, since 
it will be difficult to generalize a rule. Decision criteria studies have shown that the reasons 
to invest vary between different angels. For example, Van Osnabrugge (1998a) used investor 
experience as a control variable and concludes that serial angels are ‘less concerned  with  
agency  risk  and  more  concerned  with  market  risks’  than  less- experienced angels. The 
heterogeneity of the angel population has not been fully factored into the research on 
investment decision-making. A recent study asked for further debate on how the 
heterogeneity of the business angel population shapes the investment criteria (Hsu et al., 
2014). 
 
This very brief introduction of the investment decision making process of business angels 
has highlighted five important points: (1) there is a set of investment criteria; (2) high 
rejection rates; (3) the reasons to reject are not the same as the reasons to invest; (4) business 
angels change the investment criteria as the process unfolds; (5) homogeneity and decision 
making have not been fully explored. This last point is the key theme of this thesis, that is, 
how does business angel’s diversity have an impact on the decision making criteria? So, do 
different types of business angel have different approaches to decision-making? The 
underling hypothesis of this research, is that angel investors should be segmented into 
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different cohorts given their rules of choice. Moreover, segmenting angels by their decision-
making will enable the creation of theory for the different groups, allowing for a broader 
understanding of why projects typically get different results from different angels.  
1.5 Overall purpose and overview of the chapters 
 
This research aims to connect two bodies of business angel literature. On the one hand, 
scholars have emphasized the importance for the academic and practitioner communities to 
understand how business angels make their investment decisions. However, this body of 
literature has largely ignored the variations within the angel population. On the other hand, 
the categorization studies have tried to group the different “types” of angel investors without 
taking into account that their investment behaviour might also be different. Hence, this thesis 
aims to evaluate what is the impact of business angel diversity on the investment decision 
making criteria used by investors. 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature review 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on the investment decision process of 
business angels, in particular the studies on their investment criteria. Whilst the bulk of the 
chapter covers the investment criteria, the first subsection reviews the studies on the 
investment process. The synopsis of the investment process literature presents the initial 
models that were focused on the venture capital architype to the later style of decision 
followed by angel groups. This helps to situate the key moments of the investment decision 
and to position the research on the screening (evaluation) stage. The following section 
moved to the investment motivations with the aim of highlighting the variations within the 
angel population. This makes the point that investment motivations are associated with the 
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use of different criteria by angel investors. This is followed with a review of the investment 
criteria studies.  
 
The investment criteria literature is divided chronologically into two blocks. A first set of 
studies that contributed to an initial understanding of the investment criteria used by angel 
investors. Typically, these studies provided a general description of the investing criteria. A 
second group of studies delivered more robust methodological and theoretical contributions. 
Thenceforth, the discussion moves to the rejection criteria and how the investment criteria 
changes has the investment process progresses. All of these reviews enable questions to be 
raised regarding how the homogeneity of the angel population impacts the variability of the 
criteria used by business angels. At the first glance, it is clear that the studies reviewed 
provide different results. Two possible justifications are advanced that could justify this 
outcome: (i) the effect of the heterogeneity of the angel population which would be reflected 
by the use of different samples or (ii) the result of the use of different methodologies and 
data.  This is further discussed in the fourth chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 – Research in business angels: the research challenges 
In order to conduct robust research it is necessary to understand the object of study. This 
third chapter reviews the five main challenges that business angel scholars face (definition, 
invisibility, heterogeneity, sampling and response rates). After a detailed description of these 
challenges the chapter presents a discussion on how the evolution of the angel market has 
impacted these issues. Two of these problems are further debated: sampling and response 
rates. In terms of sampling the chapter offers a critical review of the recruitment sources 
used by scholars. Top academic publications are reviewed and it is observed that recruitment 
through angel groups has become the key source of data. The repercussions of such a practice 
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are debated. Lastly, the chapter suggests an alternative way to calculate response rates in the 
context of data collected via angel groups.  
 
Chapter 4 – Methodologies for examining the investment criteria of business angels: a 
comparative approach  
The literature review raised issues of inconsistent results across different studies. However, 
these studies have used several methodologies to evaluate the investment criteria used by 
business angels. It is possible that differences between studies are methodologically 
dependent. This chapter addressed this issue by using four methods (Open-ended questions, 
Verbal Protocol Analysis, Ordinal Measurement Method and Conjoint Analysis – pairwise 
comparisons) with the same sample of fifty one angel investors (21 gatekeepers and 30 
individual angels). The results indicate that the choice of the methodology used does have 
an impact on the relative importance of the investment criteria. However, it is not possible 
to evaluate how much of this effect is due to cognitive limitations of the participants. Hence, 
the chapter suggests that the object of study should be the investment decision rather than 
the investor. This would reduce the impact of cognitive limitations of participants in the 
results and point to the heterogeneity of the angel population as a possible justification. 
 
Chapter 5 – How similar are investment decisions made by Business Angels? 
The fifth chapter evaluates whether the investment decisions made by business angels can 
be grouped by the criteria weights. In the best tradition of categorization studies, this 
research offers a typology of business angel investment decisions. This categorization 
suggests three types of investment decisions based on the weights given to a list of seven 
criterion. The results indicate a strong relationship with investment experience. Additionally, 
the findings denote that business angels are influenced by others (gatekeepers and other 
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investors) while investing. These results indicate the existence of herd behaviour. The 
chapter also suggests the use of communities of practice to explain these close connections 
with other investors and with the gatekeeper. 
 
Chapter 6 – Do business angels always use the same criteria?  
 
Building on the typology suggested in previous research, this chapter appraises if business 
angels change their investment criteria and what drives this change. As noticed during the 
literature review, the vast majority of previous studies assume a very static approach of angel 
investing. Using up to three investment decisions by the same investor this chapter is able to 
bring light on how the same investor changes his/her investment criteria. The findings 
suggest that: (i) business angels do change the relative importance of the investment criteria 
(46%); (ii) three areas are responsible for this variation (investment specific area, angel 
specific area and group specific area).  
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
This chapter offers an overview of the key findings of this thesis. It reviews the 
methodological, empirical and theoretical contributions of this research and suggests 
practical implications for policy, entrepreneurs, angel groups/networks, entrepreneurial 
teaching and further research. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Generalizations in angel research are difficult to achieve due to the lack of homogeneity of 
the business angel population. This becomes the first key driver of this research – business 
angel diversity. This chapter offers a brief review of the business angel research, highlighting 
53 
 
two key bodies of the literature: (i) first and second generation of studies; (ii) investment 
decision making literature. These two reviews of the literature help to set up the discussion 
in terms of what is the objective of study of this thesis and what is known. The review of the 
decision making literature enables the identification of a second driver of this research – 
variations in investment decision making criteria across the angel population. Hence, this 
thesis has two key drivers. The first is that the business angel population is not homogenous. 
The second is that there are variations in the investment decision making criteria used by 
business angels. These two drivers help to position this thesis in the gap between the two 
bodies of angel literature. As it was already mentioned, this has not been previously explored 
by the existing literature and it is expected that the findings of this thesis can contribute to 
enhance the academic and practitioner knowledge on business angels.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Business angel investment decisions have attracted substantial interest from scholars with 
the research outcomes being extremely useful for several stakeholders. The first group of 
stakeholders who have benefited from the research findings are entrepreneurs. Research has 
enabled entrepreneurs looking for angel investment to understand what appropriate 
information is required by investors. Additionally, the reasons to invest and to reject an 
investment opportunity have become clear to entrepreneurs. It also informs them how a pitch 
should be conducted. The second group of stakeholders who have benefited from the 
knowledge produced by scholars are business angel group managers (gatekeepers). Research 
has helped the angel community to better understand what makes business angels different 
from other types of sources of capital (crowd funding, venture capitalists, etc.). This added 
understanding has been helpful for the rise of business angel groups/networks which has 
attracted a new breed of investors. The significance of business angels for the development 
of entrepreneurial ecosystems has been recognized by the academic community (Neck et al., 
2004; Prevezer, 2001). The last group of stakeholders that have benefited from the findings 
of angel research are policy-makers, who have acknowledged this importance and have 
created policies to incentivize angel investments. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the literature on the investment process, decision and 
criteria of business angels. The initial debate focused on the investment process, with a brief 
presentation of the models derived from venture capitalists (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). Then 
investment models specific to business angels (for example: Amatucci and Sohl, 2004; 
Haines et al., 2003; Paul et al., 2007) were presented. Business angels’ investment 
motivations literature will also be revisited, with the intention of drawing links with the next 
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level of analysis – the investment criteria. The reasons to accept and to reject will be critically 
reviewed. Lastly, the major theoretical frameworks used in this topic will be identified and 
discussed.  
2.2 Investment process 
 
Several studies have acknowledged, the heterogeneity of business angels (Avdeitchikova, 
2008; Lahti, 2011). However, this characteristic has had limited impact in terms of modelling 
the investment process of business angels. This is largely because, with just a few minor 
variations, the great majority of angel investors follow very similar steps when investing. 
Scholars were able to create linear models to express the different stages that an investment 
opportunity goes through when angel investors are involved. The multistage nature of the 
models developed facilitated the understanding of stage specificities and the actions 
associated with each step. These models were used as reference in different studies, in 
particular for investment criteria research.  
 
The initial models of venture capital investment decision making were used as proxy in angel 
research. Several scholars have tried to model the investment decision making process of 
venture capitalists (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Hall, 1989; Silver, 1985; Tyebjee and Bruno, 
1984; Wells, 1974). However, not all of these models had clear relevance for angel 
investment decisions. From the models cited above the one suggested by Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984) is closest to matching the investment process of business angels. This model has the 
fewest number of stages, five in total, from those previously cited: deal origination, 
screening, evaluation, deal structuring and post-investment activities. Similar characteristics, 
in terms of the number of stages and linearity of the process, can be found in the initial 
business angels’ investment process model suggested by Dal Cin et al. (1993) and further 
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developed by Duxbury et al. (1997). Relying on almost 300 in-depth interviews of Canadian 
angel investors the two research teams developed a five stage model: deal origination and 
first impressions, review of business plan, screening and due diligence, negotiation and 
lastly, consummation and deal structure. However, the model did not acknowledge any 
activity after the deal is finalized. Typically, to keep investing angel investors need to recycle 
their money (Mason and Harrison, 2006) by achieving a successful exit. Usually, angel 
investors are associated with this liquidity event through a set of post-investment actions that 
enhance the likelihood of an exit occurring (Mason et al., 2015). These post-investment 
activities were not represented in this model. This can be considered as the principal 
limitation of the model.  
 
Subsequent studies presented some variations in terms of the number of stages and on the 
perspective of the process. All the models fully represented the investment process from deal 
origination to exit. However, the major difference between models is the level of detail 
provided at each stage. Table 2-1 provides a summary of the different explicit models 
suggested by the research teams. Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) presented an eight 
stage model. According to the authors, this model could represent the investment process of 
both business angels and venture capitalists. To some extent, this can be questionable given 
the differences between these two types of investors (Mason and Stark, 2004; Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). However, the model has clear contributions. First, when 
compared with the Dal Cin et al (1993) and Duxbury et al. (1997) models it covers a wider 
length of the investment process, from pre-investment to exit. Second, it highlights the 
importance of pre-investment factors, such as, motivations to invest and the criteria used by 
investors. This is the lengthiest of all explicit models. To some point, it can be seen as an 
advantage by providing a deeper level of detail when compared with other explicit models. 
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However, the pre-investment stages (investment motivations, investment criteria and finding 
deals) could have been grouped under a single stage as in the Haines et al. (2003) model.  
 
The model suggested by Haines et al. (2003) echoed both the Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) and 
Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) models. First, it expanded the five step model of 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) by replacing the evaluation and structuring stages by due 
diligence, negotiation and decision making steps. Additionally, the model by Haines et al. 
(2003) introduced the exit stage. These suggestions represent additional fit in terms of the 
investment process of business angels. The authors also suggested two considerable 
modifications to the Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) model. As it was previously 
mentioned, the first three stages in the Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) model were 
compressed into one single stage (deal origination) in Haines et al. (2003) proposal, while 
the negotiations and actual investment stage in Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) was 
expended into two steps (negotiation and decision making). Additionally, Haines et al. 
(2003) defined a broader set of actions for the post-investment stage. Whereas Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) restricts this stage to a monitoring exercise, Haines et al. 
(2003) include all the typical activities (also known as value added activities (Politis, 2008)) 
at this point of the process. The length of stages in this model can be seen as one of its 
advantages since it enables a separation of the different actions across the investment 
process. However, subsequent models have suggested a reduction of the number of stages 
of the investment process.  
 
The same research team went on to present a variation of the 2003 model. This comprised a 
five stage linear model from deal sourcing to exit (Riding et al., 2007). Compared with their 
previous suggestion, this model compacted the first two stages under one single step: deal 
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sourcing and initial screening. Additionally, the same procedure was done for the negotiation 
and decision making stages, which was compressed into a single stage. There is a clear trade-
off between the number of stages in a model and the level of detail provided. To some extent 
the authors’ idea of synthesizing the initial version of the model was useful. Fewer stages 
make it easier to describe, particularly when there is a sequence of actions. However, 
compressing stages reduces the level of detail at each step which can be seen as a limitation.  
 
The further model was offered by Paul et al. (2007). These authors advocated a linear model 
with five stages: familiarization, screening, bargaining, managing and harvesting. The 
novelty of this model is to present an interactive assessment in the first three stages of the 
investment process. This enables the model to move forward and backward without 
restrictions. This feature recognizes that new or unexpected information may influence the 
angel investor to review the investment opportunity. The authors also recognised specific 
activities for each of the first three stages. For example, the familiarization stage has two 
activities: learning about the opportunity and meeting the entrepreneur. This can be seen as 
a good solution to reducing the number of stages without losing information about the 
process. Another interesting feature of this model is the reference to investment motivations. 
Similar to the Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) model, the authors include the 
investment objectives as an important component of the process. But contrary to the Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) model, the authors did not include it as a stage but has a 
factor that could impact the behaviour of the angel investor. The main criticism that can be 
made of the model is the lack of activities included in the last two steps of the model, 
particularly, regarding managing the investment. The authors could have linked this to the 
value-added literature (some examples: Bjørgum and Sørheim, 2015; Collewaert and 
Manigart, 2016; Fili and Grünberg, 2016; Politis, 2008). 
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The last model in this review was suggested by Amatucci and Sohl (2004). The originality 
of this model is that it represents entrepreneurs’ perspective. Another particularity of this 
model is that it is the shortest of all linear models suggested in the literature, with only three 
stages: search, negotiation/contract agreement and post-investment relationship, future 
rounds, exit. The main aim of this model was to study the relationship between women 
entrepreneurs and angels investors and not to find the ideal model to represent the investment 
decision process of business angels. The major limitation of the model is the scope used by 
the authors to define the stages. By reducing the investment process to just three stages the 
authors made each stage very broad which can create misrepresentation problems. For 
example, the initial stage, pre-investment stage includes all the activities that enable the 
entrepreneur to reach to the point where they can negotiate with the angel investor. However, 
this implies that they need to make the investor aware of the opportunity and the investment 
proposal needs to be robust to survive the initial screen. These two activities are completely 
different. While the first is an issue of reducing searching cost, the second is a problem of 
satisfying the investment criteria of the angel investor. Nevertheless, the different 
positioning of this model – entrepreneurs looking for angel funding – can be seen as a very 
positive attribute. However, for this research this model is not ideal given that the core focus 
of this thesis is the investor or the investment decision. 
 
The aim of this research is to study the decision making criteria used by angel investors. 
Hence, the choice of the model to use as a reference needs to reflect the aims of the study. 
The model suggested by Haines et al. (2003) is the one that best fits this research since it 
provides a clear initial screening stage. As mentioned previously, the length of this seven 
stage linear model allows to perfectly identify the specificities of the investment process of 
business angels. Although, this was the selected model, it is important to acknowledge the 
differences in the investment process of individual investors and members of angel groups 
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which is not reflected in this model. However, the purpose of this thesis is to study the 
investment criteria rather than the process.  Figure 2-1 depicts the linear model suggested by 
Haines et al. (2003). 
Figure 2-1: Investment process (Haines et al., 2003) 
 
The first stage, the deal origination, is associated with investment motivations, investment 
criteria and finding deals. This stage is the starting point of the process and can be divided 
into two points: reasoning to be an angel investor and becoming aware of the specific 
opportunity. This stage can be understood as the set of justifications to be making angel 
investments associated with opportunity search mechanisms. Typically, this stage is 
different for members of angel groups since the group manager (gatekeeper) provides the 
syndicated investors with new investment opportunities (Paul and Whittam, 2010). 
Carpentier and Suret (2015, p. 813) acknowledge that “the initial steps of the decision 
process are delegated to a gatekeeper”. Hence, the searching costs and the motivations to 
invest might be slightly different from that of solo angels.  
 
The second stage of the model is the initial screening. At this stage, the angel investors have 
an initial occasion to review the investment opportunity. This stage is associated with high 
rejection rates (Dal Cin et al., 1993). Typically, this is a very quick review, where the 
investor reads through a brief business plan to assess if the opportunity fits the investment 
criteria. This is the fundamental stage for this thesis since it is the first stage where the 
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investment criteria are used by the angel investment to evaluate an opportunity. In terms of 
the investment process of members of angel groups this initial screening stage could be 
divided in two. The first screening is often conducted by the gatekeeper (Carpentier and 
Suret, 2015) and the second by the individual investor. In the great majority of cases the 
gatekeeper has the power to decide what will be subject to the group’s scrutiny. Typically, 
syndicated members would receive the investment opportunity by email so they could 
review it before the group meeting. 
 
The following stage is the due diligence stage. According to the Haines et al. (2003) model 
this is the moment in the investment process where the business angel reviews the financial 
information contained in the business plans, meets with the entrepreneur and confirms that 
the material in the investment proposal is correct. The length of this stage can vary 
considerably depending on trust relationship between the entrepreneur and the angel 
investor. Haines et al. (2003) report that the way business angels conduct the due diligence 
process can vary from being quite informal to a very formal and structured procedure. 
However, in both situations, if the business angel starts to identify missing information or 
contradictions, this can jeopardize the possibility of a successful funding round. This 
happens because the investor needs to trust the entrepreneurial team associated with the 
opportunity.  
 
In angel groups this stage is slightly different. Typically, entrepreneurs have an opportunity 
to pitch in front of the group members. This is followed by a question and answer session 
where several members look for additional clarifications regarding issues identified. Then 
the angel investors have do decide whether to show interest in the opportunity. If enough 
interest has been shown in the investment opportunity by group members then it follows to 
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a formal due diligence by the gatekeeper and/or members with industry expertise (Carpentier 
and Suret, 2015). Mason and Botelho (2014) identify that “centralized” due diligence 
conducted by the gatekeeper is seen as one of the advantages of being part of an angel group. 
 
The fourth stage in the process is negotiation. Carpentier and Suret (2015) noticed the 
opportunities that reach to the negotiation stage are considered investable. However, the 
entrepreneur and the angel investors might disagree on the deal terms. Typically, the source 
of divergence are financial considerations, in particular the firm valuation (Carpentier and 
Suret, 2015) and size of equity stake (Paul et al., 2007). Haines et al. (2003) emphasize that, 
at this stage, the most frequent reason as to why investment opportunities do not get funded 
are unrealistic expectations of the entrepreneur regarding valuation. This finding is also 
supported by other research (Carpentier and Suret, 2015). This is a particularly important 
stage since it is the moment at which the angel investor can try to minimize the likelihood 
of adverse selection and moral hazard with the use of a contract (Kelly and Hay, 2003). 
However, contracts are not enough to ensure that either will not occur. Kelly and Hay (2003) 
point out that angel investors need to supplement the contract with a high level of 
involvement in the investee company. Typically, in angel groups, this stage is centralized on 
the gatekeeper or on a group member with industry expertise (Paul et al., 2003). The group 
representative negotiates the deal terms with the entrepreneur. Normally, the deal terms do 
not differ across the group members. 
 
The following stage is the decision making stage. Haines and his colleges (2003) define this 
stage as the moment immediately after the conclusion of negotiations. The authors 
emphasize that investors can still reject investment opportunities at this stage. This can be 
seen as the moment when the angel investor makes the final decision whether or not to write 
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the cheque to the entrepreneur. This is the point of “no return”, that is, if the angel investor 
decides to invest then he would be associated with the investee firm until a liquidity event, 
also known as an exit. In an angel group context this stage is not significantly different. 
Typically, in angel groups this is the moment where all members send the required financial 
resources to invest in the opportunity, and the group administrate all the legal and logistical 
procedures for the investment to go through.  
 
The sixth stage of the investment process is the post-investment activity. A significant body 
of literature has focused its attention on this aspect of the investment process. First, scholars 
have questioned whether angels add value or not with the post-investment activities (Macht 
and Weatherston, 2011; Macht, 2011). Second, research has been conducted to characterize 
these value added activities (Macht and Robinson, 2009; Politis, 2008). In a review of the 
literature, Politis (2008) classifies the post-investment activities into four categories of roles 
that can be played by the angel investors: strategic, supervision and monitoring, resource 
acquisition and mentoring. The level of involvement that the angel investor will have with 
the investee company will depend on its needs. Nevertheless, this stage is particularly 
important for the development of the non-financial contributions of angel investors (Macht 
and Robinson, 2009). 
 
This stage is considerably different for business angels investing through groups. Normally, 
the group nominates one non-executive board member in the invested venture. Hence, to all 
other members of the group, the post-investment activities are associated with monitoring 
the information provided by the angel group. Contrarily to solo/leading angels, members of 
angel groups are not hands-on and in case of doubts they should enquire the gatekeeper about 
the investee firm. In some cases, the gatekeeper can nominate one group member to be a 
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non-executive board member. However, only a very small number of group members are 
invited to take this role. The key factor to be invited to such a role is to have specific 
knowledge about the industry/sector where the investee firm operates. Kerr et al. (2014) 
identify that the value added contributions that angel groups make to their investee 
companies, is more important than their financial contribution. The post-investment 
activities may have a direct effect on the outcomes of the final stage – the exit. Scholars have 
identified that post-investment activities can increase the likelihood of achieving a successful 
exit (Kerr et al., 2014; Mason and Botelho, 2016).  
 
The last stage of the model suggested by Haines et al., (2003) is the harvesting moment, the 
exit. This is the moment where the angel investor realizes the investment and can measure 
the financial return associated with the opportunity. In terms of recycling resources this stage 
is fundamental for angel investors. Without achieving successful exits, angel investors will 
be less motivated to make new investments and may lack the financial resources to do so 
(Mason et al., 2015) with repercussions in terms of aggregate market activity. At this stage, 
the entrepreneur and the angel investor end their partnership. This stage can generate 
conflicts between the two. Collewaert (2012) identifies that the angel intention to exit can 
create conflicts with the entrepreneur. In an angel group context, the most common outcome 
is the gatekeeper providing an indication to the group members that they should exit the 
investment. Carpentier and Suret (2014) note that angel groups have a preference for to exit 
an investment via a trade sale.  
 
Various studies have identified that the investment criteria changes as the process progresses 
(Brush et al., 2012; Duxbury et al., 1997; Mason and Harrison, 1996b; Maxwell et al., 2011; 
Mitteness et al., 2012a). Hence, it is important to define what stage the research will focus. 
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The choice was to focus on the initial screening stage. This enables the comparison with 
other research on the same stage. Additionally, it is the stage that is the most important for 
entrepreneurs for two reasons. First, it is the one that defines if the entrepreneur will have a 
chance to interact with the angel investor. A rejected investment opportunity will not allow 
the entrepreneur to provide detailed explanations about the opportunity. Second, it is the 
hardest stage, with the highest rejection rates (Duxbury et al., 1997).  Table 2-1 summarizes 
the different models reported in this review. 
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Table 2-1: Models of business angel's investment process 
Authors Stages 
Dal Cin et al. (1993) and 
 Duxbury et al. (1997) 
Deal Origination and first impressions 
Review of 
business plan 
Screening and 
due diligence 
Negotiation 
Consummation and 
deal structure 
  
  
Van Osnabrugge and Robinson 
(2000) 
Investment 
motivations 
Investment 
criteria 
Finding 
deals 
Initial screening Due diligence Negotiations and actual investment 
Post investment 
monitoring 
Exiting and 
realizing 
returns 
Haines, Madill and Riding (2003) Deal Origination Initial Screening Due diligence Negotiation Decision Making 
Post-investment 
activity 
Exit 
Riding, Madill and Haines (2007) Deal Sourcing and initial screening 
Evaluation and 
due diligence 
Negotiation, consummation and deal 
structure 
Post-investment 
involvement 
Exit 
Paul, Whittam and Wyper (2007) Familiarisation Stage Screening Stage Bargaining Stage Managing Stage 
Harvesting 
Stage 
Amatucci and Sohl (2004) Pre-Investment Contract/Negotiation agreement 
Post-investment relationship, future 
rounds, exit 
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2.3 Investment motivations 
 
The investment motivations of business angels have been a widely researched topic. As the 
case with other assets, angel investments are associated with financial rewards. Hill and 
Power (2002, p. 36) emphasize that for some angels “it’s all about cash”. However, this is 
not always the case. Business angels are also associated with nonfinancial motivations. In 
his early studies of business angels, Wetzel (1983) recognized that nonfinancial rewards 
might influence individual investors in their decisions. The author called attention to the fact 
that angel investors do not exclusively make decisions based on the financial return of their 
risk portfolios. Hence, before studying the investment criteria one needs to understand the 
full range of investment motivations of angel investors.  
 
By definition, business angels are seen as hands-on investors. This feature is associated with 
the level of interaction between the investor and the entrepreneur to develop the investee 
firm. Scholars have defined these actions as value-added contributions (Politis, 2008). 
Previous research has presented two possible justifications for this behaviour. First, the 
similarity of motives and personal characteristics between angel investor and entrepreneur 
(Sullivan, 1991). Second, the entrepreneurial spark that both the entrepreneur and the 
business angel hold (Politis and Landström, 2002). These are often associated with non-
financial motivations to invest representing the former entrepreneurial experiences of angel 
investors. To some extent, this justifies the mentoring role undertaken by business angels 
(Leonard and Swap, 2000) which linked with their aim of passing on the knowledge acquired 
while an entrepreneur.  
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A Japanese study (Tashiro, 1999) identifies that non-financial rewards were the main driver 
for angel investing. The author asked participants which reward was more important: 
financial or non-financial. Using a sample of 10 angel investors the author recognises that 
only one investor stated his preference for financial rewards. The most common non-
financial reasons presented by participants were: fun, help young entrepreneurs, regional and 
technological development. While the importance given to non-financial reasons might be 
questioned for different reasons (e.g. cultural issues) the variety of non-financial motivations 
should not be questioned.  
 
A study of German business angels (Brettel, 2002) showed similar findings in terms of the 
importance of the non-financial motivations. Using a sample of 48 angel investors the author 
highlighted that 81% of the participants thought that it was very important to have fun while 
investing. Being involved in the entrepreneurial process and supporting young companies 
were also a significant motivation to act as a business angel. More than 50% of respondents 
saw these two reasons as an important motivation. The financial motivations were also 
acknowledged by investors. Achieving high capital growth was seen as the financial reward 
with the highest level of importance with 46% of the investors identifying it as very 
important. The significance of non-financial motivations was further supported by Stedler 
and Peters (2003). Their research showed that there is a mix between financial and non-
financial reasons to invest. The main reasons identified by the sample of 232 respondents 
were to pass on professional experience (81%) followed by higher ROI (77%) and 
contributing to successful start-up (73%). 
 
Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) emphasized the importance of the motivations to 
invest by defining it as a stage in the investment process. This is particularly relevant because 
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the authors defined this stage before the investment criteria. The authors identified that 
business angels have a set of primary investment motivations. Which they grouped into five 
categories: (i) high financial return (ii) involvement in an entrepreneurial process (iii) 
prospect of job and income (iv) social responsibility (v) the thrill associated with being 
involved with a new firm. Once again, research stresses the existence of both financial and 
non-financial reasons to invest. This duality of investment motivations has been further 
defended in recent reviews of the literature (Kelly, 2007; Morrissette, 2007). 
 
One of the most structured studies on investment motivations was conducted by Sullivan 
and Miller (1996). The authors divided the investment motivations of business angels into 
three types: Economic, Hedonistic and Altruistic motivations. The first set of motivations, 
the Economic, can be associated with the notion of wealth maximization which focuses 
exclusively on the financial outcomes. This group can be seen as: higher ROI (Stedler and 
Peters, 2003), high financial return (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000) or ROI 
expectations (Morrissette, 2007).  
 
The second set of motivations were the Hedonistic, this group are associated the notion of 
“psychic income”. This can be defined as the non-monetary or non-financial rewards that 
are provided from the economic activity. Simon (1959) emphasized that in the 
entrepreneurial setting the “psychic income” argument is not about profit maximization, 
arguing that entrepreneurs can always “balance loss profits against an increase of psychic 
income” (Simon, 1959, p. 262). Hence, these are the motivations associated with the 
individual’s satisfaction. Some examples of this set of motivations would be: fun (Brettel, 
2002), societal and community recognition (Brettel, 2002) excitement of being involved 
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with start-ups (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000), involvement with the entrepreneurial 
process (Mason and Stark, 2004) and the personal challenge (Stedler and Peters, 2003).  
 
The last set of motivations were the Altruistic, this group of motives are associated with the 
will to help others. Elster (2006, p. 186) defined altruistic motivations as all actions where 
“the agent is willing to suffer a net loss in welfare by the promotion of the welfare of 
another”. Examples of these type of motivations can be found in angel research: supporting 
socially desirable products or services (Brettel, 2002), job creation in the community (Freear 
et al., 1995), helping other entrepreneurs (Freear et al., 1995), social responsibility (Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000) or passing on professional experience (Stedler and Peters, 
2003). This work provides a clear representation of the motivations of angel investors, 
separating them into more than the initial two dimensions suggested by Wetzel (1983).  
 
Ramadani (2009) acknowledged that in the 19th century, business angels were known to fund 
several musicals and plays in Broadway. Their main driver was their passion for the theatre 
and the possibility to be in the social circles of some of their favourite producers, screen 
writers and actors. Since then the perspective on business angels has changed as well as their 
investment activity, with the importance of their investment motivations diminishing 
considerably in terms of research focus. Business angel investment motivations have been 
largely been dropped from the research agenda. Partially, it is the result of research 
exhaustion of the discussion of the motivations for business angels to invest. However, this 
is a very simplistic and static view of business angels. The angel market is evolving from an 
individualistic to a collective approach (Sohl, 2012a) which can bring additional motivations 
to the discussion. Are angel groups changing the landscape of motivations to invest? Is the 
possibility of being part of a group a motive to invest? Or are angel groups bringing greedy 
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speculators to the market? Scholars need to acknowledge the implications of the dynamics 
of the angel market in terms of their investment motivations. 
 
 
2.4 The criteria used by business angels 
 
A considerable amount of angel research has focused on the investment criteria used by 
business angels. These studies have provided a robust understanding of what factors angel 
investors take into account while screening an investment opportunity. Although scholars 
have mainly put their efforts into the identification of the reasons to invest, additional 
research has been conducted on the motives to reject an investment opportunity (Mason et 
al., 2016; Maxwell et al., 2011). The main driver of the latter is the high rejection rates 
entrepreneurs’ face when applying for angel funding (some examples: Duxbury et al., 1997; 
Mason and Harrison, 1995, 2003; Stedler and Peters, 2003). The significance of the rejection 
reasons can be seen as important as the investment criteria for two reasons. First, to achieve 
a desirable outcome an investment opportunity must not be rejected. Second, the reasons to 
invest in an opportunity are not the opposite of the motives to reject (Feeney et al., 1999). 
This was also raised by Haar et al. (1988) in an earlier study7, however, these authors decided 
to draw attention to what was common between the rejection and acceptance criteria instead 
of highlighting the differences. Hence, one may conclude that, to understand the investment 
criteria one needs to study the reasons supporting both outcomes. The following section will 
review both bodies of literature with a focus on the identification of the relevant criteria used 
to back an investment or a rejection decision.  
                                                          
7 Ahtila (2014) raises uncertainty regarding this finding. In his opinion the reasons to reject and accept are the 
same.  
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2.4.1 Investment criteria 
 
Understanding the decision making process of business angels is particularly important for 
entrepreneurs (Some examples: Clark, 2008; Mason and Rogers, 1997), policy-makers 
(Freear et al., 1995) and even to the angel community (Maxwell and Lévesque, 2014; San 
José et al., 2005). Ever since the early business angels studies the investment decision 
process has been the focus of scholars. This is particularly true in terms of the investment 
criteria used by angel investors. The benefits of further understanding what drives angel 
investing have been spread to entrepreneurs in investment readiness training. Hence, it is 
important to understand what is known and which areas still need to be researched. Given 
the variations across the investment process this section will focus on the criteria at the 
screening (evaluation) stage.  
 
2.4.1.1 Decision making criteria in ABC studies 
 
The early attributes, behaviour and characteristic (ABC) studies focused on creating a profile 
of angel investors. Among other issues, these profiles explained how business angels 
screened investment proposals and what were the motivations for these investments (some 
examples:Aram, 1989; Benjamin and Margulis, 2001; Gaston, 1989; Haar et al., 1988; 
Riding and Short, 1988; Wetzel, 1981; Wetzel, 1983). These studies were able to identify 
the representative investment preferences in terms of: deal source, location, amount invested, 
stage, industry, possibility to add value, financial return, non-financial return, etc. The most 
important findings will be reviewed in the following paragraphs. Much of these have been 
seen as investment attributes/fit in later research (Some examples: Harrison et al., 2015; 
Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and Harrison, 1996a; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997). 
Scholars were able to verify that the investment preferences were very consistent across the 
world (Kelly, 2007).  
 73 
 
 
In the USA, some of these early studies identified that business angels invest on average 
between $50,000 to $75,000 (Freear et al., 1994; Gaston, 1989; Hill and Power, 2002). Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) data presented an average per deal higher than the upper 
bound of the range ($145,000) and the median deal was of $75,000. Scholars identified 
slightly lower absolute values for average (£30,000) and median (£50,000) invested (Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). The differences found can be justified by the lack of 
homogeneity in the angel population. Three studies showed this in a clear way. Freear et al. 
(1994) reported these differences using different measurements from Gaston (1989) and 
Benjamin and Margulis (2001). When comparing the last two studies, it is possible to verify 
a higher proportion of investors. Table 2-2 highlights these differences which lead one to 
conclude that the heterogeneity of the angel population is also reflected in terms of amounts 
invested. Hence, the amount available to invest would be a constraint to angel investors and 
would be a strong element of investment attributes/fit.  
 
Table 2-2: Heterogeneity in terms of amounts invested. 
Freear et al. (1994)   Gaston (1989)   Benjamin and Margulis (2001) 
% of Maximum 
Wealth 
Allocation 
% of 
Angels 
  Amounts invested 
% of 
Angels 
  Amounts invested 
% of 
Angels 
0-4 8   <$10.000 21   <$25,000 20 
5-9 18   $10,000 - $24.999 22   $25,000 - $99.000 40 
10-14 25   $25,000 - $49.999 21   $100,000 - $250.000 25 
15-24 21   $50,000 - $99.999 14   >$250,000 15 
25-50 19   $100,000 - $250.000 14       
More than 50 9   > $250.000 8       
 
These ABC studies identified that, typically, business angels wanted to invest close to their 
home or office. This would facilitate the interactions between the angel and the entrepreneur, 
enabling the investor to add value and to monitor the investee firm. Numerous studies have 
acknowledged this preference. However, scholars have provided different distances as a 
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reference. Riding and Short (1988) noticed that 85% of angel investments were made within 
range of 50 miles. Aram (1989) research observed that 24% of the investments were within 
10 miles, 76% in a range of 50 miles and 96% in a radius of 150 miles. A study from the 
same year showed a different propensity to closeness (Gaston, 1989), 41% of the investments 
were within 10 miles, 72% within a radius of 50 miles and 82% within a range of 150 miles. 
Freear et al. (1992) identified that 66% of angel investments were made within a radius of 
300 miles. This was later supported by Benjamin and Margulis (2001) who identified that 
65% of angel investors prefer investing within the same distance. However, these results are 
not valid for the entire angel population. Once again, heterogeneity is reflected but now in 
terms of location of the investee company. Riding and Short (1988) noticed that 36% of their 
sample had no geographic constraint, Freear et al. (1994) suggested this value was slightly 
lower (24%) while Gaston (1989) showed an even inferior percentage (7%). The importance 
of this factor has decreased with the rise of angel groups due to the extended networks of 
this type of organization. One of the most advanced studies on the impact of location on 
business angel decision making was conducted by Harrison et al. (2010b). The authors were 
the first to identify and profile non-local angel investing. 
  
Business angels are known for taking risks in unquoted companies. Typically, this happens 
at an early stage of the company development. The ABC studies stressed this point very 
clearly. One of the initial studies on business angels noticed that 44% of investments were 
at start-up stage (Wetzel, 1983). Similarly, the willingness to invest in the early stage in the 
future was demonstrated with 78% of investors stating a clear interest in conducting start-up 
and early stage investments. The same research observes that 80% of the investments were 
in firms that were less than five years old. Aram (1989) identified that 55% of his sample 
consisted of investment made at start-up stage. Another study from the same year (Gaston, 
1989) reported a very similar percentage. The author noticed that 56% of angel investments 
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were at the start-up stage. Freear et al. (1994) highlighted that business angels showed 
interest in seed financing (35%) and at the start-up stage (52%). Sohl (2004) acknowledged 
that the 52 % of the 2003 angel investments were at seed and start-up stage. Hence, it is 
possible to conclude that these studies showed that business angels have a clear propensity 
to invest at early stages. However, this is perhaps the least restrictive investment attributes/fit 
requirement. All these studies reviewed report that business angels invest at all firms’ growth 
stages.  
 
Lastly, the ABC studies were able to provide a rich indication of whether business angels 
have a specific industry preference. The most supported idea is that business angels do not 
invest in only a specific industry. Rather, their portfolios consist of firms from a wide range 
of industries. However, this needs to be broken into two effects: at the aggregate level and 
at the individual level. First at the aggregate level, several studies showed that the angel 
population invest in a wide set of industries, some examples: manufacturing, natural 
resources/mining, retail trade, finance/insurance/real estate, etc. (Gaston, 1989; Haar et al., 
1988; Mason and Harrison, 1996b; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000; Wetzel, 1983). In 
one particular study the participants reported to have invested in more than one industry 
(Gaston, 1989). Hence, this shows that typically angel investors would not invest in all 
industries. Therefore, despite the fact that at the aggregate value business angels invest in a 
wide range of industries this is not true at the individual level. The most cited reason for this 
behaviour is that business angels invest in industries where they have some specific 
knowledge/experience (Aram, 1989; Hill and Power, 2002; Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Wetzel, 
1983). However, other early studies found contradictory results. Mason and Harrison 
(1996b) observed that in only 35% of the investments the investors had 
knowledge/experience within the specific industry. This was later confirmed by Benjamin 
and Margulis (2001). These authors acknowledged that 59% of angel investors had invested 
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in industries that they had no prior knowledge or experience. One early study identified one 
possible reason for this behaviour (Freear et al., 1994). In some cases business angels will 
try to diversify the risk by investing in a wide spread of industries. Another justification 
could be that it is the result of angels investing with others which would put the onus of the 
decision on the business partner which would typically have this business experience (Mason 
et al., 2013).   
 
These studies were able to provide a very insightful image of angel investing. However, the 
major limitation of this stream of research was the lack of generality due to the biased 
samples used in the studies (Kelly, 2007). The natural path of this discussion is to look at 
what have been the most common criteria used in business angel decision making research. 
The debate will have a particular focus on the criteria trends that have been used and how 
relevant these criteria are at the selection stage. This is not an easy task because the number 
of articles analysing decision criteria is very extensive and have used different lists of 
investment criteria. Nevertheless, the next subsection will cover the key articles identified 
in the literature.   
 
2.4.1.2 Decision making criteria  
 
At the screening (evaluation) stage business angels make investment decisions based on a 
combination of factors (For example: Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997). Hence, it is important 
to review the criteria used and its importance. This subsection aims to identify and explain 
the key criteria used in previous research providing a coherent list of criterion. It is important 
to acknowledge that the number of criterion used has ranged from lists with two broad 
criterion (Feeney et al., 1999) to studies that used 34 very specific criterion (Landström, 
1998). The trade-offs of such a decision will also be discussed, taking into account the 
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current trend in terms of investment criteria used by researchers. The key list of investment 
criteria will be the one used by Mason and Harrison (1996b) with the inclusion of a more 
recent criterion (exit) that has arose from the lack of liquidity events. 
 
The previous subsection showed that initial studies covered investment preferences that later 
would be considered by several scholars as investment attributes/fit. In terms of importance 
there are mixed reviews about this criterion. Some studies have identified this as not being 
important while others have shown contradictory results. Using a real time technique, Mason 
and Rogers (1997) studied angel decision making, which generated a list that included nine 
criteria of which investment attributes/fit was the second least important. In a study that used 
a conjoint method Landström (1998) asked 22 angel investors to rank the importance of a 
list with 34 criteria. The study identified that some components of investment attributes/fit 
were considered less significant, for example: Stage (34th), Scale and change of later rounds 
of funding (32nd), Location of the business relative to the investor (22nd) and Relative 
familiarity of investors with industry/technology (14th). A very similar result was found by 
Van Osnabrugge (1998b) in his PhD thesis. Using a Likert scale the author asked 143 angel 
investors to state how important specific criterion were. From a list of 27 criterion those 
associated with investment attributes/fit received the following positions: investor 
understands the business/industry (24th), venture is local (23rd) and size of investment (20th). 
Consistent findings in terms of investment attributes/fit were found by Mason and Harrison 
(2003), who also used again a real time methodology to rank the importance of a set of 
criteria Investment attributes/fit was the 7th most significant out of ten. In a USA study with 
173 investors, Sudek (2006) reviewed Van Osnabrugge‘s (1998b) results. The findings of 
this study are much in line with this lack of importance. Size of the investment scored 21 
(out of 25) and investor knowledge of the industry score 16 (out of 25). More recently, a 
study by Mason and Botelho (2016) used a real time methodology to evaluate if gatekeepers 
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took exits into account as a relevant criteria. The study ranked the importance of nine criteria 
and investment attributes/fit was the 7th most significant. Although this shows consistency 
in terms of the importance of investment attributes/fit as a criterion, other studies have shown 
contradictory findings.   
 
Mason and Stark (2004) identified that business angels gave more emphasis to investment 
attributes/fit than banks or venture capital funds. The authors used a real time technique to 
evaluate if different types of funders assessed opportunities in different ways. Investment 
attributes/fit scores a higher importance when compared with previously mentioned studies, 
scoring four out of nine. Harrison et al. (2015) found its importance to be even higher. 
Applying a real time methodology, the authors evaluated how different investment 
experiences impact the weights given to each criterion. The study divided a sample of 12 
angel investors into three equal groups, controlling the level of investment experience. 
Investment attributes/fit scored consistently higher in terms of its importance across the three 
groups (Nascent 4th, Novice 2nd and Super 1st). This suggests that learning has an impact on 
the way angels weight investment criteria. The conflicting results across the reviewed studies 
may be the result of two factors. First, this could be due to methodological differences. Some 
of these studies used real time methods while in others questionnaires were chosen. Second, 
this could be due to sampling issues. Typically, these studies used small highly biased 
samples which can represent problems in terms of generalization. 
 
The early ABS studies allowed scholars to understand the importance that the characteristics 
of the entrepreneur and product/market features had at the screening stage (for example: 
Mason and Harrison, 1996b; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b). This is particularly true for the 
entrepreneur characteristics. The great majority of studies have highlighted the idea that, at 
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the screening stage, the entrepreneur is the key factor in an investment decision. This goes 
much in line with Fiet’s (1995b) argument that angels put more emphasis on agency risk, 
therefore it is important to invest in a project with good entrepreneurs. According to May 
and Simons (2001) getting to know the entrepreneur is the most important step of the 
investment process. Two levels of analysis have been used to stress the importance of the 
entrepreneur. First, scholars have discussed the relative importance of the 
entrepreneur/management team within a set of investment criteria. Second, researchers have 
gone further to try to detect which characteristics of the entrepreneur were important for the 
angel investors.  
 
The great majority of real time studies applying verbal protocol analysis have followed the 
first approach (Some examples:Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and 
Rogers, 1996, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004). This should not be seen as a limitation of this 
type of study. Instead, it should be understood as the result of the authors need to present 
aggregate findings rather than extremely specific conclusions. It should be noticed that 
although the coding scheme presented sub levels, only the key criterion was discussed in the 
research. In this type of study the importance of the entrepreneur is somewhat underplayed. 
The highest importance these researchers have given to the entrepreneur was in Mason and 
Stark (2004) study. Although the authors highlight that business angels give more emphasis 
to the entrepreneur than bankers and venture capitalists this criterion is just the third most 
important. Finance and market were respectively considered as the two most important 
criterion in this study; a consistent result when compared with earlier studies (Mason and 
Rogers, 1996, 1997).  
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Two recent studies showed even lower rakings for the entrepreneur. Harrison et al. (2015) 
study how different levels of investment experience impact the criteria importance. In this 
study the entrepreneur achieved consistently low scores in terms of importance provided by 
the three groups of angel investors. The entrepreneur scored between 5th and 7th position 
depending on the group. This was confirmed in Mason and Botelho’s (2016), study which 
focused on gatekeepers’ decision making criteria and identified that the people 
(entrepreneur/management team) were the sixth most important criteria. Another real time 
study used a video presentation of an entrepreneur looking for funding to evaluate the 
investment criteria (Mason and Harrison, 2003). Even with this methodological nuance, the 
results again show that the entrepreneur is not the key investment criteria (4th overall 
position) at the initial screening stage.    
 
Alternative studies have used Likert scale to measure the relative importance of each 
criterion have presented a different story. In a Canadian study, Bachher and Guild (1996) 
asked three types of equity investors (Business angels, Public venture capital funds and 
Private venture capitalists) to evaluate the importance of five investment criteria at the 
screening stage. The findings highlighted that angel investors considered the entrepreneur as 
the most important investment criteria.  
 
Subsequent research conducted by Van Osnabrugge (1998b) used a very similar research 
methodology that showed comparable results. Although the study used a wider range of 
investment criteria (27), with the entrepreneur being evaluated in five dimensions, it is 
straightforward to verify the importance of this criterion. Four of the five dimensions 
associated with the entrepreneur were ranked in the top five investment criteria with the last 
dimension (track record of the entrepreneur) being the 10th most significant in the angels’ 
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opinion. This was later supported in the work of Sudek (2006). The author asked angel 
investors to express the importance of a list with 25 investment criterion. This list contained 
six criterion associated with characteristics of the entrepreneur. The results showed the top 
three criterion to be associated with the entrepreneur. The remaining three ranked the sixth, 
twelfth and fourteenth, respectively. Other studies using different methodologies showed 
that at the screening stage, the importance of the entrepreneur as the key investment criteria 
(Feeney et al., 1999; Haar et al., 1988; Landström, 1998; MacMillan et al., 1987; Mason and 
Harrison, 1996b). This is further developed by Mitteness et al. (2012a). The authors 
identified that the entrepreneur’s strong points are seen as being more helpful for a proposal 
to move further in the investment process than the opportunity power. 
 
The specific characteristics of the entrepreneur have been an object of study. In the great 
majority of the studies, researchers have focused on characteristics that are verifiable, what 
can be understood as the tangible part of an individual and are easier to evaluate, such as: 
skills, experience, track record and so on (Some examples: Haar et al., 1988; Landström, 
1998; Mason and Stark, 2004; Sudek, 2006; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b). Other characteristics, 
which can be seen as intangible, have also been taken into account by some scholars, such 
has leadership (Landström, 1998), trustworthiness (Harrison et al., 1997; Sudek, 2006; Van 
Osnabrugge, 1998b) and enthusiasm (Feeney et al., 1999; Mason and Harrison, 1996b; Van 
Osnabrugge, 1998b). However, Maxwell et al. (2011, p. 218) observed that “precise 
attributes of the entrepreneur are often difficult to determine objectively or rank in 
importance”.  
 
The major advantage of these studies is to help understand which characteristics are more 
important. The results of these studies are not consistent across studies. Take, for example, 
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how the most important characteristic of the entrepreneur has varied across studies: 
enthusiasm (Van Osnabrugge, 1998b), expertise (Mason and Harrison, 1996b), 
trustworthiness (Sudek, 2006), leadership potential (Landström, 1998), ability to 
management (Haar et al., 1988). This would seem to support the obverstion made by 
Maxwell et al. (2011). The oral pitch has also been the object of study. One of the most cited 
research papers identified that business angels put more emphasis on the negative effects of 
a bad presentation rather than what they take from it (Clark, 2008). Issues associated with 
lack of clarity and the information provided were the most mentioned problems refered to 
by angel investors. Mason and Harrison (2003) also identified the importance of presentation 
skills as a key crierion that influences the investment decision.  
 
The product/market is an important as investment criterion at the screening stage. As 
previously mentioned, Sudek et al. (2008) argued that the tangible nature of this criterion 
makes it easier for the angel investor to evaluate its potential when compared to evaluating 
the entrepreneur’s characteristics. When the product/market was used as a single criterion 
(Mason and Harrison, 1996b) it was the criterion mentioned more times by angel investors 
(30 times versus the people that took second place being cited 26 times). According to the 
same study, the market (sales prospects) was more significant than the product (quality of 
the product). However, several studies have examined the importance of this criterion 
separately showing different levels of importance. Starting with the real time studies, it is 
possible to infer that when analysed in isolation as one individual criterion it loses 
importance. For example, in Mason and Rogers (1996, 1997) studies, the market was the 
most significant criterion with the same relative importance than the financial 
considerations, while product was the third most important.  
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A very similar conclusion can be drawn from Mason and Stark (2004). If this study reported 
that the market and the product as a single criterion it would be the most cited one with the 
percentage of thought units averaging 25.3%. However, the study reported the two 
separately, which made the financial considerations the most important criterion with 22.5%. 
Harrison et al. (2015) is possibly the best example of this issue. The authors also opt to 
present both criterion individually. The importance of the product and of the market presents 
a large variance across the three groups of business angels. The product ranged from 2nd to 
3rd while the market ranged from 3rd to 6th. Contrasting with other studies where the market 
was more relevant than the product. Again, if the two were measured together the importance 
would be exactly the same across the three groups; it would be the most frequent funding 
criterion. A similar procedure was followed by Mason and Botelho (2016) while studying 
gatekeepers. The conclusions regarding the relative importance of product/market are the 
precisely the same. In the case of the two being presented independently the importance is 
low at 4th and 3rd place, respectively. However, if measured together, they would take the 
first place in front of financial considerations.  
 
From the real time research under analysis, only in Mason and Harrison (2003) it is possible 
to verify a criterion scoring more than product and market together. The presentation is the 
key criterion in this study. However, this could be the result of the research instrument used 
(video with an entrepreneurs pitch for funding). Another study focusing on the evaluation of 
a pitch by angel investors, the market potential and the product features were two of the four 
most cited investment criterion (Clark, 2008). 
 
In studies that used a wider list of research criteria, it is possible to recognise a high level of 
inconsistency across studies in terms of particular issues associated with the market and/or 
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product. In Landström (1998) the highest criterion associated with product/market, market 
growth and attractiveness, achieved the 9th position with the following one, uniqueness of 
the product being 13th. This indicates that business angels give a fairly low significance to 
this criterion. This was later supported by (Sudek, 2006), where the highest ranked criterion 
associated with the product/market was ranked 7th (growth potential of the market). A 
completely different scenario can be found in the work of Van Osnabrugge (1998b). 
According to this research it is possible to identify four criterion associated with 
product/market in the top ten8 and one in the top three.  
 
The importance that business angels give to the product/market at the screening stage was 
previously considered by Bachher and Guild (1996). In this study business angels ranked the 
product as the second most important criterion while the market came third. Haines et al. 
(2003) also defended the market as the second most important criterion. According to this 
research, for some business angels this criterion is considered the most important of them 
all. Although no reference is made to whether or not the authors included the product in the 
criterion, the findings indicate that was the case. Similar results were found by Haar et al. 
(1988). Additionally, the authors identified a list of evaluation criteria that are important for 
business angels. In this list, product and market came under the same label which is 
consistent with Mason and Harrison (1996b). Again it is possible to identify a high level of 
inconsistency across studies on the importance of a specific criterion (product/market). 
 
The original list of investment criteria suggested by Mason and Harrison (1996b) included 
the financial attributes. In this study the authors make a reference to high margins in the 
                                                          
8 Sales potential of the product (3rd); Growth potential of the market (6th); Quality of the product (7th) and 
Niche market (9th). 
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criterion. However, the financial attributes have represented a wider dimension of issues. 
For example, in real time studies that used verbal protocol analysis, the coding scheme 
included several dimensions to the financial considerations. In terms of coding schemes, two 
approaches have been followed by scholars for the meaning of the financial considerations. 
For the main stream of the literature the financial considerations comprised three areas: (i) 
financial projections; (ii) valuation and (iii) the exit (Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and 
Rogers, 1996, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004).  
 
A second approach also considered three dimensions under the financial considerations but 
replaced the exit by governance issues (Mason and Botelho, 2016). In terms of importance, 
the great majority of real time studies consistently considered this criterion as the most 
important (Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; 
Mason and Stark, 2004)9. The only exception, in real time studies, can be found in Mason 
and Harrison (2003), where the financial considerations were ranked at the 5th position in a 
list with ten criterion. This difference could be the result of methodological differences. The 
first group of studies asked participants to evaluate a business plan, whereas the second 
captured the impression, reactions and thoughts of investors while watching a video with an 
entrepreneur pitching for funding.  
 
Alternatively, when scholars used other methods to study business angels’ investment 
criteria the importance of the financial considerations becomes less significant. In contrast 
to the real time research, this group of studies did not aggregate the several financial 
dimensions under a single label. This makes it harder to measure the importance of this 
                                                          
9 In Harrison et al. (2015) the importance is not the same across the three groups of investors. However, in 
aggregate terms it is the criteria with the higher percentage sum.  
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particular criterion. One exception to this approach is Mason and Harrison (1996b) work. 
The study classified the financial attributes as the third most cited criterion. Another example 
can be found in Feeney et al. (1999) work. The authors separated the decision criteria into 
the attributes of the business and the attributes of the entrepreneur and identified that 
growth/profit prospects was one of the key criterion for angel investors. This indicates the 
importance of the financial attributes for business angels.   
 
As it was previously mentioned, it is not easy to measure the importance of broad criterion 
such as financial attributes in studies that used wider list of investment criteria. However, it 
is possible to understand that the financial attributes are not the key factor in terms of 
decision making scoring consistently low across the criteria list. In Landström’s (1998) study 
the financial attribute that received the highest ranking was expected rate of return in 15th 
position (in a list with 34 criteria). Taking into account that this criterion should be seen as 
a dimension of exit, the first financial consideration would be time to break-even in 27th.  
 
A very similar result can be found in Van Osnabrugge (1998b) work, where the first financial 
consideration ranked at position 15th (out of 27)10. This lack of importance of the financial 
attributes is later confirmed in Sudek (2006) research. Return on investment was considered 
by the participants of this study as the 8th most important criterion in a list with 25 criteria. 
Other financial dimensions score very low, for example: size of the investment (21st), ability 
to reach beak-even without further funding (22nd), and low initial capital expenditure needed 
(23rd). All of these rankings confirm Van Osnabrugge’s (1998b) findings. Stedler and Peters 
(2003) found that for 34% of German business angels, high profit margins were considered 
very important. The move into profit quickly had an even higher percentage of participants 
                                                          
10 Perceived financial rewards ranked 8th but in this review is considered one dimension of the exit. 
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stating its importance (38%). Although the scores can indicate that a significant number of 
angels think that some dimensions of the financial attributes are important, this is not verified 
when compared with the rest of the investment criteria. In this study there are at least six 
criteria with a higher number of investors stating it is very important.  
 
This review is able to highlight that the importance of the financial attributes varies across 
studies. As in the case of other criterion, sampling and methodological issues can be 
identified to justify the differences. In this particular case, the methodological reasoning can 
be stretched to the way importance is measured in the real time studies. When a particular 
criterion, such as, financial considerations, has several dimensions11 then the likelihood of 
achieving a higher score is greater given that importance is measured by the number of times 
it was cited. However, when participants are asked to rank relative importance in a Likert 
scale this is done in a very specific manner which does not come without its drawbacks. 
Despite that, it is important to acknowledge that at the screening stage, angel investors look 
at the financial attributes in a very particular way. Clark (2008, p. 268) noticed that some 
angel investors had “criticisms about the financials, sales projections and the stated/unstated 
value of their company.” This negative mind set can be associated with the high amount of 
assumptions associated to financial projections (Brealey et al., 2012). 
 
The business plan is a key document on the entrepreneur’s journey to achieve funding from 
angel investors. This is the minimum requirement by any funding source (Kuratko and 
Hodgetts, 1992). Entrepreneurs who are pursuing angel funding must have one since 75% 
of angel investors require one (Mason and Harrison, 1996b). However, Bygrave and 
                                                          
11 For example, in Sudek (2006) approximately a quarter of the criterion can be considered financial 
attributes.   
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Zacharakis (2009) argued that entrepreneurs spend too much time and effort on the business 
plan rather than on other things that could impress the investors12. One may question to what 
extent this is valid. Several studies of business angel investment criteria have included the 
business plan as one potential criterion. However, this has not been followed across different 
research teams. The evidence seemed to indicate that the business plan is not viewed as a 
key criterion, but as a necessary requirement since the document is only exactingly reviewed 
after the initial screening (Riding et al., 2007).  
 
One of the first references to the business plan as an investment criteria was made by Haar 
et al. (1988). The study draws attention to the fact that business angels require a much less 
detailed business plan when compared with venture capitalists. Most likely, for this reason, 
the importance of a thorough business plan was low. Only 3.2% of participants ranked this 
criterion as the top two investment criteria. In Mason and Harrison (1996b) the authors noted 
that angel investors looked at a business plan for evidence that the proposal is feasible. The 
study also noticed that angel investors expected to see that the entrepreneur had made a 
considerable effort producing a quality document. In a list of six investment criteria, the 
business plan was considered the 3rd most important with the same score of the financial 
attributes. However, it was only referred to in 5.9% investment opportunities. Some lessons 
can also be taken from international research. A study with German business angels 
identified that the business plan is fundamental for the investment decision (Stedler and 
Peters, 2003). A similar study in Japan noted that 47% of angel investors considered their 
investment decision to be guided by the business plan and management policy (Tashiro, 
1999). This seems to reinforce the idea that a business plan is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition to obtain angel funding. 
                                                          
12 The authors stress the importance of having a product or service that has already been under the consumer 
appraisal.  
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The real time studies provided very consistent results on the importance of the business plan 
at the screening stage, in particular, the studies that used verbal protocol analysis. In Mason 
and Rogers (1996, 1997) the business plan is considered as the 6th most important criteria. 
A very similar result can be found in Mason and Stark (2004) where the business plan scored 
exactly the same position. The most significant lesson from this study is that distinctive 
funders will appraise the business plan in a different way.  
 
Another real time study looked at how different levels of experience impacted the way 
investment appraisal was conducted (Harrison et al., 2015). The study noticed that angels 
with different levels of investment experience will value the same criterion differently. In 
this study the business plan ranges from being the 3rd most important criterion to being the 
6th. This study indicated that more experienced investors tend to appraise the business plan 
as being a more relevant investment criterion. Moreover, the business plan obtains a higher 
rank with the super angel group, while its lowest ranking is with the nascent angel. Another 
real time study that looked at the decision making criteria of gatekeepers also reached to 
similar results for the business plan (Mason and Botelho, 2016). This criterion was 
considered the 5th most important criteria. Hence, this stream of real time studies has 
provided sufficient evidence that the business plan is not highly ranked as an investment 
criterion. 
 
A variant of the real time studies was conducted by Mason and Harrison (2003) using a video 
pitch rather than just a business plan. The study identified that the presentation was 
considered as the top investment criterion. This can be seen as analogous to a business plan 
in a verbal protocol analysis. This can raise speculation regarding the importance of the 
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business plan. Unfortunately, only a small number of studies used the presentation as an 
investment criterion, particularly, when compared with other investment criterion. Decision 
making criteria research that used Likert scales, and were previously citied in this subsection, 
did not include any dimension of the business plan. Nevertheless, it is possible with the set 
of studies reviewed to have a clear notion of the prominence of this criterion. The great 
majority of studies reviewed seem to validate Bygrave and Zacharakis (2009) views on the 
significance given to the business plan by angel investors – entrepreneurs should put less 
efforts on the business plan and more on what matters to investors.  
 
The last of the six investment criteria in Mason and Harrison (1996b) study is the attributes 
of the business. This is a very broad criterion. For example, in Mason and Harrison (1996b) 
it reflects: the industry, local, readiness of the product, stage of development, etc. Mason and 
Botelho (2016) defined attributes of the business to include: strategy, business model, 
operations, time frame and so on. This represented an innovation to the typical coding 
scheme used in real time studies, which had considered the strategy and operations 
independently, as two separate criteria (Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 
1997; Mason and Stark, 2004). It is important not to confuse this criterion with the one used 
by Feeney et al. (1999). These authors divided the investment criterion into two groups, 
attributes of owners and business attributes. The latter, business attributes, reflects several 
different investment criteria (exit, financial attributes, investment fit, business plan and so 
on)13. Other studies of business angel investment criteria did not define the attributes of the 
business with sublevels, instead it was used as a single criterion. In this case, the review will 
follow a similar approach to Mason and Harrison (1996b) in what regards the attributes of 
the business.   
                                                          
13 Examples of the sub layers of attributes of the business are: Good business plan and proper security, Profit, 
Established well-respected company with obvious bugs that I can help fix. 
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The great majority of real time studies did not identify the attributes of the business as a key 
investment criteria. The only exception to this can be found in Mason and Botelho (2016). 
Gatekeepers of angel groups seemed to be more inclined to emphasize this criterion with it 
being the 2nd most cited criteria. This is in line with the importance given by venture capital 
fund managers that cited this criterion (sum of counts of strategy and operations) as 3rd most 
significant (Mason and Stark, 2004). This can indicate some truth in Sohl’s hypothesis that 
business angels groups are evolving into venture capital funds (2012a). In all other studies 
the attributes of the business would range from 5th to 7th (Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and 
Rogers, 1996, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004). This reasonable level of consistency in real 
time studies, related to the attributes of the business, seems to be also valid across the angel 
population. The three groups of angel investors scored this criterion consistently low in 
Harrison et al. (2015) research. 
 
The low score for attributes of the business is also reflected in studies that used other 
methodologies. Landström (1998) showed that the highest attribute of business dimensions 
achieved a modest 15th position in a list with 34 criteria. The ability to create post-entry 
barriers in the market can be seen as a measure of strategy (Porter, 2008). Sensibility to 
economic cycles also scored low rankings (30th). Van Osnabrugge (1998b) findings also 
showed the same low level of importance of the attributes of the business. Two strategy 
dimensions were included in the study. Nature of competition in 17th and formal competitive 
protection of the production in the last position showed the low importance business angels 
give to this criterion. Another study with a very similar methodological approach showed 
slightly different results (Sudek, 2006). Three dimensions of strategy ranged from the 9th to 
 92 
 
15th position14. However, this does not present a significant difference when compared with 
other studies.  
 
It is possible to conclude that angel investors do not put too much emphasis on the attributes 
of the business, with the only exception being made to the gatekeepers of angels groups. A 
possible justification for this is how the dimensions of this criterion are able to be changed 
during the post-investment stage. Business angels are known for being hands-on investors 
that actively influence the entrepreneur in specific areas of the firm, such as: strategy and 
operations (Politis, 2008). This is a much straightforward area to influence than the 
entrepreneur or the product, for example.  
 
From the original criteria list suggested by Mason and Harrison (1996b) this research only 
recommended the addition of one criterion. The last criterion evaluated in this review is the 
exit. According to several scholars and practitioners, the angel community is suffering from 
an exit drought (Gray, 2011; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason et al., 2013; Waddell, 2013; 
NACO, 2014; Mason et al., 2015). Hence, it would be expected that the lack of exits would 
be reflected in the decision making criteria. The suggestion aims to evaluate whether the 
lack of exits impacts the decision making criteria of angel investors. Although the exit is not 
always considered as a key investment criterion, scholars have used it in different ways 
across business angel decision making research. Hence, this suggestion should not be seen 
as a pioneering novelty.   
 
                                                          
14 Barrier for entry for competitors (9th) Nature of competition (13rd), formal competitive protection of the 
production (15th). 
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The exit, also known as liquidity or harvest event, is associated with the last stage of the 
investment process. However, scholars have questioned the importance of the exit as a 
selection criterion at the earlier stages of the process. In the great majority of cases, this 
reference has been associated with only one dimension of the exit, for example: time to 
payback (Landström, 1998), the potential exit routes (Sudek, 2006; Van Osnabrugge, 
1998a), exit mechanism (Brettel, 2002), exit options (Stedler and Peters, 2003), exit plan 
(Feeney et al., 1999), expected rate of return (Landström, 1998; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b). 
Typically, these issues have not been ranked as highly important for angel investors. The 
main reason for this is that, at this early stage of the investment process, business angels only 
expect that the opportunity is able to present an exit route which would allow investor to 
obtain a financial return (Feeney et al., 1999).  
 
The only exception is Sudek (2006) study where the potential exit routes was considered the 
fourth most important investment criteria. The author defended that this could reflect the 
distinctive nature of US angel investors. In his opinion, the US business angels think that “if 
a new venture does not have a clear exit path, it is unlikely to be successful and bring any 
return to the investor” (Sudek, 2006, p. 100). However, one can speculate about an 
alternative justifications. First, this could be the result of sampling problems. This study 
sampled angel investors from the oldest US group. Second, business angels need to recycle 
their money to keep investing. There is significant evidence that holding periods have 
increased (Mason et al., 2015). This, associated with Sudek’s study being the most recent 
study in this group, can justify the higher rankings for exit.  
 
Two additional approaches have been followed by researchers to study the importance of the 
exit as an investment criterion. The first, followed by the great majority of decision making 
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studies, that used verbal protocol analysis, has included the exit route possibilities under the 
financial considerations criterion (for example: Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and Rogers, 
1996, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004). This type of analysis presents a considerable problem 
when trying to evaluate a single component since the studies only reported the first level of 
the criterion. It is not suitable to use the importance of the financial consideration on its own, 
since it is measuring more than one criterion. However, one particular study can be helpful 
to understand the lack of an identical view across the angel population about the exit as an 
investment criterion. Harrison et al. (2015) indicated that, depending on the investment 
experience of the angel investors, the importance of the financial considerations varies. 
Additionally, one quote can help to summarize the overall importance of the exit as an 
investment criterion. In this study, one angel noticed that the exit was one of the four things 
he looked at. Hence, it is possible to infer that the exit is the top issue for some business 
angels, but definitely not for all. 
 
A second approach considered the several dimensions of the exit in the list of investment 
criteria. According to one of these studies, it is possible to conclude that most of the investors 
who made comments regarding exits did so in a negative way, and did not consider pursuing 
the opportunity further (Mason and Harrison, 2003). In terms of relative importance the exit 
was the 8th (out of 10) most important criterion. One real time study has addressed the 
importance of the exit in the decision making process of gatekeepers of angel groups (Mason 
and Botelho, 2016). Similar to the suggestion made by this review, the study adapts a coding 
scheme previously developed by other research teams to include the exit. This research 
highlighted that the great majority of gatekeepers stated that they do take into account the 
exit when investing. However, the result from the real time methodology states the opposite. 
The exit is considered the least important investment criterion.   
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Once again it is possible to identify inconsistencies across studies in terms of the importance 
of the exit as an investment criterion, although, the level of contradictions seems to be less 
significant than other cases previously mentioned. In the majority of studies reviewed, the 
exit seems to be almost negligible as an investment criterion. However, it has also been 
acknowledged as one of the key motivational factors to be considered while investing. 
Sampling, methodological and even temporal issues can explain these differences. 
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged as an investment criterion in angel research.  
 
In summary, this subsection has reviewed the key studies of business angel investment 
criteria at the screening stage. It has highlighted what the key investment criterions are for 
angel investors. However, the high level of inconsistent findings across studies is a clear 
feature of this body of literature. This questions one of the observations of a previous review 
of the literature (Riding et al., 2007) which argued that there is a high level of consistency 
across a set of studies regarding the importance of the management team, market and product 
potential. Two reasons can be highlighted for the different views. First, the range of studies 
reviewed is different. The set of studies referred in Riding et al. (2007) is just a subset of the 
decision making criteria literature. Second, some of the most recent studies have covered 
different “types” of angels which can increase the inconsistency of the results. Hence, this 
review highlighted this problematic issue and helped to set context for heterogeneity 
discussion that will follow in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. The next section is still 
on the domain of investment criteria but will broader the discussion by looking at the reasons 
to reject.  
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2.4.2 Rejection criteria 
 
The most common outcome that an entrepreneur will get when looking for angel funding is 
a rejection. This can be observed in terms of low Yield rates15 or by high rejection rates. The 
first observation has been received less attention by scholars and consequently has been less 
researched. In a review of the literature focused on the market evolution and trends, Sohl 
(2012a) identified that the Yield rate in the USA in the period between 2000 and 2009 varied 
from 23.3% to 7.1%. The author highlighted similar levels for other countries, for example: 
28% for the UK, 27% for France, 13% for Italy and 16% for Germany. These values are 
considerably high when compared with other studies that evaluated the total acceptance rate. 
Sohl (2012a) acknowledged several problems in the calculation of yield rates since the 
measure does not take into account all the deals (screened and non-screened) only the ones 
that were screened. Hence, the author would expect a substantially lower rate in case the 
denominator included the non-screened deals. This is verified in studies that have used both 
screened and non-screened deals. 
 
Several studies have highlighted the second type of observation (some examples: Croce et 
al., 2016; Dal Cin et al., 1993; Mason et al., 2016). The first study to empirically verify the 
high rejection rates was conducted by Dal Cin et al. (1993) with Canadian business angels. 
The authors identified that at the deal source and screening stage for every ten opportunities 
submitted to an angel investor seven are immediately put aside. The study tracked the 
rejection rates through the investment process and concluded that only 3% of the original 
business opportunities were successful in achieving funding. Recent studies have shown 
very similar results. A USA study included 332 firms that sought funding from a Boston 
                                                          
15 Yield rate or acceptance rate was measured as the ratio between the total number of investments made and 
the total number of opportunities presented to investors. 
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group (Brush et al., 2012) identified only 82 (24.70%) investment opportunities that were 
able to pass desk rejection. A study using a similar approach analysed the decision making 
process of Tech Coast Angels (Mitteness et al., 2012a). The study highlighted that only 4% 
of the opportunities that did not get rejected at the application stage were funded.  
 
Mason and Harrison (2015) studied the levels of investment activity in the post 2008 
financial crisis and identified that less than 3% of the opportunities got funded by angel 
groups. A very similar result was attained by Carpentier and Suret (2015). The authors 
analysed 636 investment proposals submitted to a Canadian angel group and identified that 
only 2.4% of the opportunities survived the investment process. According to the same 
study, the rejection rate varied across the different stages of the investment process. The pre-
screen of the proposal is the stage with the highest rejection rate (70%), while the detailed 
presentation was the one with the lowest rejection rate (4%). Very similar results were found 
by Croce et al. (2016) who studied the 1942 investment proposal submitted to an Italian 
angel group. The research identified an overall rejection rate above 90% with 72% of the 
opportunities being rejected after the pre-screening stage. 
 
Other lines of research have identified that the means by which the angel investor sources 
the investment opportunity has an impact on rejection rates (Croce et al., 2016; Dal Cin et 
al., 1993; Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000). This is particularly significant for 
investment opportunities referred by business associates16. Angel investors perceive two 
implicit benefits from these referrals. First, the business associates will be the first screening 
mechanism working as an initial quality filter (Harrison et al., 1997) Second, a reference 
                                                          
16 Dal cin et al., (1993, p. 195) defined these business associates as individuals “with whom the investor have 
had extensive investment experience”.  
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from a business associate will be seen as a quality signal for the presented opportunities 
(Sørheim, 2003) which counts as a validation factor. Hence, both implicit benefits will be 
valuable for the angel investor, increasing the likelihood of finding a suitable investment 
opportunity (Kelly and Hay, 2003; Mason and Harrison, 1996a; Paul et al., 2007). Van 
Osnabrugge (2000) identified a third benefit of referrals. The due diligence requirements 
will be substantially lower for referenced opportunities. A subsequent study corroborated 
this finding (Morrissette, 2007). A recent study conducted by Croce et al. (2016) noticed that 
opportunities that had been referred by venture capital firms had a higher probability to pass 
the pre-screening stage. 
 
To understand the reasons for this high rejection rate one must ask four questions. First, how 
many reasons do angel investors give to reject? Second, what are the most frequently reasons 
for a rejection? Third, do the reasons to reject change as the opportunity moves along the 
different stages of the investment process? Lastly, does the fact that business angels are not 
homogeneous impact the rejection decision? In other words, do different angels reject for 
different reasons? These four questions will be answered in the following paragraphs for a 
better understanding of the rejection literature.  
 
The first question has been significantly researched (Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Mason et 
al., 2016; Mason and Harrison, 1996a; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; Maxwell et al., 
2011). Using a sample of 35 investment opportunities Mason and Harrison (1996a) identified 
that the great majority of rejected proposals (more than 90%) exhibited no more than three 
weaknesses. The study acknowledged that 61 reasons were given for rejecting the 32 
investment opportunities. This represents approximately two reasons per proposal. However, 
this will not be the case across the different stages of the investment process. Mason and 
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Harrison (2003) showed that an even lower number of reasons to reject are given at the 
screening stage. Their study indicated that, on average, participants gave 1.29 reasons to 
reject an opportunity. Mason and Rogers (1996, 1997) identified a very similar approach for 
the way business angels reject a business opportunity. The authors emphasized that business 
angel’s move toward the screening stage looking for justification not to fund the opportunity. 
However, this does not happen as soon as they identify a “fatal blow”. The research found 
that angel investors will look for a combination of deficiencies which tentatively suggests 
the use of a compensatory decision model. This approach was defined by the authors as 
“three strikes and you’re out” (Mason and Rogers, 1997, p. 43).    
 
Subsequent research has questioned the type of decision model used. Maxwell et al. (2011) 
concluded that business angels do adopt a non-compensatory decision model which will 
allow them to make quick decisions based on finding one or more reasons to reject. The 
research identified that the detection of a fatal flaw17 will make the investor reject the 
opportunity. This finding validates the non-compensatory hypothesis of the study. 
Carpentier and Suret (2015) identified what was the specific “deal killer” during the 
screening stage. Out of the 105 opportunities rejected at the screening stage, the authors 
identified 105 reasons for this decision. Although all of these studies have focused on the 
screening stage, the difference in decision making models suggested can be related to the 
methodology used.  
 
Shepherd and Zacharakis (1999) alerted the problems associated with different 
methodologies. This debate will be further developed in chapter four. The discussion will 
show that the importance of investment criteria is methodologically dependent. Additionally, 
                                                          
17 Other authors have called it “deal killers” 
 100 
 
the difference in decision making models could be associated with generalization. Although 
Maxwell et al. (2011) defended a non-compensatory model, 89% of the rejections were due 
to a single reason, leaving 11% of decisions which the non-compensatory approach does not 
fit. Mason and Harrison (1996a) acknowledged that methodological limitation of their study 
prevented them from being able to evaluate whether business angels used 
compensatory/non-compensatory models. A recent study, Mason et al. (2016) provide a 
useful summary of this literature. The authors’ analysed 148 investment opportunities that 
were rejected. The authors concluded that 90% of these decisions were based on three or less 
reasons. Any comparison with previous studies needs to be done with care since the authors 
did not control for the stage of the investment process in which the proposal was rejected. 
However, this research is able to contribute to the existent literature by highlighting that 
typically business angels do not need a significant number of reasons to reject an investment 
opportunity.  
 
Several factors have been highlighted by scholars as justifications to reject an investment 
opportunity at the screening stage. Haar et al., (1988) attempted to profile the investment 
community in the USA. Relying on a sample of 121 East Coast angels the authors concluded 
the key reasons to reject. A considerable amount of participants (72.8%) reported that the 
lack of capability of the management team was the key issue to disqualify an investment. 
This was followed by insufficient market potential (67.5%) and problems with the 
entrepreneur with high valuation expectations (52.8%). The major limitation of this study is 
the lack of stage focus. These findings of this study are very similar to subsequent research 
that highlighted the importance of the entrepreneur, market and financial as possible fatal 
flaws.  
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A later study conducted by Mason and Harrison (1996a) reached very similar results. The 
research used a random sample of deals that were submitted to an angel group to evaluate 
what factors led angel investors to drop an investment opportunity. The authors coded the 
notes, memos and minutes of the syndicate discussions on the opportunities. This identified 
the entrepreneur/management team as the most important factor contributing to a rejection 
at the screening stage. Marketing/market related issues and finance were in joint second 
position in terms of importance for a rejection. The most cited reason to reject was a weak 
management team (referred to 11 times) followed by unrealistic financial projections 
(mentioned seven times). The importance of the people, in particular their management 
capability, was stressed by Feeney et al. (1999) as the central rejection criteria. The study 
also called attention to other factors but it emphasized that people characteristics are the 
main driver of a rejection (lack of managerial knowledge, unrealistic expectations and 
personal qualities).  
 
A recent study reached similar results. Mason et al. (2016) used two different samples18 to 
emphasize that the most common reasons that lead an angel investor to reject an opportunity 
are the people followed by product/market. During the in-depth interviews, issues related to 
the entrepreneur’s character (honestly, trustworthy, believable and so on) were the most cited 
deal killers for participants.  
 
However, there is a second group of studies focusing on rejection reasons that did not 
identify the entrepreneur as the central deficiency. Mason and Harrison (2002a) used a 
sample of 74 investors to identify the barriers that angel investors’ face while investing. 
Although the results also stressed the importance of the entrepreneur, in particular, 
                                                          
18 30 in-depth interviews and 148 questionnaire responses 
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credibility issues, it was not the key reason identified by investors. Issues associated with 
the business plan (unrealistic assumptions, unsatisfactory information, and lack of credible 
evidence) was key flaw in the investment proposals available to angel investors. Mason and 
Harrison (2003) presented additional evidence to support the idea that the entrepreneur is 
not the key reason behind a rejection. The authors sought to minimize methodological critics 
by using a real time technique. Hence, a video with a real pitch was presented to a sample 
of 30 angels and participants were asked to think out loud with the unit of thought being 
recorded. The study identified that 80% of the participants rejected the opportunity, with the 
most referenced negative reasons that led to this decision being: presentation19, market and 
lastly, the financials.  
 
Issues regarding the importance of presentational skills were further developed by Clark 
(2008). The author asked participants to watch three real-life presentations and then asked 
their investment decisions and the reasons for these resolutions. The results show that non-
presentational reasons were more frequently pointed as justifications to reject than 
presentational motives. Participants highlighted as the most important non-presentational 
reasons (i) lack of investment fit (ii) competitive issues (iii) apprehensions regarding the 
business model. However, when asked specific opinions about the presentation angel 
investors were extremely critical with 70% of the presentational comments being negative. 
The main limitation of this research is the fact that the study focus on presentational issues 
which are important but not necessarily the reason for the rejection. In their study, Carpentier 
and Suret (2015) presented slightly different results, with much less emphasis on the 
entrepreneurial team. The study acknowledged that the main reason to reject at the screening 
                                                          
19 The study had separate criterion to evaluate the presentation and the entrepreneur (people). 
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stage was the market (39%) followed by product and model (37%) and the financial (12%). 
The team (entrepreneur/management team) only represented 10% of the reasons to reject.  
 
Four possible justifications can be advocated for the different findings. First, it is possible 
that in almost 30 years entrepreneurs have become more aware of what is needed to get the 
approval of an angel investor. It is reasonable to expect that this could be an effect of 
entrepreneurial learning/training. Second, the results are influenced by how the importance 
of the criteria is measured. Mason and Harrison (1996a) measured importance in two ways 
(i) the number of times the criterion was mentioned (ii) the number of opportunities that the 
criterion was referred. In Mason and Harrison (1996a) study, if the importance is measured 
with the latter, then the results are much closer to Carpentier and Suret (2015). Thirdly, this 
could be related to sampling issues. These studies have used the data provided from different 
sources: individual angels, syndicated angels and gatekeepers. Previous studies have shown 
that the heterogeneity of the angel population impacts the decision making criteria (some 
examples: Feeney et al., 1999; Harrison et al., 2015; Landström, 1998; Mitteness et al., 
2012a; Van Osnabrugge, 1998a). Lastly, some of these studies are strongly stage dependent, 
while others are not. While asking participants to recall a decision it is almost impossible to 
ensure that the answer will be stage dependent.  
 
In terms of the third question, changes across the investment process are discussed. The 
decision making literature has clearly emphasized that analogous to the reasons to invest, 
the motives to reject also change as the process unfolds. Much of this change can be 
explained by Fiet’s (1995b) research. Business angels put more stress on agency risk rather 
than in market risk. Their risk avoidance strategy will consist in “recruiting” an entrepreneur 
that is able to (i) manage the downsides associated with market risk (ii) minimize the agency 
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risk. The latter is particularly important given the emphasis that business angels give to 
agency risk. Ensuring that interests between the entrepreneur and the angel investors are 
aligned is extremely important. Hence, during the initial stages of the investment process the 
emphasis is on knowing (Haar et al., 1988; Riding et al., 2007; Sudek, 2006) and building 
trust (Harrison et al., 1997; Kelly and Hay, 2003; Maxwell and Lévesque, 2014) with the 
entrepreneur. At later stages the relative importance of these risks will change and market 
risk will become central (Paul et al., 2007). This approach is supported by several studies 
(for example: Mason and Harrison, 1996a; Mitteness et al., 2012a).  
 
Specifically, changes in the number of reasons to reject as the investment proposal evolves 
across the different stages of the process has been examined by Mason and Harrison (1996a). 
During the initial screening stage, angel investors will reject for a combination of reasons, 
while at later stages they will be reject based on a specific “deal killer”. Although with a 
different research angle Maxwell et al. (2011) also examined changes in the decision models 
used by business angels across the different stages of the process. This research reported that 
at the screening stage the angel investor will use a single deal killer, while at later stages the 
rejection will be due to an accumulation of reasons. A third study by Croce et al. (2016) 
showed that investors presented more reasons to reject after pre-screening rather than after 
screening20.  
 
In a recent study, the findings of Carpentier and Suret (2015) suggest that in a group context 
the level of variation of the investment criteria across the process may be smaller. The study 
highlighted that after the pre-screen stage the reasons to reject do not vary. However, one 
                                                          
20 1813 reasons were mention for the 1381 rejections after pre-screening while only 526 were presented for 
the 466 rejections after screening.  
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limitation of this analysis is the exclusion of the negotiation stage. The rational for this 
decision is that at the negotiation stage the key reason to reject are the financial 
considerations, in particular the valuation. Hence, one may conclude that the variation might 
be smaller than initially expected. The research also provided evidence of different rakings 
of importance across the investment process. The market (39%) was the most common 
reason to reject at the screening stage, while during all the following three stages, product 
and model (60%) was the key reason to discard the opportunity. Financial considerations 
(50%) were the main reason to reject at the negotiation stage. 
 
Homogeneity is also a feature of the rejection discussion. A recent study has looked at the 
reasons to reject taking into account the lack of homogeneity of the angel population (Mason 
et al., 2016). A key finding of this research was the fact that investor characteristics were not 
a good predictor to explain the number of reasons to reject nor the specific reasons presented. 
The authors suggested that this similarity of investment approaches could be the result of 
investors being part of angel groups which could be generating ‘communities-of-practice’ 
where participants share a similar identity.  Some level of convergence can also be found in 
Harrison et al. (2015). Using three samples of four investors the authors looked at how 
investment experience impacted the way business angels made decisions. The three groups 
exhibited the same rejection rates (75%) while taking different average times to reject the 
opportunity. Although the criteria rankings is different across the different groups, it is 
important to emphasize that this study did not focus on the motivations to reject. Hence, the 
criteria rankings are not suitable for this section of the review.  
 
Feeney et al. (1999) used a sample with active investors and another with occasional 
investors. The study identified that the biggest turn-off for an active angel was the 
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entrepreneur’s attributes, while for occasional investors it was the business attributes. Hence, 
one may conclude that earlier studies recognized that homogeneity plays a role in terms of 
rejection criteria. However, recent research has called attention to the possibility that angel 
groups might be reducing the variability of the investment behaviour of business angels, 
which could be explained by the learning process associated with being part of an angel 
group (Harrison et al., 2015).  
 
One may conclude from this review that the reasons leading to a rejection have been under 
researched, both when compared with the investment criteria literature and in terms of what 
is still to be found. There is a clear need to understand the change in the rejection criteria as 
the process evolves. The contradictory results do not make it clear how important is the 
entrepreneur at the screening stage in terms of a rejection criteria. Therefore, one can 
question the reasoning made by Fiet (1995b) that the angel investors hedge market risk with 
their choice of entrepreneur. Another questionable finding regards the differences between 
investment criteria and rejection motivates. In a review of the literature, Ahtila (2014) 
questioned the extent to which the investment criteria differs from to the reasons to reject. 
In fact, the author noticed that contrary to the findings of previous research (Feeney et al., 
1999; Haar et al., 1988), the investment and rejection criteria are very similar. Hence, it is 
fundamental that scholars put more emphasis on the rejection reasons so these queries can 
be clarified. 
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to review the key literature in terms of business angels’ 
investment decision and to lay the ground for subsequent chapters. The road travelled has 
helped scholars to have a robust idea of the process and drivers of angel investing. But this 
review reveals that there is still more to be done, in particular, in terms of investment criteria 
and rejection motivations. At this stage, what is known by scholars about the business 
angels’ investment decisions has been presented. This does not mean that there are no 
disagreements in the literature or unknown areas. Possible justifications to explain the 
reasons for contradictory results are associated with methodological and sampling problems. 
However, this review sought to provide a deep overview of the different areas of angel 
investment, such as: process, the motivations to invest, the criteria to invest and to reject. In 
terms of the investment process, the review enabled an informed decision on which model 
is more suitable for this research.  
 
A reference is made to the differences between group and individual investment processes. 
Much more could be said if the aim was to reflect an angel group investment process. 
However, the results focus on the individual decision process. This is done without forgetting 
the importance of syndication to the process. The investment motivations are reviewed and 
it is possible to identify that recently the literature has not been developed. A call for 
acknowledgement of the importance of investing with others that results from the growing 
of angel groups is made. In terms of investment criteria, this review has identified the set of 
criteria commonly used in previous studies. Additionally, this review has put a precise 
emphasis on the inconsistency of relative importance given to specific criterion. This is 
particularly important given that previous research has highlighted exactly the opposite 
(Riding et al., 2007). Lastly, the literature on rejection motivations is summarized with the 
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need for further research being requested. This is due to the contradictory findings in terms 
of how the rejection reasons change as the process unfolds. Additionally, scholars should 
acknowledge that this stream of research has been undermined when compared with the 
investment criteria. 
 
This chapter has provided the underling literature for the three empirical chapters. 
Nevertheless, given the differences across the topics further discussed in this thesis, each 
empirical chapter will have a specific review of the literature covering the debate. The 
following three empirical chapters will extend the discussion of business angel investment 
decision in terms of (i) methods used (ii) typologies of investment decisions (iii) changes of 
investment criteria. This will obviously require three additional literature reviews 
highlighting in detail the need for the discussion and the state of art of the research area. 
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Chapter 3.  Research on business angels: the research challenges  
3.1 Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship has been a common practice of mankind since the beginning of time and 
it was first defined more than 250 years ago. But only recently, has entrepreneurial 
knowledge developed significantly, with particular progress being made over the last 30 
years (Cornelius et al., 2006). Hence, it is a research area still trying to achieve the necessary 
legitimacy (Bruyat and Julien, 2001; Busenitz et al., 2003). Over this period the field of 
entrepreneurship and small business management has evolved considerably both in terms of 
importance and research conducted, particularly in terms of its conceptualization, 
methodologies applied and topic development (Landström et al., 2012). However, this does 
not mean that conducting research in entrepreneurship will not have a considerable number 
of challenges. This is also particularly true in entrepreneurial finance, which is the 
motivation for this chapter.  
 
To a large extent, business angel research reflects these issues. Kelly (2007) recognised how 
much scholars have developed this research area. However, the author emphasized that much 
more needs to be done, with definitional, methodological and theoretical issues being noticed 
as possible improvements. Illustrations of such issues can be easily found. For example, in 
terms of the definitional concern, the recent universalisation of equity crowdfunding 
platforms has brought additional confusion to the business angel definition. The overlap of 
the two communities is not totally clear and not very easy to measure.  
 
Methodologically, scholars have attempted to improve the methods of data collection to 
achieve representative samples. Two alternative strategies have been used by scholars. On 
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the one hand, scholars have used secondary data sets, e.g. Dragons’ Den data (Maxwell et 
al., 2011; Maxwell and Lévesque, 2014), Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (e.g. Ding et al., 
2015). On the other hand, angel groups have been used as mechanism to collect aggregate 
or individual data (some examples: Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Mitteness et al., 2012a; 
Parhankangas and Ehrlich, 2014). Both strategies are not without limitations that should be 
addressed by researchers. Lastly, there has been an increasing number of publications that 
are theory driven. However, it is important to acknowledge that this demand for strong 
theoretical foundations is not always possible. Two justifications can be acknowledged. 
First, several areas in angel research are still under developed. Take the exit process as an 
example where the strategies used by business angels are still under researched (Carpentier 
and Suret, 2014; Mason et al., 2015). Second, the fast evolution of the small business equity 
finance market creates additional pressure for scholars to describe, explain and discuss the 
implications of new developments.  
 
There has been an awareness of the challenges of researching business angels since Weztel’s 
(1983) pioneering work. Hence, it is fundamental to understand how scholars have dealt with 
these limitations and what can still be done to overcome them. This discussion takes into 
account the evolution of the alternative finance industry. The aim of this chapter is to discuss 
the challenges of conducting business angel research and to provide methodological 
suggestions to researchers in the field. The next section will present the three characteristics 
of the angel population which create challenges for researchers. Subsequent sections will 
debate the implications of the solutions presented by scholars, particularly, the 
methodological solutions used. Lastly, the chapter suggests a new approach to calculate 
response rates when business angel groups are used in the recruitment process.    
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3.2 Definition  
 
The definition of a business angel has evolved without a clear path or direction. Farrell et 
al., (2008) presented an extensive review of the definitions used in previous research 
highlighting the two major concerns about these studies. First, scholars have used different 
definitions for the same concept (business angels). Second, the definitions used are created 
to fit specific studies. Both problems pose limitations in terms of generalization and theory 
development. Similar concerns were raised by Avdeitchikova et al., (2008). They 
emphasized that after 25 years of research there is no standard definition of the key concepts 
in the field. The existence of three grey areas is referred to as the justification for the lack of 
a single definition.  
 
Contrarily to other objects of study, business angels have a wide spread of individual 
characteristics and backgrounds (for example: industry experience, education, investment 
motivations and so on). This variability adds complexity to formulate a valid definition. This 
is reflected by Mason and Harrison (2008) who argued that the crucial issue to define an 
angel investor is associated with the delimitation of the concept. Business angel activity is 
not static. This has repercussions not only in terms of what makes an investor become a 
business angel, but also in terms of population size. The authors identified the transitory 
nature of angel investing. Other scholars (Avdeitchikova, 2008; Riding, 2005) also 
supported the argument that the dynamic nature of the angel market which generate 
definitional complications (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008). This indicates that the major 
problem is how set the limits of a concept that is not static. This has led scholars to produce 
 112 
 
conflicting definitions, which in many case have been produced to satisfy data requirements 
rather than develop knowledge. 
 
The terminology used by researchers has not been consistent. ‘Informal investors’, ‘business 
angels’ and ‘private investors’ have been used interchangeably in the literature, although the 
terms do not represent the same concept. Four papers (Avdeitchikova, 2008; Avdeitchikova 
et al., 2008; Farrell et al., 2008; Mason and Harrison, 2008) have addressed the problems 
created by scholars by using the different labels under the same umbrella. Several reasons 
have been referred to in each paper. Reasons do not vary too much across the studies. All 
four papers make reference to two factors (i) the lack of differentiation between love money 
(family and friends) and business angels (ii) the level of investment experience – minimum 
number of investments. The remaining causes presented highlighted different dimensions: 
involvement with the invested firms, financial tools used, syndication, dynamics of the angel 
market, heterogeneity of the angel population, etc. For all of these reasons, and with the 
evolution of the angel market, it is important to acknowledge the limitations associated with 
angel research. Table 3-1 summarizes the problems identified in these four papers.  
 
Table 3-1: Definitional problems presented in previous research. 
(Farrell et al., 2008)  
(Mason and Harrison, 
2008) 
(Avdeitchikova, 2008) (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008) 
Timing Dynamics of angel activity  Love money 
Requirements on the 
channelling of investments Debt Investment experience 
Investment 
experience 
Virgin Investors Heterogeneity   Requirements on the level 
of investment activity and 
hands-on contribution 
given to the company 
invested in 
Corporate Angels Love money    
Family Syndication   The types of relations 
between the investor and 
the entrepreneur 
Friends Hand-off   
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The rise of equity crowdfunding platforms brings an additional grey area to this discussion. 
How can researchers clearly differentiate between crowd funders and angel investors? 
Scholars have already identified commonalities between business angels and crowdfunding 
investors (Ordanini et al., 2011). A recent UK study (Mason and Botelho, 2014) identified 
that 22% of business angels also invest through crowdfunding platforms. Another UK study, 
conducted during a similar period, identified that 45% of business angels invest alongside 
crowdfunding platforms (Wright et al., 2015). Hence, scholars need to be alert when 
designing surveys which investor type they are targeting. The new alternative finance trends 
can lead to incorrect recruitment processes which would result in unrepresentative samples. 
Hence, scholars should use previous definitions to enable comparison between studies. 
However, scholars have to be alert to market evolutions to ensure that the definitions are up-
to-date.  
 
3.3 Invisibility and Anonymity 
 
The angel market is known for having two segments - visible and invisible (Wetzel, 1994). 
The visible side is characterized by investors who are members of business angel networks 
or business introduction services. This enables researchers to be able to estimate the size of 
the visible market with a comfortable degree of assurance when compared with the invisible 
segment. The invisible side of the market is characterized by investors who operate on their 
own, or in very small groups. These investors want to be anonymous with their investment 
activity not being publicly documented (Mason and Harrison, 1997). Their practices are 
slightly different from those in the visible market. For example, their deal flow depends on 
their reputation and word-of-mouth. The size of the invisible portion of the market still 
remains unknown. As a consequence, the total size of the angel population is also unknown. 
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This is not surprising, since in his early study Wetzel (1983, p. 26) has maintained that the 
size of the angel market ‘is unknown and probably unknowable.’ 
 
This important characteristic has significant impact in terms of research design. Mason and 
Harrison (1997) acknowledged that the biggest fragment of the angel market is the invisible 
fraction. The same research team emphasized that in the UK the visible market can also be 
segmented into two overlapping parts (Mason and Harrison, 2010): (i) visible market (ii) tax 
relief scheme. The first sub-segment consists of investments made through some type of 
business angel networks or groups. The second sub-segment entails those investments made 
using the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS). It becomes clear that although these two sub-
segments are considered “visible” they are not equally accessible to researchers. First, not 
all angel networks provide information about their members. Second, not all EIS investments 
are made by angel investors (Mason and Harrison, 2010). Hence, it is not possible to 
understand how much these two sub-segments overlap.  
  
However, this is just a part of a bigger problem – understanding the relation between the 
visible and invisible markets. The existence of these two segments of the angel market 
generates additional problems to scholars conducting angel research. First, the relationship 
between segments of the angel market remains unknown. Until recently, scholars were not 
able to precisely quantify the size of both segments. Scholars have “played with numbers” 
to produce fragile estimations of the market segments. An example of this was conducted by 
Mason and Harrison (2000a). Having calculated the size of the visible market based on 
membership of business angel networks, the authors suggested that in the UK the invisible 
market is five times larger than the visible counterpart. However this was a guestimate so 
the research presented two additional suggestions (i) invisible is ten times larger than the 
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visible segment (ii) 20 times relationship. Hence, the invisible segment of the angel market 
does not allow a correct estimation of the angel population. Second, the level of interaction 
between segments.  
 
Mason and Harrison (2010) recognised three “types” of investment behaviour. First, there 
were a group of investors who solely operated in the invisible market. Second, there were 
business angels who invested in both the visible and invisible markets. Lastly, there were 
those who only invest through networks or as part of angel groups. The proportion of each 
“type” of investment behaviour is unknown. In a later study, Mason and Harrison (2015) 
highlighted that “many” angel investors were actively involved in both segments of the 
market. However, it is not clear to what extent both segments overlap which creates 
additional imperfections to the correct estimation the size of the angel population.  
 
Scholars have acknowledged the sampling limitations created by invisibility and anonymity 
of the angel market (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008; Mason and Harrison, 2008). If the size of 
the angel population is unknown how can scholars collect representative samples? Several 
sampling techniques have been employed (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008), but only a rare 
number of studies, if any, were able to collect a random sample (Riding, 2008). Harrison and 
Mason (2008) noticed the need for sampling improvement, with the need to go beyond just 
identifying and surveying the angel population. They stressed the need to identify, measure, 
and track the angel market using new procedures rather than following similar rules as 
venture capital research. However, in the majority of cases, scholars have described a highly 
invisible market using the visible counterpart (Kelly, 2007). This will be further discussed 
in a following section. In the great majority of angel studies scholars have solved the 
invisibility and anonymity limitation by surveying the visible market. Given that the 
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interaction between the visible and invisible segments remains unknown, representativeness 
cannot be ensured. However, scholars are able to get a step closer to understanding angel 
investment behaviour.   
 
 
3.4 Heterogeneity  
 
The lack of homogeneity in the angel population has been identified in Wetzel’s (1983) 
initial work. This characteristic has direct impacts on business angel research, specifically 
the level of homogeneity of a population has a direct impact in terms of research design. On 
one hand, it has sampling implications. Zikmund et al. (2013) noticed that the heterogeneity 
of a population will be one of three factors necessary to identify a sample size.  On the other 
hand, it has direct definitional implications. This was observed by Mason and Harrison 
(2008) when the authors pointed to it as one of the reasons for the definitional problem. 
Farrell et al. (2008) made a similar comment when referring to specific “types” of investors 
as a definitional issue. Scholars have conducted categorization studies to better understand 
to what extent this heterogeneity is important and what does it represent. A 22 year old 
journey that allowed scholars to offer different typologies enabling unique ways to 
understand the angel population. However, the common feature in categorization studies is 
that different angels will have different investment behaviours. 
 
Since the initial categorization study conducted by Gaston (1989), scholars have highlighted 
differences in the angel population. However, the rules used to distinguish angel investors 
have varied across studies. Typically, categorization studies have used investor 
characteristics to differentiate angel investors. The most frequent characteristic used has 
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been investment activity (Freear et al., 1994; Kelly and Hay, 1996, 2000; Kelly, 2000; 
Sørheim and Landström, 2001), but scholars have also looked at investment motivations 
(Sullivan and Miller, 1996), entrepreneurial background (Coveney and Moore, 1998) and 
investment preference (Erikson, 2007). Avdeitchikova (2008) represented a breaking point 
in categorization studies. First, her research suggests the use of the investment as a unit of 
analysis, rather than the investor. This suggestion is perfectly aligned with previous research 
(Avdeitchikova et al., 2008; Farrell et al., 2008; Mason and Harrison, 2008) that goes beyond 
categorization studies. Second, the research showed that the investment behaviour of 
business angels is not static, but varies across investments. Hence, if investment behaviour 
changes then investors can switch the “type” they belong to. This implies that it is a much 
harder task to map the angel population. 
 
The heterogeneity of the angel population increases the problems of achieving representative 
samples (Farrell et al., 2008). The great majority of business angel studies are based on 
samples of convenient population groups (Harrison and Mason, 2008) that have not taken 
into account the heterogeneity of the angel population. The evidence collected by researchers 
showed that the angel market is evolving with the visible segment increasing size (Mason et 
al., 2013; Sohl, 2012a). The effect on the level of homogeneity of the angel population has 
not been studied. However, as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, it is reasonable to 
expect that angels in the visible segment are becoming more alike, increasing the 
homogeneity, associated with the standardization of the investment process and the learning 
from group interactions. A recent study conducted by Mason et al. (2016) on the rejection 
criteria of business angel noticed how group membership was creating a common way of 
thinking across investors. The effect on the invisible segment is harder to predict. Hence, 
one logical step is to take Avdeitchikova’s (2008) advice and conduct research that is 
investment driven rather than investor focused.  
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3.5 Sampling 
 
The three characteristics previously mentioned raise a very important challenge to scholars 
to generate representative samples. Much of the studies conducted in angel research has been 
the product of convenience or snowball sampling (Riding, 2008). This is not a desirable 
outcome, but the result of the characteristics of the angel market. First, scholars need to be 
able to identify representative samples (Månsson and Landström, 2006). This problem is 
directly linked with the invisibility/anonymity characteristic. Second, the alternative 
sampling approaches do not come without their weakness. Avdeitchikova et al. (2008) 
reviewed sampling techniques used in angel research and identified the different trade-offs 
of each approach. The authors argued that “to gain robust knowledge within the field, we 
need to increase the quality of the sampling techniques used” (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008, p. 
392). This research suggested two options in terms of sampling approaches (i) random 
sample approach (ii) multi-sample approach. The first sampling approach is comprised of 
two stages (a) identification and (b) data verification. At the identification stage, the 
researcher would contact a large number of potential angel investors. Then, the second stage 
consists of verifying which of the respondents can be considered as business angels.  
 
Avdeitchikova (2008) applied this approach in Sweden and from an initial random sample 
of 40,320 individuals, the author completed 278 interviews with angel investors. The second 
sampling approach suggests, rather than using a unique sampling technique, the researcher 
should use a number of different sampling methodologies.  Avdeitchikova et al., (2008) used 
this approach applying 7 procedures (for example: business angel’s networks, media, 
referral, earlier study and so on). This approach resulted in 297 responses of angel investors 
from 1518 invitations. Both sampling approaches are seen by the authors as ways to increase 
the quality of the data. However, the great majority of studies from 2008 onwards did not 
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follow this recommendation. Scholars have used self-selected registers (business angel 
networks/groups) as a sampling frame. 
 
Farrell et al. (2008) had already called attention to the rise in the use of business angel 
networks and business introduction services as a sampling frame. The authors conducted a 
review of angel research in the period between 1981 and 2007 and identified three 
methodological trends. First, scholars have reduced the number of convenience methods 
used. Second, there was a decrease in the number of organization types used in the studies. 
Research conducted before 1993 examined an average of 3.6 different organizations while 
studies conducted in the following period only surveyed two types of data sources. Lastly, 
the number of business angel networks and business introduction services examined has 
increased significantly21. This increase in the number of organizations examined is seen as 
an attempt to reduce biases (Mason and Harrison, 2002c).  
 
However, Farrell et al. (2008) emphasized that the use of these organizations still represented 
a convenience sample because of self-selection biases. Investors who are members of such 
organizations are not necessarily representative of the angel population. First, these 
organizations are believed to be just a small proportion of the angel investing and do not 
represent the entire market (Mason and Harrison, 2001).  Studies using this sampling 
approach would not include the group of investors that only invest in the invisible market. 
Second, Farrell et al., (2008) defended that even if scholars increased the variability of 
business angel networks surveyed, it is impossible to guarantee that a sample is 
representative. The key problem is the uncertainty associated with the invisible segment. If 
scholars could better identify the size and the practices of the invisible segment, then the 
                                                          
21 From 10 BISs surveyed by Van Osnabrugge (1998a) to 19 BISs studied by (Mason & Harrison, 2002c) 
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sampling approach would be seen less susceptible to biases. Otherwise, scholars should take 
on board Avdeitchikova et al.,’s (2008) suggestion. 
 
Subsequent research has not taken into account the advice offered by Farrell et al. (2008) 
regarding the use of business angel network as a sampling method. Since 2008, the great 
majority of studies have used business angel networks/groups as a sample or as a recruitment 
mechanism. To evaluate if Farrell et al.,’s (2008) findings were still valid, a review of angel 
research from 2008 to 2015 was conducted. This built on the period of analysis used by 
Farrell et al., (2008). The decision was the choose journals articles in the field of 
entrepreneurship. Only 3 and 4* journals22 in the field of entrepreneurship were included. 
This represented a total of eight journals, five ranked as 3 and three ranked as 4*. The 
rationale behind this decision was to evaluate which sampling approach high level 
publications have used. The last decision was to identify which words to use in the search. 
The words used were “business angel” and “business angels”. The objective of this search 
strategy was identify high quality publications on angel research rather than maximizing the 
number of articles found on the topic.  
 
The combined results of the two searches are presented in Table 3-2. Depending on the 
search words used the number of identified articles differed. The two result lists were 
combined into a single list. The aggregate list of publications had a total of 178 articles that 
had some reference to business angel(s). The following step was to identify articles that had 
the angel investor and/or investment activity/process as the key theme of the research. From 
this initial set, only 22 (12%) of these articles were focused on business angels and/or their 
practices. In terms of the number of publications, the results show that there is no significant 
                                                          
22 Journals in the ABS rankings  
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difference between the number of 3 and 4* journals. Both ranks of journal have published 
around ten articles in the period under review. The total number of articles found that used 
business angel networks/groups or business introduction services was 11 (50%). A further 
three papers were based on data from TV shows Dragons’ Den and/or Shark Tank. This 
would increases the values to 14 (64%). This inclusion can be defended by the similarities 
between angel groups and such TV shows23. These results indicated that the sampling 
recommendations made by Farrell et al. (2008) and Avdeitchikova et al. (2008) have not 
been taken into account in succeeding research. When evaluating the quality of the 
publications the results are even more surprising, 75% of 4* journal publications used groups 
as a sampling approach. This finding is even stronger if the analysis evaluates publications 
by the creation of new data set.   
 
There is a clear division between articles that used existing data sets (38% representing 7 
articles) and others that collected new data (62% representing 15 papers). The first group of 
research used financial data that were publicly available. This included data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor. The second group of papers needed to generate a data set which 
implied a data collection process. The articles found in the search indicated that 93% of the 
research with new data used business angel networks/group or business introduction 
services. Only one article did not use this sampling approach. This provides a clear indication 
that scholars have a strong preference to study what they can easily identify rather than 
pursuing representativeness of the sample gathered. Hence, one might ask if this is an 
appropriate behaviour and what can lead to this decision. On the one hand, scholars cannot 
fully understand the invisible segment. So, how can researchers discuss representativeness 
                                                          
23 Size and investment process. 
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when the population in unknown? On the other hand, surveying the visible segment is cost 
effective and likely to be less time consuming.  
 
Table 3-2: Published angel research in 3 and 4* journals, 2008 to 2015 
Initial search 
"Business Angel" and ”Business 
Angels” 
Rank 4 74 
Rank 3 104  
Total 178 
Angel Research   
Rank 4 12 
Rank 3 10 
Total 22 
BAN/G Sampling   
Rank 4 6 (9)* 
Rank 3 5 
Total 11 (14)* 
 
The increase of the number of articles in angel research using business angel 
networks/groups reflects the low cost24 and simplicity of data collection process. 
Additionally, it also reflects the increasing interest in angel groups (Gregson et al., 2013; 
Mason et al., 2013; Sohl, 2012a). However, this practice does not come without limitations. 
As previously mentioned, representativeness can be questioned.  
  
3.6 Response rates 
 
Measuring response rates is a further challenge in angel research. The first issue that arises 
in angel research is to define the unit of analysis the response rate is going to be measured. 
Response rates can be measured in terms of business angels or in terms of 
groups/gatekeepers supporting the research. If scholars decide to use the investor as the unit 
of analysis, then the population will be the total number of business angels. This has clear 
                                                          
24 Time and money. 
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problems, namely, how to identify and quantify the population of business angels. Some 
studies have applied a random sample approach to try to identify angel investors 
(Avdeitchikova, 2008), which besides representing a considerable cost, raises questions 
regarding the denominator of the response rate. As previously noted, Avdeitchikova (2008) 
contacted 40,320 individuals achieving 278 responses of angel investors. The author 
presents several responses rates following each of the stages of the sampling approach. The 
final response rate is 69.3%, however, this is questionable since 278 investors out of 40,320 
initial contacts provides a considerable lower response rate (less than 1%). Hence, more 
needs to be done to calculate response rates.  
 
The main efforts of scholars have been to estimate the size of the angel market in terms of 
number of investments/amounts invested (for example: Sohl, 2003a), which is an easier task 
than the number of investors. The attempts to evaluate the number of angel investors started 
with Wetzel’s early estimations (1986). Using a market based approach, which consisted of 
comparing supply and demand, the author made a guesstimate of a total of 100,000 angel 
investors in the USA in the early 1980s. In a later study (1994), the author updated his 
estimation and projected that the number of angel investors in USA had rose to 250,000 in 
the early 1990’s. The realiabiltiy of these estimations is low, as he acknowledges (Wetzel, 
1986).  
 
Gaston (1989) used a firm based approach which consisted firstly of identifing firms that 
had raised finance resources from business angels using a Small Business Administration 
survey, and then contacting these investors. The author estimated a total number of 720,000 
angel investors in the USA Comparing both studies, it becomes clear how hard it is to have 
a realiable estimation of the number of angel investors. Other techniques have been used, for 
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example, the capture-recapture approach used by Riding and Short (1988) to estimate the 
angel population in Ottawa-Carleton, Canada. Using the known number of members of 
business angel networks (visible market) operating in the UK as a reference, Mason and 
Harrison (2000a) inferred the total number of angel investors (visible + invisible).  
 
Avdeitchikova and Landström (2005) used a large scale large omnibus survey to conclude 
that in Sweden the number of angel investors ranged between 154,000 and 180,000. All these 
techniques have limitations that are well documented in the literature, but were helpful to 
provide an initial notion of the dimension of the angel market. However, as Wetzel 
recognized (1983, p.26) the size of the angel market is ‘unknown and probably unknowable’. 
Hence, this has implications in terms of research design – how is it possible to evaluate the 
quality of a sample if you do not know the population.  A valuable alternative is to use the 
angel groups as the unit of analysis. This enables scholars to understand how representative 
a sample is in terms of the visible segment of the market. Additionally, it would be easier to 
understand bias problems.  This helps to understand its use as a sampling approach by 
scholars.  
 
Response rates in angel research vary across studies depending on the way they are 
measured. The response rates are easier to calculate, when the study does not use business 
angels’ networks/groups as a sampling approach, because typically scholars are using 
convenience samples. However, when scholars decide to use this sampling approach, the 
way response rates are calculated varies across studies. Partially, this is justified by what 
information is available. In some cases, the response rate might be calculated based on the 
number of angels, while in other cases it is computed using the number of groups supporting 
the research. Several scholars (Mason and Harrison, 2008; Avdeitchikova et al., 2008; 
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Farrell et al., 2008) have identified how problematic response rates are in angel research. 
Response rates measured in terms of angel investors range significantly (15% to 46%) (for 
example: Erikson et al., 2003; Harrison and Mason, 1992a; Wiltbank, 2005). Yet, if they are 
measured by the groups taking part, it seems to be slightly higher.  
 
In a study evaluating angel organization, Sohl (2006) reported a 37% response rate. This 
value is measured in terms of angel groups taking part in the research. Another study that 
took the same approach in terms of response rates looked at women syndication (Sohl and 
Hill, 2007). From the 120 groups’ contacted (19 women exclusive and 101 male dominated 
groups), the authors received the support of 47 groups representing a response rate of 39%. 
Mason and Harrison (2008) raise suspicion about the response rates in Sohl first study. The 
authors indicated that the response rate was not correctly calculated with the results 
presented being inflated. Nevertheless, the scepticism raised by Mason and Harrison (2008) 
is not only problem of this response rate. Calculating response rates based on angel 
organizations participation can result in misleading indicators. Two points can be raised 
regarding this issue. First, response rates do not take into account the type of organization. 
Sohl (2007) identifies six types of angel portals25 with different investment processes, 
visibility, organizational structures, membership criteria, etc… Hence, depending on the 
type of “portal” supporting the research, the results can be easily questioned in terms of 
validity and reliability (Hair et al., 2006). Second, response rates do not consider the size of 
the organizations surveyed. This is particularly important in terms of representativeness 
(Schalm and Kelloway, 2001). Membership of angels groups varies significantly from just 
a couple of investors to larger syndicates with almost three hundred members. If response 
                                                          
25 The author defines portal as the interface between business angels and entrepreneurs. 
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rates are measured in terms of angel groups then it is possible to have a distorted 
representation. 
 
An alternative approach to calculate response rates was followed by Wiltbank and Boeker 
(2007). The authors contacted 279 angel groups but only 89 of them accepted to take part in 
the research. However, the response rate was not measured in terms of angel groups, but in 
terms of investors. Using the group membership, the authors reached a 13% response rate. 
However, if the response rate was calculated using the number of angel groups supporting 
the research, the value would increase to 31%. This particular procedure of calculating 
response rates using the group membership was also followed by Wiltbank et al. (2009). The 
authors based the research on two samples (i) based on 12 business angel groups (ii) an 
online investment network. The reported response rate was based on the number of investors 
taking part, which was 23%. Although the authors of these two articles seem to have a 
conservative approach, the method used to calculate response rate can be questioned. 
 
First, it is not clear if the groups supporting the research provided details of the membership 
list, or just the number of members belonging to the organization. Assuming that the 
individual details of group members were not provided to the researchers, double counting 
of might have occurred. That is, the same investor could be counted more than once by 
belonging to more than one group. This not only underestimates the response rate26 but it 
also represents a misrepresentation in the study. Second, the authors calculated response 
rates with the returned responses instead of the usable responses. This procedure goes against 
Baruch (1999) and it can be seen as an attempt to “camouflage” the actual response rate 
                                                          
26 If membership details were provided then scholars would be able to identify members of more than one 
organization. Consequently, the denominator would be smaller which would generate a larger response rate 
for the same number of participants.  
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(Baruch and Holtom, 2008). Lastly, and the most problematic issue, the reported response 
rate does not take into account the groups that did not support the research. The authors 
decided to only include the group membership of the organizations that supported the 
research, excluding all other organizations that did not answer, or did not accepted the 
request. However, this does not reflect the initial attempt to include all angel groups. The 
denominator in the response rate calculation should refer to the total number of investors in 
all angel groups supporting the research. Hence, the reported response rate does not reflect 
the initial effort of recruiting the angel groups, which should be measured in the response 
rate.  
 
Of course, this procedure needs a second level of confirmation which should be assessed by 
using the number of respondents and should take into account: the sample size and a 
multiplier for multiplicity of groups. Equation (1) provides the two components of the 
response rate if groups are used as a vehicle to recruit participants. Equation (2) provides a 
simple weight of the number of groups that supported the research versus the total number 
of groups identified. Equation (3) provides an approach to calculate response rates, and it 
follows a similar approach of Mason and Harrison (2000a). Thus, the response rate should 
be calculated:  
𝑅 = 𝑓(𝑟𝑔, 𝑟𝑖)                                        (1)  
𝑟𝑔 =
𝑔
𝐺
                                                 (2) 
𝑟𝑖 =
𝑛
𝑁
× 𝑚                                           (3)    
Where: 
R = response rate 
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𝑟𝑔 = weight of support 
g = groups supporting the research 
G = total number of groups of the sample 
𝑟𝑖 = individual response rate 
n = number of responses 
N = total number of members of the groups supporting the research 
m = the average number of angel groups27 which these business angels are registered with 
 
This recommendation solves the problems of the two approaches previously mentioned. It 
takes into account the two dimensions of the recruitment process (i) angel group stage (ii) 
individual investor’s phase. Scholars should follow this approach when recruiting from 
business angel networks/groups or business introduction services. The interpretation of this 
measure would help not only to understand how valid and reliable the results are, but also 
how representative is the sample. The quality of a research article should not be evaluated 
just on the basis of the response rate (Campion, 1993). However, the denominator of this 
measure is directly linked with the visible market which can provides a clear notion of its 
size allowing researchers to assess the potential of the findings. Nevertheless, this suggestion 
does not come without any drawbacks.   
 
Four major limitations can be highlighted to this approach. First, it will only take into 
account the visible market. This is not a direct problem of the measure, but of the sampling 
approach. Second, the number of angel groups is not constant. The angel market is 
                                                          
27 Of the groups supporting the research. 
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continually evolving with new groups being created and old ones being amalgamated or even 
disappearing. Hence, it becomes fairly easy to underrepresent the number of active groups. 
Third, the group weighting does not take into consideration the dimension of the groups. For 
example, in the UK the group memberships range from two to close to two hundred 
members.28 If business angels’ networks are included the variety would increase29. But this 
could provide a misleading result of this index. Lastly, the multiplier is an estimation based 
on the sample results. Hence, it can still provide a misrepresentation of the response rate 
since it does not take into account the size of the groups involved. However, the aim of this 
recommendation is not to present a flawless measurement, but to call attention to the need 
of an approach to standardization when calculating response rates when the recruitment is 
done through angel groups. 
  
3.7 Discussion 
 
The previous section has presented a problematic issue regarding angel research – the 
response rate. However, one might ask if the size of the population is unknown, how can it 
make sense to calculate a response rate? Watters and Biernacki (1989) argued that it is 
impossible to calculate response rates when studying hidden populations (1989, p. 426) 
“since one can never know and, therefore, enumerate the total number of qualified 
respondents who became aware of the study by word of mouth”. This is true for hidden 
populations that do not have a visible segment. However, the angel market has a visible 
segment. Hence, it does make sense to calculate the response rate in angel research. 
                                                          
28 Very similar to the USA market where the largest group, Ohio TechAngels, has 340 members (Ohio 
Techangels, 2015). 
29 For example, Angel Investment Network reports 300,000 members worldwide, with more than 30 
networks in over 80 countries.  
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However, it is important to understand that these response rates will mainly be associated 
with the visible segment of the market.  
 
This represents an additional pressure for scholars to use business angel networks/groups 
and/or business introduction services as a sampling framework. However, the use of such an 
approach has been widely criticized by scholars (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008; Farrell et al., 
2008) as a unique sample approach. The increased use of such an approach has indicated 
that the academic community values more a larger data set, than an unbiased one. This 
becomes particularly obvious when the great majority of alternative sampling methods also 
present representativeness biases. Hence, the decision is not whether to use the visible 
market in angel research, but why scholars have not followed any of the sampling 
suggestions presented by Avdeitchikova et al. (2008)?  
 
This thesis is able to provide additional support to defend the use of business angel 
networks/groups as a sampling approach. The evolution of the angel market has been widely 
recognized by scholars with the proliferation of angel groups being the most cited indicator. 
This has a clear impact on the size of the visible segment of the angel market. The data 
collected for this thesis, through an extensive online survey of the visible segment has 
suggested that more business angels are starting their activity in groups, rather than 
individually through the invisible market. Participants reported when they conducted their 
first angel investment and the year they joined a group. This enabled an evaluation of the 
effect of syndication in terms of the origin of new business angels. Cross tabulation of Age 
of the investor/years investing and the Angel origin, that is, the way the investor started 
(group or individually) presented clear indications of an increasing significance of the visible 
segment versus the invisible one.  
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Figure 3-1 and 3-2 provided depict these findings. Figure 3-1 depicts the relationship 
between the age of the investor and the way the business angel started investment. Solely 
analyzing the investors who started in the invisible market, it can be seen that older angels 
are more likely to have started in the invisible segment of the market, whereas younger 
investors are more likely to have started investing as part of a group. This effect is not 
consistent through the five age categories. But, if the investors who started investing in the 
same year that they joined a group are included, then it becomes clear that new business 
angels are starting their activity in the visible segment.  
 
Figure 3-2 depicts the relationship between years investing and the origin of the angel 
investor. This analysis is more robust than the previous one since it focused on the length of 
the investment activity, which is a better proxy for the market evolution. The results show a 
clear increase of the proportion of investors joining groups to start investing. Approximately 
three quarters of the investors who made their first investment prior to 1999 did it on their 
own. Only one out ten investors that made their initial investment after 2009 did it on their 
own. The proportion of investors who only invested after joining a group increased in the 
period under review, from 5% to 22%. Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the rise in the 
percentage of investors who started investing in the same year they joined a group. It is 
reasonable to assume that these investors are likely to have invested after joining an angel 
group. This finding points to the increased importance of the visible segment of the angel 
market, which can justify the sampling method under discussion. However, if this is valid, 
and it is enough to evaluate the visible market, then it becomes important to standardize 
procedures in this type of study.  
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Figure 3-1: Investors' Age and Angel origin 
 
Figure 3-2: Years investing and Angel origin 
 
In summary, scholars need to acknowledge the importance of reporting the correct response 
rate. If the object of study is investors in both the visible and the invisible segments, then the 
response rate should be calculated taking into account the total of potential participants 
contacted. This can be considered virtually impossible because of the restrictions imposed 
by the nature of the invisible segment of the angel market. Exceptions are made to studies 
that used a much more focused sampling approach, e.g. snowballing sampling. However, if 
the focus is solely on investors operating in the visible market then scholars should agree on 
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a standardized approach to calculate response rates. This would bring comparability to angel 
research following similar processes in other areas of knowledge. 
 
3.8 Conclusion  
 
Initial angel researchers had to overcome the limitation of studying a highly invisible 
population with a high degree of anonymity. The nature of this hidden population has 
changed with the concept of business angels becoming widely spread, through different 
mechanisms including several TV shows. However, this does not mean that angel research 
is free of problems. Definitional and sampling issues have created disagreements among 
scholars resulting in less comparable studies. However, the popularization of angel investing 
has also had positive effects. 
 
In the recent years, the angel market has moved from investors acting on their own to a more 
collective structure. This transformation has had a direct impact on how researchers collect 
data. Business angel groups have become a very attractive way for researchers to gather data. 
However, it has raised questions about the reliability of the research findings of such studies. 
Evaluation of articles published in top journals showed that the use of this sampling method 
has increased significantly, becoming the most common approach used by scholars when 
new data set is created. Given the Avdeitchikova et al., (2008) and Farrell et al., (2008) 
warnings, the use of this sampling approach can be seen as counterintuitive. However, the 
data collected in this thesis can help to defend this approach since it has suggested that this 
is the outcome of market evolution. There is a clear indication that younger (age) and less 
experienced (years investing) investors start investing as part of an angel group. This 
suggests that the visible market is a key driver of new business angels. One effect of this 
alteration is the decrease of sampling bias considerations when recruiting through angel 
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groups. Hence, if this sampling approach is accepted by the academic community, then the 
way research is reported and evaluated needs to be consistent. If this is not put in place, the 
calculation of response rates will vary across studies that used the same sampling approach. 
 
This discussion has important implications for business angel researchers. First, it has 
reviewed how the characteristics of business angels have impacted researchers and what 
solutions have been used by scholars. Second, it has showed the proliferation of published 
research using business angel networks and/or business introduction services as a sampling 
approach. Third, it has suggested that a sampling approach that only focuses on the visible 
market might be less problematic that was initially supposed, due to the market evolution. 
Fourth, it has proposed that angel researchers should seek to standardize the way response 
rates are calculated when business angel networks/group and/or Business introduction 
services are used as sampling approach.  
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Chapter 4. Methodologies for examining the investment criteria of 
business angels: a comparative approach  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Typically, business angels invest in just a handful of the investment opportunities that they 
see. The majority of these investment proposals are rejected at the initial screening stage and 
after just a few minutes consideration (some examples: Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Croce et 
al., 2016; Mason et al., 2016; Mason and Harrison, 2015). One of the key themes in business 
angel research has been to understand how investors select the right ventures in which to 
invest. Early studies based simply on interviews have been criticized for their retrospective 
nature and failure to differentiate between different stages in the investment process. 
Subsequent research has used real time methodologies, notably conjoint analysis and verbal 
protocol analysis, to offer more rigorous approaches. However, as highlighted in the second 
chapter of this thesis, there is no consistency in the findings. Two possible reasons are 
suggested for this inconsistency. First, it may reflect the effect of the heterogeneity of the 
angel population. The lack of homogeneity of the angel population increases the likelihood 
of biased samples. This problem can be even magnified by the remaining challenges in angel 
research. Second, findings may be dependent on the methodology used. This second 
reasoning is further developed in this chapter.  
 
A first step is, therefore, to evaluate if the inconsistencies found in previous studies are the 
result of the use of different samples and methodologies. Hence, the discussion will centre 
on the impact of the use of different methodologies to assess business angel decision making 
criteria. The aim of this chapter is to probe this issue in greater detail, applying various 
methodologies to the same sample of angels in order to offer a clearer assessment of what 
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investment criteria are consistent across methodologies and which findings can be attributed 
to particular methodologies and why. This is the first study in angel research applying four 
different methods of data collection to the same sample and to test if the results are consistent 
across methodologies. The aim of this study is to answer four research questions regarding 
the decision making criteria of business angels.  
 
The vast majority of previous decision making literature have looked at aggregate rankings 
of investment criteria rather than individual scores (for example: Mason and Botelho, 2016; 
Mason and Stark, 2004; Sudek, 2006). Hence, the first research question aspires the 
similarities of the aggregate rankings. Thus:    
[Research Question 1]: Are aggregate rankings similar across methods? 
 
The previous question discusses whether aggregate ranking of the investment criteria are the 
same across the four methodologies. However, this could be a problem of aggregating data. 
It is widely acknowledged that the choice between aggregate or individual data is directly 
linked to the research purpose (Greener, 2008). However, aggregating rank data can add 
some distortions (Cooper et al., 2003). Stevens (2012) noticed that by not using individual 
data the researcher would be losing valuable insights on the variations occurring within the 
data. Hence, it is important to evaluate the individual data separately. This will bring 
additional robustness to the analysis since it allows for statistical support. Thus:  
[Research Question 2:] Do individuals rank each criterion in a similar way for different 
methodologies? 
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The specificities of each methodology are expected to influence results. If this is the case 
then it is important to examine whether different methodologies produce similar results. So:  
[Research Question 3]: Which methodologies provide the most similar results? 
 
Angel research consistently shows that some investment criteria are considered more 
important than others. However, the relative importance of these factors changes across 
studies. Hence the fourth research question is: 
[Research Question 4]: Which investment criterion presents less variation across 
methodologies? 
 
Hence, the overall goal of this chapter is to call attention to the methodologies used in angel 
research and ask the extent to which these methodologies are responsible for the 
inconsistencies in the findings identified in the second chapter of this thesis. Answering these 
questions will provide a better understanding of business angel investment criteria and 
indicate the trade-offs between methodologies. Additionally, this informs the discussion on 
the impacts of the heterogeneity of the angel population in terms of variations of decision 
making criteria, by introducing whether the inconsistent findings are exclusively an effect 
of the lack of homogeneity or if there is methodological impact. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 The scope of methodologies used in decision making studies 
 
The volume of literature on business angels is relatively small despite their importance in 
providing risk capital to new and early stage businesses, financing several times the number 
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of businesses that raise finance from venture capital funds. To understand business angel 
research we have to go back to the early 1980s, to the first ABC-study (attitudes, behaviours, 
characteristics) conducted by William Wetzel (1981) in New England. This work offered the 
first insights about business angels. Subsequent research broadened the perspective, 
conducting efforts internationally; studies were undertaken in: UK (Mason et al., 1991), 
Canada (Riding and Short, 1988), Sweden (Landström, 1993), Germany (Brettel, 2003), 
among others. These studies were classified as first generation studies. Their focus was on 
the demographic aspects of business angels (Mason and Harrison, 2000b). This could be 
defined as “profiles of private investors”.  
 
A second generation of studies shifted the attention in the direction of how the business angel 
market operates. Some of these second generation studies focused on the investment 
decision-making process (Landström, 1995; Landström, 1998; Mason and Rogers, 1996; 
Riding et al., 1994; Van Osnabrugge, 2000). It is important to notice that some authors have 
explored these themes using diverse theoretical viewpoints, e.g. decision-making (Feeney et 
al., 1999; Landström, 1995), agency theory (Fiet, 1995a; Landström, 1992; Van Osnabrugge, 
2000), social capital (Sætre, 2003; Sørheim, 2003) and signalling theory (Prasad et al., 2000). 
 
Much of the research that has been undertaken focuses on the investment decision-making 
process (Mason, 2006). Studies have focused on two main issues: (i) the various stages in 
the decision to invest (and how it compares with that of venture capital funds) and (ii) the 
investment criteria used by business angels. Much less attention has been given to the later 
stages in the process, notably due diligence, negotiation and contracting, post-investment 
relationships and the exit. 
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Initial studies of the investment criteria either simply asked investors what factors they took 
into account when assessing an investment opportunity or provided a check list of possible 
criteria for angels to score. Researchers have adopted one of two possible approaches. One 
approach uses questionnaires administered to a large set of investors. One of the early studies 
using this method (Riding et al., 1994) focused on Canadian business angels. The authors 
used a two-phase approach for the data collection by means of direct interviews. Van 
Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) also used interviews and questionnaire responses in their 
research. The same procedure was used by Sudek (2006) in his decision making study. This 
approach has been criticized.  First it is subject to the standard problems associated with 
survey-based research, notably post facto rationalization, lack of weighting and over-
generalisation. Second, subsequent research identified that the investment decision-making 
process comprises several stages, notably an initial screening, at which more than 90% of 
opportunities are rejected, and a detailed appraisal of the remainder (Feeney et al., 1999). 
Critically, the weighting given to investment factors changed between these two stages 
(Feeney et al., 1999). 
 
As noticed in the second chapter of this thesis, rejection seems to be the most common word 
in this process. Dal Cin et al. (1993) reported that  around 70 percent of the opportunities 
were rejected out of hand. This was corroborated by Mason and Harrison (1994). The 
authors used a case study approach to evaluate an investment syndicate; only two 
investment proposals out of thirty five were not rejected after the syndicate conducted its 
own evaluation. Riding et al., (1994) also noted that Canadian business angels had high 
rejection rates, with approximately 90% of the projects being rejected before even meeting 
with the entrepreneur. T hese studies indicate that investment proposals are rejected due to 
a cumulative number of deficiencies (three strikes and you are out).  
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However, interview studies have typically not differentiated between the different stages of 
the investment process. This, in turn, led various scholars (e.g. Shepherd and Zacharakis, 
1999) to argue for the use of real time methodologies in order to gain a more detailed 
understanding of how business angels make their investment decisions. Two main 
approaches have been used. The first is Conjoint (trade-off) analysis, one of the most widely-
used quantitative methods in marketing research. It is used to measure preferences (e.g. for 
product features) but has also been applied to the venture capitalist’s investment decision 
(Muzyka et al., 1996; Riquelme and Rickards, 1992; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 1999). 
However, only one study applied this approach exclusively to business angel investment 
decisions (Landström, 1998). Another example of the use of this methodology can be found 
in Hsu et al., (2014), where the authors evaluated if four specific factors are considered 
differently by business angels and venture capital investors. 
 
The second real time approach is verbal protocol analysis which asks respondents to “think 
out loud” as they perform a task, in this case, assessing an investment opportunity. The initial 
studies that used this methodology to understand the decision making process and criteria were 
conducted by Hall (1989) and Hall and Hofer (1993) on venture capitalists. Here again, this 
technique has not been widely used in studies of business angels (Harrison et al., 2015; 
Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004; Maxwell 
et al., 2011). These studies highlighted the inconsistency of investment criteria used, both 
between different types of investors (angels, venture capital fund managers, bankers) (Mason 
and Stark, 2004) and by business angels with different levels of investment experience 
(Harrison et al., 2015). 
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Until now no research has discussed whether different methodologies applied by scholars is 
a source of dissimilar findings. Hence, it is important to understand to what extent the use 
of particular methodologies matters in terms of the relative importance of specific 
investment criterion.  
 
4.2.2 Methods used in decision making criteria 
 
The review of the literature on business angel’s decision making criteria noted that investors 
rank each criterion differently across the different stages of the investment process. (some 
examples: Brush et al., 2012; Maxwell et al., 2011; Mitteness et al., 2012b). Hence, to 
understand the variations of investment criteria across studies it is important to focus on one 
specific stage of the investment process. As previously noticed, this research focuses on the 
screening stage. Table 4-1 summarizes the methodologies used by scholars in previous 
business angel research. These studies are focused on the investment criteria used at the 
screening stage and can be grouped into four different groups. The four groups of studies 
provide a clear image of the methodologies to be used in this research: (i) interviews; (ii) 
conjoint analysis; (iii) verbal protocol analysis (VPA) and (4) questionnaire30. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30The research asked participants to rank the investment criteria using a raking procedure instead of a Likert 
scale. This choice wanted to avoid the possibility of investors giving the same weight to different investment 
criterion. 
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Table 4-1: Groups of methodologies used in investment decision studies 
Focus groups/Interviews/Case Study Conjoint Analysis Verbal Protocol Analysis Questionnaire 
Mason and Harrison (1994;1996b)   Landström (1998)  Mason and Stark (2004) Clark (2008) 
Haines et al., (2003)  Mason and Rogers (1996; 1997) Erikson et al., (2003) 
Feeney et al., (1999)  Mason and Botelho (2016) Sudek (2006) 
Paul et al., (2007)  Mason and Harrison (2003) Haar et al. (1988) 
   Harrison et al., (2015) Harrison and Mason (1992b) 
  Stedler and Peters (2003) 
  Kelly and Hay (2003) 
  Brettel (2003) 
    Van Osnabrugge (1998; 2000) 
 
4.2.3 Consistency within these methods 
 
This section will summarize the key variations identified in the literature review chapter with 
the aim of directing the discussion. The discussion will focus on the each of the seven 
investment criteria to identify whether variations exist and if these variations are linked to 
the methodologies used. The investment criteria were divided into three groups; moderate 
consistency across studies, inconsistency due to heterogeneity and inconsistency due to 
methodology (and heterogeneity). 
 
Only one investment criterion obtained moderate consistent results across previous decision 
making studies and methodologies. Although the business plan is seen as a necessary 
document for entrepreneurs seeking external funding, it has consistently been considered as 
a less important investment criteria (Haar et al., 1988; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and 
Rogers, 1996, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004). The only exception to this was found with 
more experienced business angels in Harrison et al., (2015) which can be seen as the effect 
of the heterogeneity of the angel population. However, this can be seen as a moderate effect 
which does not impact the consistently low scores in other studies.  
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The second group of investment criteria are those where the inconsistency is related to the 
heterogeneity of the angel population. Investment criteria that obtained inconsistent results 
in studies that used same methodology were clustered in this group. Three investment criteria 
are classified within this group. The first criterion to be considered in this list is investment 
attributes/fit. Scholars have noticed that business angels do not give too much emphasis to 
the investment attributes/fit (some examples: Landström, 1998; Mason and Botelho, 2016; 
Mason and Rogers, 1997; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b), with these studies using a range of 
different methodologies. The source of inconsistency comes from the verbal protocol 
studies. There is a number of real time studies that presented higher rankings for this criterion 
(Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and Stark, 2004). This inconsistency between real time studies 
could be the result of sampling issues which are linked with the heterogeneity of the angel 
population. In Harrison et al.,’s (2015) study the importance of investment attributes/fit 
varies with the different levels of experience of the angels which is an indication of the 
impact of the heterogeneity of the angel population.  
 
The exit is the second investment criterion within this group. With the exception of a single 
study (Sudek, 2006) that considered the potential exit routes being of considerable 
importance, all other studies have ranked this criterion as being not very important 
(Landström, 1998; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and Harrison, 2003; Van Osnabrugge, 
1998a; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b). In this case, the inconsistent results are found in studies 
using questionnaires. As noticed in the review of the literature this could be related to the 
effect of sampling bias – Sudek studied members of one of the oldest angel groups in the 
world which could question the generalization of the results. Harrison et al., (2015) noted 
that more experienced business angels were likely to emphasize financial issues, such as the 
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exit, than their counterparts. This supports the idea that the inconsistency regarding the exit 
scores can be attributed to the heterogeneity of the angel population.  
 
The last criterion in this group is the attributes of the business. As previously noted during 
the review of the literature, the attributes of the business are considered by angel investors 
as a less significant criterion. Several studies have shown this effect using different 
methodologies (Harrison et al., 2015; Landström, 1998; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; 
Mason and Stark, 2004; Sudek, 2006; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b). However, a recent study on 
the investment decisions of gatekeepers has presented a different result (Mason and Botelho, 
2016). Here the attributes of the business are considered as the second most important 
investment criteria. This might suggest that gatekeepers perform the initial screening 
differently from that of individual angels. This, in turn, raises the question as to whether 
gatekeepers are a special “type” of business angels. Once again it is possible to link this 
result inconsistency in VPA with the lack of homogeneity of the angel population. 
 
Inconsistent results across studies using different methodologies is the third group. Three 
investment criteria are classified in this group. The first criterion to be considered is the 
people, with the vast majority of studies highlighting this as one of the key criteria at the 
screening stage (for example: Sudek, 2006; Feeney et al., 1999; Haar et al., 1988; Van 
Osnabrugge, 1998b; Landström, 1998; MacMillan et al., 1987; Mason and Harrison, 1996a). 
These studies used a different set of methodologies. However, real time studies are not 
included. Typically, in real time studies the entrepreneur is not the key criteria  (some 
examples: Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; 
Mason and Stark, 2004). As previously stated, this could be the result of the use of a written 
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document – the protocol – which puts more emphasis on the opportunity rather than on the 
entrepreneur.  
 
The second criterion within this group is the product/market. The vast majority of studies 
have used these two criteria separately. However, if the analysis takes into account the two 
together then there are consistent results across studies that used real time methodologies, in 
particular VPA (for example: Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; Mason and Stark, 2004). But 
this is not a consistent result across studies using other methodologies. In the studies by 
Landström (1998) and Sudek (2006) this criterion was not considered as significant as 
previously mentioned. However, the opposite can be noticed in other studies (for example: 
Haar et al., 1988; Haines et al., 2003; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b).  
 
A very similar analysis can be done for the third criterion the financial attributes. In real time 
studies that used VPA this criterion is consistently considered as the most important 
(Harrison et al., 2015; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997; Mason 
and Stark, 2004). However, in other studies using different methodologies it receives a lower 
evaluation by angel investors (some examples: Feeney et al., 1999; Landström, 1998; Mason 
and Harrison, 2003; Van Osnabrugge, 1998b) Two explanations can be advanced for this 
inconsistency. First, it could be associated with a methodological dimension - conjoint 
analysis undervalues the criterion. Second, instead of asking for the aggregate criterion 
importance, some methodologies look at the several components of the criterion which could 
dissipate its importance. An example of this can be found in Sudek’s (2006) study with the 
financial considerations being disaggregated into several components: (i) return on 
investment; (ii) size of the investment; (iii) ability to reach beak-even without further 
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funding; (iv) low initial capital expenditure needed. This idea fits the consistency found in 
studies using VPA which aggregates the different features of a specific criterion.  
 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data Sources 
 
This study is based on fifty one semi-structured interviews. Within this sample of fifty one 
business angels there were two subsamples, one with twenty one gatekeepers of nineteen 
groups investing in Scotland and another with 30 individual business angels. The decision 
to target gatekeepers was based on two main factors. Firstly, given the role of this position 
(Mason et al., 2013; Paul and Whittam, 2010); gatekeepers are the initial screening point for 
entrepreneurs seeking for funding from an angel group. Secondly, angel groups have 
increased in importance. Accordingly to Sohl (2012b), USA based start-ups and early stage 
businesses, valued under $1m, can only rely on angel groups as a source of funding resources 
in the range £250,000 to £1 million. In the UK several studies have acknowledged the rise 
of angel groups (Gregson et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2013) and its importance for investors 
(Mason and Harrison, 2015; Paul et al., 2003).  
 
In two groups the gatekeeper role was shared by two individuals. In each case both 
individuals were interviewed. The gatekeepers of all seventeen groups that are publicly listed 
on LINC Scotland’s web site at the time of data collection were interviewed. Three other 
groups are also members of LINC Scotland but prefer anonymity. These groups were also 
invited to participate, via LINC Scotland, but declined to do so. Additionally, two other 
gatekeepers were interviewed. One was from a UK-wide group with a very active Scottish 
branch but has no association with LINC. The other was part of a group that is a Scottish 
Co-investment Fund partner that also has no association with LINC.  
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The Scottish Risk Capital Market Report (Harris and Mason, 2012) identified twenty four 
angel groups. However, the groups not included in this study either no longer exist or are 
private offices of high net worth families whose investments and operations are much closer 
to venture capital investing than angel investing. So, although the study could be criticized 
for being LINC-centric it would appear that we have captured most of the participants in the 
Scottish market. Additionally, LINC does not present any recommendation to the syndicates 
regarding their investment decision. Hence, it would not represent any type of sector or stage 
bias.  
 
Securing the participation of such a high proportion of angel groups in the Scottish market 
was a considerable achievement. In many cases the initial response was not positive and 
follow-up approaches were required. As a consequence, the recruitment process took three 
months.  It started with an initial email to the gatekeeper to request an interview. In several 
cases it was not possible to identify the gatekeeper, but in these cases the recipient of the 
email forwarded it to the relevant individual.  
 
Of the twenty one interviewees that were gatekeepers of angel groups, nineteen were face-
to-face and two were conducted on the telephone. All agreed for the interview to be recorded 
for later transcribing. The interviews ranged in length from 37 to 93 minutes, with the 
average being about one hour. The face-to-face interviews took place at a location of the 
interviewee convenience. Venues included the group’s office, coffee shops and the 
researcher’s office. It was agreed with participants that information on individual groups 
would not be disclosed and that findings would be aggregated.  
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Scholars have largely ignored the gatekeeper as a key actor of the visible market. Mostly, 
this is result of the recent raise of angel groups (Mason et al., 2013).  Hence, this represents 
a challenge to identify how representative is this sample of 21 gatekeepers. However, Paul 
and Whittam’s (2010) characterization of gatekeepers can be used as a reference. In terms 
of the gatekeeper background experience, this sample is much in line with the original 
description made in Paul and Whittam’s (2010) study in which two characteristics were 
identified. First, gatekeepers typically have a professional qualification and/or a university 
degree. In this sample of gatekeepers 19 of the 21 gatekeeper had a university degree with 
the other 2 having a professional qualifications. Second, gatekeepers tend to have a varied 
range of professional backgrounds and industry experiences. The professional background 
of this sample of gatekeepers ranged from oil and gas to education with finance related areas 
being the most common experience (42%). The majority (52%) of these gatekeepers had 
being involved in setting up a new venture while 90% had previous been involved with small 
and medium-sized enterprises. All participants were responsible for the screening of 
investment opportunities in their groups. In terms of investment experience, this sample of 
gatekeepers had been involved in 382 group investments and on average have been 
undertaking this role for almost 5 years. Hence, this indicates that this can be considered as 
a representative sample of gatekeepers.  
 
The subsample of 30 individual business angels was recruited through convenience sampling 
and snowball sampling. The starting point of the recruitment process was group meetings or 
through the gatekeepers introduction. The author attended group meetings and pitched to the 
members requesting participation. After the interview, the initial participants were asked to 
suggest other business angels to take part on this research. Whilst this sampling method has 
several limitations (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) the sample in this study is very broad. The 
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research took into account several factors including: syndication, investment preferences 
(number of investments, years investing, amounts invested, etc…) and education. 
 
Of the 30 interviewees, 29 were face-to-face and only one was conducted on the telephone. 
All agreed for the interview to be recorded for later transcribing. The interviews ranged in 
length from 25 to 60 minutes, with the average being about one hour. The face-to-face 
interviews took place at a location of the interviewee convenience. Venues included the 
group’s office, coffee shops and the participant’s office/home. It was agreed with 
participants that information on individuals would not be disclosed and that findings would 
be aggregated.  
 
The profile of the 30 individual investors is very similar to previous characterizations of a 
business angel (some examples: Gaston, 1989; Morrissette, 2007; Shepherd and Douglas, 
1998), that is, mid-aged, male with entrepreneurial experience31. This sample of business 
angels have been investing on average for 12 years and made a total of 473 investments. The 
vast majority of participants, 80%, were part of angel groups while the remaining 20% 
invested by themselves. Three issues can be raised regarding the representativeness of this 
sample of business angels. The first, this sample does not include any female investor. 
According to Harrison and Mason (2007) this underrepresentation32 is not an issue since 
there is no considerable differences between female and male angel investors.  
 
                                                          
31 The 30 participants were all male with an average age of 56 years. The majority (57%) of investors had 
previously been involved in starting a new venture. 
32 Different studies have shown the importance of female angel investors. Sohl (2014) indicates that in 2013, 
20% of the angel investors in the USA were women. Recent studies denote that in 2014 between 12% to 14% 
of angel investors were women (Mason & Botelho, 2014; Wright et al., 2015). 
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The second, when compared with recent UK studies (Mason and Botelho, 2014; Wright et 
al., 2015) this sample presents higher levels of investment experienced – more investments 
(median of 10 vs 5 investments) and more years investing (average of 12 vs 7 to 10 years). 
This should not be considered as a problem for two reasons. The first, the sample is diverse 
in terms of investment experience. The sample was equally divided into three groups of 10 
investors, one group with investors who only made 5 or less investment, another group of 
angels who had invested between 14 to 6 opportunities and the last group with more than 15 
investments. This ensures enough variability within the sample of individual investors. 
Second, contrary to Harrison et al. (2015), this study does not aim to evaluate how 
investment experience impacts the criteria to invest.  The aim is to understand if the same 
individual will ranking the investment criteria differently across different methodologies. 
Hence, a more experienced sample of angel investors is not an issue. Third is the high 
proportion of investors that are members of angels groups. According to Kelly and Hay 
(1996) there are no significant differences between solo and syndicated serial angels. 
Although it is not possible to evaluate the representativeness of this sample, due to the 
invisible nature of angel population (Wetzel, 1983), the characteristics of this sample of 
investors does not raises any bias considerations.  
  
4.3.2 Methodology 
 
During the semi-structured interviews, besides direct questions, participants were asked to 
undertake three additional exercises regarding their decision-making criteria. This section 
will discuss these four techniques of data collection, describing what participants were asked 
to do and what limitations the results may present. The objective of using these four 
techniques is to discuss the trade-offs between restrictive and unrestrictive techniques. The 
restrictive techniques asked participants to make a decision based on a pre-defined set of 
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factors while the unrestrictive techniques did not present any constraint to respondents, that 
is, they were free to choose which factors were taken into account. The restrictive techniques 
can be subdivided into pure and impure rankings, depending if an additional inequality 
restriction was imposed on participants. The unrestrictive techniques were divided according 
to how context specific this method is.   
 
 4.3.2.1 Open-ended question 
 
First, respondents were asked an open-ended question about what were the key factors that 
they considered when assessing an investment opportunity. The limitations of this technique 
are well identified with conscious and subconscious errors associated with post-hoc 
rationalisation, recall bias both resulting from asking participants to bring to mind the 
reasons of a past decision. Zacharakis and Meyer (1998) mention in their decision making 
study that participants usually overstate the number of criteria used, understate the most 
important criteria, overstate the least important criteria. This point will be discussed later in 
this chapter, given the low number of investment criteria mentioned by each participant. On 
average, each participant only mentioned 3 (3.42) factors as the most important in their 
investment decision.  
 
Once the 51 interviews were completed the data was transcribed and in the particular case 
of this open question the results were coded. How to analyse the information that was 
collected is recognized as one of the major challenges of this qualitative methods. For 
consistency reasons and to enable a comparative analysis of the result across data collection 
techniques we used the same coding scheme that was developed and used on the VPA. To 
ensure robustness of the results, the author of this thesis and his supervisor were involved in 
triangulating the coding (Leitch et al., 2010). The codes were put together under the same 
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investment criterion label and a frequency count was performed in order to depict an order. 
This unrestrictive technique is clearly not context specific, given that respondents are not 
biased by any external factor – such as a protocol or video. However, it is important to 
emphasize that participants mentioned that this answer was based on the most recent 
investment opportunity seen by them. Although, this technique is unrestricted and not 
context specific it has major potential for recall bias.  
 
 4.3.2.2 Verbal Protocol Analysis 
 
In the second exercise, participants were asked to screen an investment opportunity. The 
investment opportunity was in the form of a business plan. To ensure that this document was 
according to market standards, a non-Scottish business angel network was contacted to 
provide some examples of business plans. From the four business plans made available by 
the network one was chosen. The choice of the protocol used was based on: location, sector, 
stage and initial investment.  It was expected that the use of these controls would reduce the 
likelihood that participants would reject the opportunity in the first seconds of the 
experiment. This seemed to be much in line with previous research. The average and median 
durations are very comparable with those in Mason and Rogers (1997) study. In their 
particular case participants were able to reach to a decision within an average time of 11.25 
minutes with a median of 9 minutes. In this case participants made their decision within an 
average time of 11.10 minutes with a median of 10 minutes.  
 
The investment proposal was anonymised, changed in parts to make it fit the research 
objectives, and is used with permission. The final business plan presented to participants had 
seven pages length, which in some cases was considered by participants to be too long. 
Participants were asked to “think out loud” while they appraised the investment opportunity. 
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This assessment was intended to be as close as possible to the way they would do it for real. 
To guarantee that participants were verbalizing their thoughts they were instructed to make 
any comment about the document that came into their mind. These comments did not require 
any justification and in cases where participants lapsed into silence of more than 10 seconds 
the researcher would prompt the respondent to say what he/she was thinking. This is the 
procedure suggested by Ericsson and Simon (1993) for the use of this technique.  
 
Their verbalisations were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The transcriptions were 
divided into individual “thought units”. The following stage required the development a 
coding scheme based on the investment criteria. Table 4-2 depicts the coding scheme. Each 
“thought unit” was coded following the coding scheme and then the frequency of each code 
was counted. As in the previous method both the author of this thesis and his supervisor were 
involved in triangulating the coding to ensure robustness. The frequency count provides an 
implicit order, that is, the higher the number of mentions of an investment criterion the higher 
the ranking position.  
 
This unrestrictive technique presents some limitations. First, it is impossible to entirely 
eliminate the effect of the artificiality of the situation. One-third of the participants mention 
that they were not being totally fair to the opportunity given the nature of the circumstances. 
Second, it may overweight or underweight some factors. On the one hand, some participants 
may be uncomfortable or self-conscious about thinking and speaking out loud and being 
recorded. On the other hand, respondents may repeat something they are not sure about but 
say it only once if they are absolutely sure. Lastly, angel investing is very context specific. 
However, it completely ignores the source of the opportunity which is an important initial 
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influence on the investor’s attitude towards the opportunity (Duxbury et al., 1997) and this 
might bias the results. 
  
Table 4-2: Thought segments classification 
Investment  Criteria Description 
1. THE PEOPLE Issues regarding: the entrepreneur, management 
team, the inventor. Their background, experience, 
qualities, etc. 
2. PRODUCT/MARKET The nature of the product: technical aspects, 
intellectual property protection, competitive 
advantages, design, etc. Additionally it included 
points on market: organization, growth, 
competition, geography, size, etc. 
3. BUSINESS PLAN Specific comments on the plan: length, 
presentation, content missing data, etc. 
4. EXIT Who? When? How much?  Type of exit. Existence 
of an exit plan 
5. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS Amount of investment, amount raised,  future 
funding needs, valuation, equity share, cash-flows, 
valuation, etc. 
6. INVESTOR ATTRIBUTES Issues regarding investment fit,  investment 
experience 
7. ATRIBUTES OF THE BUSINESS This includes a broad scope of issues: e.g. 
strategy, business model, risks, operations, time 
frame, etc. 
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 4.3.2.3 Ordinal Measurement Method – ranking procedures 
 
The following methodology requested participants to take an ordinal measurement method 
- ranking procedure (RP). This is a very common technique used in marketing research to 
depict: preference rankings, market position, social class, etc. Respondents were asked to 
order a list of seven investment criteria. This list was based on the list of investment criteria 
used in a previous study on business angel decision making (Mason and Harrison, 1996b) 
and included (business plan, the people, product/market, financial attributes, attributes of the 
business, investment attributes, exit). Although other studies have suggested different sets 
of investment criteria, this list was consistent with the literature. Additionally, it was 
recognised that the list should not be very extensive. This was to ensure the total engagement 
of participants in the two methodologies that used it.  
 
This list would imply just six decisions since (n - 1) scaling decisions need be made in rank 
order scaling. Smith and Albaum (2005, p. 375) note that “one major concern in asking a 
ranking question is whether the number of items is too many for a person to be able to make 
distinctions”. One possible solution was proposed by Coombs (1964), who recommended 
that instead of ordering all factors participants only order k factors from a full set of n factors. 
In this research the “order k/n” is equal to 1, that is, participants were asked to order all 
factors. The choice of a full rank order resulted from the initial decision not to have a long 
list of investment criteria. It important to emphasize that although an ordinal scale is able to 
determine whether a criterion is more or less important than some other criterion it is not 
able to determine how much more or less (Zikmund et al., 2012). Hence, this is a good tool 
to depict order but not distances between factors ordered. Unlike previous studies (Sudek, 
2006; Van Osnabrugge, 2000) that used a Likert scale to investigate angel investment criteria 
this research used an ordinal scale for the reasons previously presented.    
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This was the most restrictive technique applied to respondents since it forced them both to 
make a decision from a pre-defined set of investment criteria and also to rank them from 1 
to 7 without being given the opportunity of equality between factors. Forcing respondents to 
make a choice has pros and cons. The most obvious advantage is a clear order of factors both 
at individual level but also at aggregate level. The major disadvantages are: first, the list 
could miss other investment criteria that could be considered important for some investors; 
and second, not giving respondents the possibility of equality between investment criteria 
forces them to make a decision “on the spot” and this makes it harder to replicate the results.   
 
4.3.2.4 Conjoint Analysis – Pairwise comparison 
 
As in the previous case, the forth experiment also used a restrictive technique based on a 
fixed set of seven factors, exactly the same list of seven investment criteria used previously. 
It follows Landström’s (1998) approach where respondents were asked to make a decision 
between two investment criteria. This trade-off approach requires participants to make n(n-
1)/2 decisions. In this particular case (n=7) it required 21 decisions. For each of these 21 
decisions respondents were asked to identify which of two investment criteria was more 
important or if they were equally important. The difference from the prior experiment lies in 
the type decisions that respondents were asked to make. While indifference between 
investment criterions was not allowed in the aforementioned experiment in this case, 
participants were given that choice. This technique could be classified as an impure ranking. 
The data from the 51 individual decisions were coded according to a conjoint model. This 
enabled the construction of a relative ranking between investment criteria for every 
participant. The individual rankings were then aggregated to provide a meaningful 
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comparison. Then the individual rankings of the investment criteria were aggregated for a 
whole sample of investors. 
 
One of the main caveats of this method is the length of the experiment. Participants are asked 
to evaluate several trade-offs which make the task very time consuming. This might result 
in loss of concentration on the content by participants making them less engaged and 
consequently adopting a standardised answer pattern. The lack of realism of the situation is 
a further limitation of this method. Each time, respondents are only assessing two investment 
criteria instead of all possible factors. Only 7 participants33 (14%) mentioned that this was 
not way they typically think about an investment opportunity. However, the decisions are 
considered to be easier and very suitable for a study that appraises a large set of investment 
criteria.  
 
 4.4 Analysis and empirical results 
 
The following three sections present the results of this study, highlighting the different 
dimension of the research. The first section is an overview of the results, focusing on the 
aggregate data, identifying which are the top ranked criteria in each of the four 
methodologies. The two samples (gatekeepers and individual angels) will be separated to 
enable comparisons between them. The second section is an analysis of the consistency of 
the results across the four methodologies used. This analysis is undertaken at individual and 
aggregate level. This analysis looks at the two samples separately and then examines the 
whole sample of 51 investors. The third section considers the entire sample to assess whether 
methodologies produce the most, and least, consistent results.  
                                                          
33 3 Gatekeepers and 4 individual angels. 
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4.4.1 Overview 
 
This first empirical section presents and discusses the overall results. This section answers 
the first research question. The aim of this section is to identify which are the key criteria in 
each of the four methodologies. The aggregate rankings for each of the four methodologies 
are shown in table 4-2. Each of the methodologies supplied 51 individual rankings providing 
unique insights into the business angel investment decision-making process. Similarity 
between methods is tested in both individual levels as aggregate level. To reach aggregate 
rankings two different procedures were conducted. Regarding the unrestrictive techniques, 
all the individual frequencies under the same investment criteria were added and an 
aggregate frequency count was carried out. Lastly, the aggregate frequency counts were 
ordered by the cardinality of the investment criteria, that is, the higher the number the more 
important is the investment criteria. In the case of the restrictive techniques the aggregate 
rakings were assembled using a data transformation suggested by Zikmund et al. (2013).  
 
Table 4-3: Rankings of the seven investment criteria. 
  
Gatekeeper Individual Angel Stand 
Interview VPA RP Pairwise Interview VPA RP Pairwise Deviation 
Business Plan 7 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 0.518 
The people 2 5 1 1 1 4 1 1 1.604 
Product/Market 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 0.518 
Financial Attributes 3 2 3 6 4 3 3 4 1.195 
Attributes of the Business 6 3 6 4 3 2 4 3 1.458 
Investor Attributes 5 4 4 5 5 5 7 7 1.165 
Exit 3 7 5 3 7 7 5 5 1.669 
 
Three key issues can be observed from the analysis of Table 4-2. First, there is ranking 
inconsistency across the samples and methodologies. The results show that both the 
gatekeepers and the individual business angels rank the investment criteria differently across 
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the different methodologies. Second, some investment criteria are more methodological 
dependent while others are consistently scored high or low across the different 
methodologies. Third, some methodologies undervalue or overvalue specific investment 
criteria. So the answer to the first research question is that different methodologies do not 
provide similar aggregate rankings. This first point, the inconsistency, will be further 
developed in the next section for individual data when statistical tests are presented while 
the other two points will be presented here.  
 
To help understand the second observation, which investment criteria are more susceptible 
to variations across the methodologies, the standard deviation will be used. The criterion 
with the highest variability is the exit. In some methodologies it is seen as moderately 
significant while in others its importance is negligible. This is not a surprising result, as 
noticed in the review of previous research which observed that this criterion of considerable 
importance (Sudek, 2006) while in other studies it were almost insignificant (Mason and 
Harrison, 2003). Mason and Botelho (2016) noted that gatekeepers comment that the exit 
was an important investment criterion. However this did not show in the VPA analysis when 
they were presented with an opportunity. The variability is higher in the gatekeeper 
subsample than with individual investors.  
 
The second criterion with the highest standard deviation is the people. As noticed in the 
review of the literature, this criterion is typically considered as very important with the 
exception of the real time studies, in specific VPA studies. The results show clearly this 
effect, with the people receiving low scores on VPA in both sub-samples which results in a 
high standard deviation.  
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The third criterion with the highest variability is the attributes of the business. The variation 
of this criterion ranking is stronger with the gatekeepers than with the individual angel 
investors. Normally, gatekeepers tend to give a lower rank to the attributes of the business 
than individual business angels. As noticed in the literature review chapter, previous research 
has given moderate importance to this criterion. Similar results are found with the exception 
of the real time VPA study.  
 
In the opposite direction, the investment criterion with the lower variability are the business 
plan and the product/market. While in the case of the business plan, this is not a surprise 
since the criterion is consistently considered to be of low importance across different studies 
and methodologies, for the product/market this comes as a revelation given the variability 
identified in the review of previous research. However, this could be the effect of grouping 
the several dimensions of the product/market into a single criterion.  
 
The final discussion asks whether the rank of specific investment criteria are affected by the 
specific methodology used. As noted earlier, the business plan and the product/market show 
very low standard deviation which indicates a very limited methodological dependency. Two 
methodologies raise attention (i) VPA; (ii) pairwise comparison. The VPA provides a real 
time methodology that enables research to get additional insight on the decision making 
process. It seems to consistently rank the people lower than the other methodologies. This 
was previously noticed in the literature review section.  In this study, this effect is visible for 
the two sub-samples – gatekeepers and individual angels. This could be the result of the 
nature of the use of the protocol which typically has more information about the business 
than about the entrepreneur.  Another distinctive feature of the VPA is that the financial 
attributes and the attributes of the business achieve a higher rankings than in other 
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methodologies. This is seen both in the review of the literature and the results of this study. 
Again the effect of a written document (the protocol) could prompt the angel investor to give 
a higher consideration to these criteria.  
 
The pairwise comparison provides higher rankings for the attributes of the business and the 
exit. This effect can be noticed in both sub-samples and could be the result of the less direct 
nature of asking the importance of an investment criteria. This methodology does not 
replicate the typical investment decision of a business angel and is not “reflective of ‘real-
life’ decision contexts” (Hsu et al., 2014, p. 20). By being forced to compare between two 
criteria an investor is doing an abstract exercise that could led to over-rating specific 
criterion. This increases importance of these criteria could just be a misrepresentation cause 
by investors having to do a comparison rather than an independent choice.  
 
These three observations rely on aggregate data. As previously noticed, aggregating data can 
create problems. Hence, the next section will analysis the individual data to evaluate if 
different findings can be found. 
 
4.4.2 Consistency testing 
 
This section will discuss how the four rankings were put together, how they were compared 
and what statistical tests were conducted. The first analysis answers the question whether 
aggregate rankings were similar across the four different methodologies. This will allow to 
answer the second research question. Two statistical procedures will be conducted to 
reinforce the robustness of the findings. The results will be presented for the sample of 51 
investors instead of displaying the two sub-samples. There are two reasons for this choice. 
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First, this study aims to understand the reasons for the inconsistent results found in the 
literature. Second, the statistical tests require a minimum number of observations which is 
not satisfied for the sample of gatekeepers. However, the results are presented in Appendix 
1 and 2 to indicate possible variations.  
 
A test of proportions provides statistical evidence regarding this issue. A test of proportions 
evaluates the equality of proportions for a normally distributed random variable. In this 
specific application the test measures whether the ranking of one factor is the same in a 
different methodology. The null hypothesis states that for all individuals’ observations the 
ranking of the factor is the same in the two tests. Table 4-3 presents all the tests outcomes. 
These are tests that compare the rankings of two methodologies. Hence, this combination 
without repetition of four methodologies compared two by two which will result in six 
possible comparisons34. 
 
Table 4-4: Tests of proportions for all methods 
Test 
Business 
Plan 
The people Product/Market 
Financial 
Attributes 
Attributes of 
the Business 
Investment 
Attributes  
Exit 
Interview vs VPA -181551,05 -199263,35 -110701,86 -190407,20 -194835,28 -177122,98 -225831,80 
Interview vs RP -194835,28 -132842,23 -159410,68 -185979,13 -190407,20 -212547,58 -203691,43 
Interview vs Pairwise -194835,28 -110701,86 -168266,83 -203691,43 -185979,13 -208119,50 -168266,83 
VPA vs RP -177122,98 -199263,35 -154982,61 -185979,13 -194835,28 -199263,35 -181551,05 
VPA vs Pairwise -159410,68 -194835,28 -141698,38 -194835,28 -181551,05 -208119,50 -194835,28 
RP vs Pairwise -101845,71 -92989,56 -101845,71 -137270,31 -137270,31 -88561,49 -123986,09 
Each cell ij is the Z-statistic for the comparison of tests in row i and factor in column j 
                                                          
34 This follows 𝐶(𝑛, 𝑟) =
n!
𝑟!(𝑛−𝑟)!
=
4!
2!(4−2)!
= 6. 
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The null hypothesis of the test of proportions (i.e., for all observations the ranking of the 
factor is the same in the two tests) is rejected whenever the absolute value of the test statistic 
is greater than the critical value. The critical value for a five percent significance level is 
approximately two. Therefore, it is possible to reject the supposition that the ranking of the 
factor is the same in the two tests for all observations, whenever the absolute value of the 
test statistic is greater than two. The rejection of all the null hypotheses provides a clear 
answer to the first question, that is, it is not possible to affirm that individuals rank each 
factor in a similar way for different methodologies. It is particularly interesting that only one 
participant gave the same order ranking in two of the four experiments. All other participants 
always had always four dissimilar rankings. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the answer 
for the second research question is also negative. Investors do not rank the importance of the 
investment criteria similarly across the four methodologies. The next section will discuss the 
reasons that might justify these differences.  
 
A paired t-test evaluates whether the mean for a random variable from a within-subjects test 
group differ over two test conditions. The test assumes that the evaluated random variable is 
normally distributed. Thus, a paired t-test is used when there are two observations per subject 
and the researcher wants to measure whether the means on these two normally distributed 
interval variables differ from one another. The paired t-test is similar to the repeated 
measures ANOVA test. Table 4-4 depicts all the confident intervals.  
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Table 4-5: t-tests for equality of means for all methodologies 
Each cell ij contains the lower and upper bound of the CI for the comparison of tests in row i and factor in column j 
 
It can be seen that the great majority of the null hypothesis of equal means of the pairwise 
tests can be rejected. In 74% of the tests the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
means are rejected because the confidence interval does not include zero. Table 4-5 
summarizes these results. 
Table 4-6: t-test for equality of means rejections 
Test 
Business 
Plan 
The 
people 
Product/Market 
Financial 
Attributes 
Attributes 
of the 
Business 
Investment 
Attributes 
Exit 
Interview vs VPA x x √ √ √ x x 
Interview vs RP x √ x x x x x 
Interview vs Pairwise x √ x x x x x 
VPA vs RP x x x x x x x 
VPA vs Pairwise x x x x √ x x 
RP vs Pairwise √ √ √ √ x √ x 
√ - the Ho cannot be rejected; x - the Ho can be rejected 
  
Business Plan The people Product/Market 
Financial 
Attributes 
Attributes of 
the Business 
Investment 
Attributes  
Exit 
test CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB 
Interview vs VPA 0,706 1,687 1,963 2,899 -0,496 0,182 -0,174 0,880 -0,349 0,742 0,644 1,631 2,406 3,280 
Interview vs RP 1,372 2,353 -0,331 0,213 0,395 1,096 0,743 1,728 1,088 2,167 1,410 2,668 1,379 2,229 
Interview vs Pairwise 1,282 2,326 -0,163 0,477 0,291 1,120 0,966 1,975 0,473 1,488 1,494 2,702 0,645 1,747 
VPA vs RP 0,105 1,228 -2,962 -2,018 0,524 1,280 0,374 1,391 0,780 2,083 0,172 1,632 -1,513 -0,565 
VPA vs Pairwise 0,007 1,209 -2,735 -1,814 0,442 1,284 0,537 1,699 0,227 1,342 0,265 1,656 -2,237 -1,058 
RP vs Pairwise -0,276 0,394 -0,510 0,078 -0,192 0,271 -0,598 0,127 0,231 1,064 -0,319 0,201 0,218 0,998 
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Regarding the second question it is possible to state that the t-tests also allow to conclude 
that the rankings are dependent on the methodology applied. These outcomes support the 
findings of test of proportions regarding the methodological dependent of the results. Table 
4-5 indicates that there are no two methodologies that provide exactly the same ranks. Hence, 
it is possible to conclude that the choice of the methodology will impact the way angel 
investors rank the investment criteria. A very similar results can be found for the two sub-
samples (gatekeepers and individual angels), this analysis is provided in Appendix 3 and 4. 
However, it is important to notice that the t-tests for the individual angel investors show that 
it is not statistically possible to reject the hypothesis that the criteria rankings from ranking 
procedures and pairwise comparison are equal. This result will be further discussed in the 
next section. 
 
The previous analysis also allows to answer the third and fourth questions. Which 
methodologies provide the most similar results? Which investment criterion presents less 
variation across methodologies? To answer these questions the results of the Paired t-tests 
conducted to test if means for each factor over individuals ranking were equal or not will be 
further discussed. 
 
4.4.3 Methodological similarity  
 
This last empirical section will address issues regarding methodology similarities. To 
facilitate the discussion a tick count was produced. This should be useful to answer the third 
and fourth questions. With respect to the third question, which methodologies provide closer 
results, the tests in table 4-6 show that the two closest methodologies are the ranking 
procedures and the pairwise (with 5 counts) followed by the relation between interviews and 
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VPA and VPA and pairwise comparison (with 3 counts).  The similarity of results between 
ranking procedures and the pairwise can be explained by the restrictive character of these 
methods. Both restrict participants’ decision to a seven rank decision. The likelihood of 
similar aggregate results is therefore greater because there was a close set of investment 
criteria provided to participants. This finding is also supported when the two samples are 
analysed separately – it is not possible to reject the rank similarity between these two 
methodologies.  
  
Similar reasoning can be applied for interviews and VPA. These two unrestrictive techniques 
give respondents the freedom to reveal their investment criteria without imposing any 
restriction on the choice. In contrast, the methodologies that present the least similar results 
are VPA with ranking procedures (with just 0 counts). This indicates that the most restrictive 
method, with a closed set of investment criteria and forcing ranking, is the least comparable 
with the unrestrictive methods. This is a particularly important finding given that this field 
has a very strong presence of studies using VPA. 
 
The results also provide evidence to answer the last research question. The investment 
criterion that is most consistent across methodologies is the people (with 3 counts) while exit 
is the least consistent of the seven investment criteria. It is interesting to notice that the results 
for the people are consistent across three methods and only lacks consistency in VPA. This 
is most likely justified by the fact that VPA is a context specific technique, that is, results 
can be biased by the use of a protocol. The level of information in the investment opportunity 
about the people can influence the number of thought units about this investment criterion 
and consequently the rank of this criterion. Exit was the criterion with the least level of 
consistency within the four methods. This can be explained by the recent evidence on how 
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angels look at exits (Mason and Botelho, 2016). This study shows that when prompted about 
the importance of exits, business angels emphasize the constant concern about the need to 
exit. However, when asked to make a decision whether or not to invest in an opportunity this 
criterion is not to be taken into account. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion  
4.5.1 Implications for future research  
 
The key conclusion is that investors are inconsistent in their decisions when examined using 
different methodological approaches. In the open-ended questions investors give fewer 
investment criteria than in the verbal protocol analysis, ordinal measurement method and 
conjoint analysis, with people and product/market dominating. The implication is that open-
ended questions provide a more superficial insight into angel investment decision-making 
when compared with the other three methodologies. There is a difference in the results from 
the two restrictive methods. Respondents find it easy to put the seven investment criteria 
into a ranking. However, in the trade-off analysis they find it much harder to make a clear 
distinction between pairs of criteria. So here again, this technique appears unable to clearly 
identify the critical elements in the investment decision. Verbal protocol analysis provides a 
much richer insight into the investment decision-making process, with additional factors 
emerging to those offered in the open-ended questions. In particular, issues associated with 
the exit are raised using VPA and also rank highly in the conjoint analysis but are given low 
emphasis in the ordinal measurement method and in responses to the open-ended question. 
On the other hand, VPA puts respondents in an artificial situation which may influence their 
approach to assessing the proposal which deviates from what they would do in practice. 
Future research should acknowledge the implications of methodological choices and this 
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should be reflected on the reviews of the literature. It is important that scholars recognize 
the methodological differences and the similarities to be able to provide robust comparisons 
of previous studies.  
 
There are three potential reasons for these differences. The first is “that decision makers 
[angel investors] should be viewed as boundedly rational” (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1449). 
Bounded rationality can be linked to (i) the lack of specific information of some of the 
methodologies; (ii) cognitive limitations associated with the constraint of recent decisions; 
(iii) time constraints; and (iv) lack of realism of some of the methodologies. These factors 
could lead participants to provide inconsistent rankings across methodologies. The second 
possible reason is that angel investors use very subjective reasons that can be associated with 
intuition and ‘gut feel’. The existence of such behaviour has already been mentioned in 
previous research (for example: Clark, 2008; De Noble, 2001; Mason and Harrison, 2003; 
Mason and Rogers, 1996, 1997) which has helped scholars explain decision making 
ambiguities.  
 
In either of these two initial reasons, there is an expectation that the decision maker is not 
able to fully explain the reasons why a decision was made. The last justification for these 
findings is not associated to the participants but with the methodologies applied in this 
chapter. Each methodology has its underlying assumptions, procedures and decision rules 
which can impact the specific research problems (Kothari, 2004). Hence, the choice of 
methodology used will have an impact on the outcomes which can influence methodological 
evaluations. Howe (1988) argues that there is an “incompatibility thesis” which does not 
allow qualitative and quantitative methods to be compatible for epistemological reasons. 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 15) support this view observing that “there are many 
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paradigmatic differences between qualitative and quantitative research”. This is much in line 
with the findings reported here, which found, first that quantitative methodologies provide 
closer results and second, that the two qualitative methodologies also produce similar results.   
 
In the light of the likelihood of the resulting inconsistency being the effect of individual 
cognitive limitations this research suggests future research to use as unit of analysis the 
investment rather than the investors. This change of focus would reduce the emphasis on the 
individual and put the attention on the venture features that led to a positive investment 
decision. Additionally, this study was not able to identify which is the best methodology to 
study decision making criteria of business angels. As a result scholars should not change 
their approach in terms of methodology used but should change the unit of analysis.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has to presented insights on the questions raised in the Literature Review. 
Previous decision making studies have provided different rankings of the investment criteria 
used by business angels. Two reasons were suggested (i) the heterogeneity of the angel 
population; (ii) methodological differences. The findings indicate inconsistencies across the 
four methodologies when they applied to a sample of 51 participants. While the 
heterogeneity of the angel population cannot be rejected as a justification for the differences 
found in the literature, in particular, because it was not tested in this chapter. This study 
focused on evaluating the methodological effect on the results which is present. However, 
this does not mean that the source of inconsistency is exclusively methodological. The 
second reason, methodological differences cannot be refuted by this research. 
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However, the impact of the heterogeneity of the angel population cannot be excluded as a 
possible reason. This effect would be noticed on sampling issues. The results show that all 
“types” of angels provide inconsistent results35. Harrison et al. (2015) noticed that 
investment experience had an effect on the way business angels ranked the investment 
criteria. Hence, the problem could lay on the convenience samples of previous studies that 
could be capturing just a specific type of angel which would imply a non-generalizable 
result.  
 
The main contribution of this research is not just to show that results are methodological 
dependent but far more importantly, it provides evidence that some methodologies present 
results that are closer to one another than other methodologies. From a research perspective 
the study serves to highlight the complexities involved in understanding the investment 
decisions of business angels, with different methodologies generating different responses. It 
is not just the research question that is critical; it is also the way in which the question is 
asked.  More open-ended approaches and real time approaches – which are combined in the 
VPA approach – appear to provide the best insight. This is because angels look at the “big 
picture” rather than specific factors when assessing investment opportunities. However, the 
artificial nature of this approach imposes limitations.  
 
This study calls the attention of scholars to carefully consider the choice of methodology 
that they use in their work. It also emphasizes that researchers need to acknowledge the 
limitations of comparing results across studies with different methodological procedures. 
                                                          
35 All 51 participants provided different ranking across the four methodologies with only 4 having exactly the 
same ranking for ranking procedures and the pairwise comparison.  
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Specially, researchers need to be aware of three types of trade-offs when choosing which 
methodologies to use: 
 The use of a pre-defined list of factors (unrestrictive versus restrictive techniques); 
 The use of methodologies that do not allow equalities of investment criteria (Pure 
versus Impure option);  
 The use of a protocol can bias the results (context specific versus not context 
specific).  
Scholars should consider experimenting with additional methodologies in future studies. 
 
From a practical perspective the study highlights the need for entrepreneurs to be wary of 
trite and overly generalized discussions of the investment criteria of business angels that are 
provided in the ‘how to’ literature. They need to be exposed to a much deeper account of 
how angels make investment decisions to reach an understanding of why angels might say 
“yes” or “no” to their investment proposal and to shape the proposal accordingly. It becomes 
clear that under different experiments different outcomes would occur. This should also be 
acknowledged by investment readiness programs. 
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Chapter 5. How similar are investment decisions made by Business 
Angels?  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Business angels are major funding source for new and early stage businesses. Their 
importance is widely acknowledged. In the USA evidence suggests that angel investors fund 
15 to 20 times as many companies as venture capitalists. A recent study conducted by the 
European Business Angel Network (EBAN) (2014) estimates total angel investment in 
Europe (visible + invisible) in 2013 reached 5.5 billion euros versus 3.4 billion euros of 
venture capital (EVCA, 2014). This is particularly pertinent in the UK where EBAN 
members financed 535 companies while their venture capital counterparts invested in just 
371 firms. EBAN estimated that angel investment represented 73.3% of the European early 
stage investment market.  
 
Understanding business angel investment decisions is extremely relevant, particularly, in 
terms of comprehending what are the combinations of investment criteria that make angel 
investors to undertake an opportunity. However, this is not a straightforward task, since the 
angel population is not homogenous (Lahti, 2011; Avdeitchikova, 2008). This limitation has 
not been acknowledged in many prior studies on angel investment decision making.  
 
The heterogeneity of the angel population has been known since Wetzel´s (1983) pioneer 
studies. Nevertheless, scholars have mainly focused on decision making in aggregate, 
ignoring the differences within the angel population. Only a small number of studies on 
decision making have evaluated how different “types” of angels made decisions. Van 
Osnabrugge (1998b) noted that the investment criteria used to make a decision by an angel 
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investor will vary depending on the investment experience. Feeney et al. (1999) corroborated 
these findings and also indicated that the decision process varied depending on the level of 
investment experience of the angel investor. This point was further developed by Harrison 
et al. (2015) who has provided an overall assessment that the level of investment experience 
has an impact on the investment criteria used by the investor. Mitteness et al. (2012b) has 
assessed how different levels of industry experience impacted the evaluations of the 
investment opportunities. However, the research topic is underdeveloped, with scholars 
focusing their attention on experience, and not on other angel characteristics. One of the few 
counter examples of this is a recent study by Mitteness et al., (2012a). The authors looked at 
how different characteristics (age, cognitive style, motivation to mentor, extraversion, 
openness and regulatory focus) of business angels impacted the way they evaluated 
entrepreneurial passion as an investment criterion. This lack of discussion can be seen as 
surprising given the views of Riding et al., (2007, p. 338) on this issue: “it is reasonable to 
expect that decision criteria would vary across different types of business angels.” Hence, 
one would expect that these differences need to be taken into account on decision making 
studies. 
 
Surprisingly, business angel categorization studies also failed to call attention to the use of 
different investment criteria by business angels. The closest these studies have been to use 
the investment criteria has been in Sullivan and Miller (1996) and Erikson (2007) studies. 
The first study, presented an analysis of investor motivations. The authors presented three 
types of “groups” (Economics, Hedonism and Altruism). The second study suggested a 
classification based on investment preferences (Shumpeterian and Austrian). The remaining 
studies have focused on grouping angel investors or their investments using a wide range of 
variables. These studies could be separated into two sub groups. The first set of studies used 
different theoretical perspectives to group investors according to investor characteristics 
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(investment activity, competence, entrepreneurial background). The second set of studies 
has used different measurements of investor involvement (type of contribution, pre and post 
investment behaviour) to classify angel investments. Hence, it has become clear that there is 
a need for further work relating these two research areas. 
 
This chapter aims to fill this gap by building on previous research on angel typologies to 
explore differences between types of angel investments in terms of investment criteria used 
by the angel investor. The unit of analysis of this research is the investment decision. Two 
main reasons can be presented to justify this choice. First, it follows the suggestion made by 
previous scholars (Avdeitchikova, 2008; Avdeitchikova et al., 2008; Mason and Harrison, 
2008; Farrell et al., 2008; Lahti, 2011) who have argued that angel investing is a dynamic 
activity that can only be captured if the analysis is done at the investment level rather than 
at the investor level. Second, the findings of the previous chapter showed that results are 
methodologically dependent. However, the chapter does not provide an indication which is 
the best methodology to evaluate the way investors rank the investment criteria. Hence, by 
choosing the investment as the unit of analysis it is possible to avoid methodological 
limitations. The research has validated some of the previous findings in the decision making 
literature by highlighting the relative importance of some investment criterion (e.g. people).  
 
This chapter examines the clusters that are generated when the investment criterion is used 
to group investment decisions, and the extent to which these clusters are distinct. The results 
display a clear link with the decision making process, presenting three different ways that 
angel investors weight the investment criteria. One of the distinct contributions of this thesis 
was to prove that Wetzel’s views (Wetzel, 1983) on angel diversity are still valid. Using 
insights of the decision making criteria, this research has presented evidence that angel 
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investors make different decisions depending on the criteria used to accept an investment 
opportunity. The heterogeneity of the angel population is not assumed but tested. This is the 
first ‘data driven’ attempt to cluster business angel decisions, with the patterns within the 
data used to identify the differences and to prove that this diversity exists.   
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Typologies of Business angels 
 
This section has the objective of reviewing all of the major studies that have discussed angel 
classification. It provides the state of the art in business angel categorization studies. With 
the aim of mapping the differences within the angel population, scholars have put a 
considerable effort to identify the best ‘criterion’ for this segmentation. Angel research has 
a number of well acknowledged limitations. One is the fact that BAs are a heterogeneous 
population (Mason and Harrison, 2002a). There are a set of dimensions where they differ 
that range from the levels of familiarity with techniques of investing to their entrepreneurial 
experience and the motivation to invest. One solution for this limitation is to apply a cluster 
analysis, also known as market segmentation.  
 
The lack of homogeneity of angel population has been known since Wetzel´s (1983) early 
studies. His analysis of financial returns revealed that the angel population is characterized 
by different perceptions of risk. This fact mirrors “the diversity of the informal investor 
population” (Wetzel, 1983 p. 30) In his work, Wetzel identified that a significant part of the 
respondents had different motivations to invest, that is, they did not look to maximize return. 
Forty five per cent of his sample had altruistic reasons to undertake an investment 
opportunity. From this point onwards several other scholars have looked at the heterogeneity 
of the angel population using different variables to illustrate the dissimilarities. This chapter 
reviews recent studies (e.g. Avdeitchiokava, 2008; Lahti, 2011) regarding the investment as 
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the unit of analysis. Table 5-1 summarizes the reasons presented by previous studies to 
defend this choice. 
 
Table 5-1: Reasons to defend the use of investment as the unit of analysis 
Author, date Reason 
Mason and Harrison, 2008 Easier to identify and to follow 
Farrell et al., 2008 
The collective nature of some angel investments, harder to identify "who" is 
the investor. 
Avdeitchikova, 2008 
Flexibility, not general behaviour but particular behaviour; Wider set of 
effects (investor, investment and context); Variability, more investment than 
investors; 
Avdeitchikova et al., 2008 
Dynamics of angel investing - different roles depending on the investment 
opportunity 
Lahti, 2011 
Aims of the study - investment differences and reasons that justify these 
variations. 
 
The first attempt to develop a categorization of business angels was presented in Gaston’s 
(1989) seminal work. Since then, various studies have examined business angels’ 
categorization using different units of analysis and clustering variables. All of these studies 
reinforced the idea that scholars cannot assume that business angels are a single population 
as a whole without any discrepancies between them. Gaston (1989) presented his 
classification of ten different “groups” of informal investors (Business Devils, The 
Godfather, Peers, Cousin Randy, Dr Kildare, Corporate Achievers, Daddy Warbucks, High-
tech Angels, The Stockholder, and Very Hungry Angels).  
 
This classification was based on the authors` empirical perceptions of what he had 
encountered in his meetings with angel investors. The segmentation was empirically driven, 
based on what the author assumed to be the relevant characteristics for each particular type 
of angel (for example: investor background, investment goals, investment activity, levels of 
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wealth, entrepreneurial experience and so on) without assigning a specific clustering 
variable. As a result of this lack of objective measures, the segmentation did not generate 
mutually exclusive groups. In other words, an angel investor can belong to more than one 
group. This can be pointed as the major shortcoming in Gaston’s (1989) work. Another 
limitation that can be highlighted is the lack of theoretical implications derived by this 
classification. However, the importance of this research should not be underappreciated. 
This research sought to “put boundaries on our ignorance” following Wetzel’ tradition for 
undertaking angel research. Hence, the main contribution of this exploratory research is that 
it was the first attempt to segment the business angel population.  
 
This empirical approach, of identifying groups of angels investors without having an explicit 
rule, was followed by Benjamin and Margulis (2000). The analysis of more than 1,359 listed 
angel investors in International Capital Resources’ database allowed nine groups to emerge 
(value-added investor, deep-pocket investor, consortium of individual investors, partner 
investor, family of investors, barter investor, socially responsible private investor, 
unaccredited private investor, manager investor). Similar critiques to the ones made to 
Gaston’ work (1989) can be made of this research. 
 
The third study on the segmentation of the angel population was conducted by Landström 
(1992), who tested the fit of Ouchi’s model (1977) to angel behaviour. The author questioned 
whether agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1979) could and should be used in the 
informal investment context. This economic theory focuses on the relationship between a 
principal (Business Angel) and the agent (the entrepreneur), who act rationally, trying to 
maximize each own utility function. The principal will have to create the right incentives to 
ensure that the agent is aligned with the principal, so he will act in the principals` best 
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interest, and for this he will incur agency costs. The level of asymmetric information (Barnea 
et al., 1981) also played an important role in this research, with higher levels of asymmetric 
information implying a larger difference between the information available to the 
entrepreneur and to the outside investors (angel investor). Hence, the entrepreneur has the 
capacity and incentive to affect wealth transfers between different parties and not just behave 
in his own interest. The most important contribution of this research was to highlight the 
need of a strong theoretical framework in categorization studies. Nonetheless, the study 
concluded that the framework suggested does not present acceptable evidence to elucidate 
the relation between the entrepreneur and the angel investor. But in comparison with Gaston 
(1989), this research used a narrower set of investor characteristics, which can be seen as an 
improvement on the previous study.   
 
The following categorization study by Freear et al. (1994) used as a clustering variable the 
level of investment activity in entrepreneurial ventures. Three clusters emerged from this 
study, business angels, interested potential investors and non-interested potential investors. 
Chronologically, this is the first of several classification studies that has used the level of 
investment experience as the clustering variable. Although this research is not based on a 
strong theoretical framework, it provides insights into the relationship between the groups 
and investment preferences (for example: stage of investment, location, amounts invested 
and so on). Another contribution of this research is to present a substantial improvement in 
terms of the statistical procedures used in comparison to previous classification studies. 
 
Sullivan and Miller (1996) presented an analysis based on investment motivations, which 
produced three “groups” (Economics, Hedonism and Altruism). Economic motivations are 
based on conventional economic and finance theories, supporting wealth maximization and 
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individual rationality (Dessler, 1980; Copeland and Weston, 1988). The informal investors 
categorized in this cluster are focused on the financial return resulting from the investment 
undertaken. Hedonistic motivations are related to nonfinancial factors, that is, factors that 
are not easily measured, such as a "psychic income" (Simon, 1959 p.252). This type of angel 
investor could easily be described as "people that are motivated solely by the desire to 
maximize pleasure and minimize pain" (Brue and Grant, 2012 p.137). Finally the members 
of the altruistic motivations cluster are encouraged to accept a proposal from an entrepreneur 
based on what Amitai Etzioni (2010) called the "moral dimension". The investors in this 
group were focused on giving back to society something that they were given some years 
ago. The key contribution of this research is that it was the first to examine whether or not 
business angels should be distinguished based on their investment preferences, particularly 
in terms of the reasons why they invest. The main criticism that can be made to this research 
is the fact that its unit of analysis is the business angel. Hence, it does not allow the 
motivations to invest to vary between the same angel investor. 
 
A study dated from the same year (Kelly and Hay, 1996) focused the analysis on a segment 
of the angel population, serial investors. This particular segment of the angel market is 
defined as investors who have made three or more investments. Using the preferences of 
business angels regarding investing at an individual level versus collective level, the authors 
were able to identify two sub-segments: solo serial investors and syndicate serial investors. 
The main limitation of this research was that it only analysed a subset (serial angels) of the 
whole population, and consequently, it lacks completeness. However, the study provided 
new evidence on the investment activity, returns and investment behaviour of serial angels. 
The topic of serial investors has also been addressed by Van Osnabrugge (1998b). This paper 
examined the differences between serial and non-serial angels in terms of investment 
preferences, investment experience and expected outcomes. Contrary to Kelly and Hay 
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(1996), this research was an assessment of the whole angel market. The principal limitation 
was the broadness of the definition of a serial angel (investor that has made three or more 
investments). Sub-categories should have been made so that the effect of experience could 
have been assessed with greater precision. 
 
In his doctoral thesis, Kelly (2000) follows the approach of using investment activity as the 
clustering variable. The author divided his sample into three sub-groups: investors with three 
or less investments; investors who made between four and nine investments; and investors 
with ten or more investments. Among other factors, the study contributed to our 
understanding of the contractual relationship between the entrepreneur and the angel 
investor, and how the number of investments made can affect this relation. This approach is 
more suited to provide a comprehensive overview of the different types of investors and 
what influences their decisions.  
 
Kelly and Hay (2000) continued their research on this topic by dividing the middle group 
(investors with four to nine investments) of Kelly’s (2000) dissertation sample into two. The 
study clustered the angel population into four types of investors based on investment activity 
(less than three investments, three to five, six to nine, more than ten). The focus of this 
research was to test the impact of investment activity on the type of suppliers of leads used, 
and on the quality of deal flow of opportunities. The findings reinforced the idea that 
investment procedures varied across the angel population. In particular, investors have 
different networks, which, as a consequence, influence the deal flow of investment 
opportunities. In terms of understanding the diversity of business angels, the study failed to 
include in the analysis the effect of investing in groups (networks, groups and syndicates).  
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Typologies using the levels of investment activity were further developed by Paul et al., 
(2003) which can be seen as a variant of Kelly and Hay (2003). The authors divided investors 
into four groups: Nascent angels (no investments), Novice (1 investment), Portfolio angels 
(2-5 investments) and Super angels (more than 5 investments). The study did not aim to 
identify particular differences across the groups. Rather it called attention to policy-makers 
of the heterogeneity of the angel population. The authors defended that the level of 
investment activity was particularly useful to (i) policy makers as it enables them to create 
optimal investment incentives; (ii) entrepreneurs as it is an objective way to detect who is 
actively involved in the supply of funding. The lack of novelty and limited contribution can 
be seen as the major drawback of this research.  
  
Coveney and Moore (1998) presented a cluster analysis based on two main criteria: the 
investment activity and the entrepreneurial experience of the angel investor. Measurement 
of entrepreneurial experience was based on their financial and business backgrounds, while 
investment activity was measured through the number of investments made and the total 
amount of funds invested. These two criteria allowed the authors to create and profile four 
“groups” of active angels (wealth maximizing angels; entrepreneur angels; income seeking 
angels and corporate angels). Two groups of inactive investors were also identified and 
profiled: those who currently are not investing (latent angels), and those that have not made 
an investment yet (virgin angels). The limitations of this study are associated with the lack 
of information on how the groups were categorized, and the absence of a clear justification 
for this. From this point onwards, the discussion in categorization studies started to be less 
focused on investment activity, and more likely to be supported by investors’ characteristics 
as the unit of analysis.  
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Sørheim and Landström (2001) included investment activity as one of the units of analysis 
of the cluster analysis, but instead of using entrepreneurial background, they used 
competence as a second unit of analysis. The authors measured investor competence through 
a set of experiences: Professional; Self-Employed; Education; Business Background; 
Entrepreneurial Background. To measure investment activity a set of questions about future 
investment intentions and past investment were asked to identify the amount of investment 
activity of each business angel. These two criteria enabled the researchers to create four 
“types” of angel investors (Lotto Investors, Analytical investors, Traders, Business Angels). 
This study had both methodological and empirical contributions. Regarding the first, this 
research presented a more robust method of categorization (Iacobucci and Churchill, 2009) 
using a set of angel characteristics as unit of analysis. Additionally, this article refined the 
way investment activity was measured, and emphasized the importance that wider criteria 
will have in terms of robustness of the research. The results have drawn attention to the 
differences within the four groups of business angels in terms of investment preferences and 
investment procedures.  
 
One common factor amongst these studies has been the lack of explanation on how scholars 
have chosen the clustering variables for their study. Erikson (2007) broke this tradition of 
the typology studies by suggesting a classification of business angels based on the two 
dominant schools of entrepreneurship (Schumpeterian and Austrian). The author 
operationalized this classification by assessing the investment history (last three years) of 
each investor. The Schumpeterian classification required the majority of investments made 
to be in new firms that were technology driven with an international market potential. The 
prerequisite to be qualified as an Austrian investor was to have the majority of investments 
in firms with the capability to reach the international market.  
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Erikson’s research (2007) overthrew the dominant paradigm used in the categorization 
studies by presenting a strong theoretical base for classification. However, some questions 
can be raised by this study. First, the group classification seems too simplistic, with no 
references to different levels of technological orientation in the Schumpeterian typology. 
Second, the length of the analysis, three years, is too short. The number of group members 
could be biased by market trends. Third, the focus is on the investor and not the investment. 
Hence, a majority rule36 does not reflect the dynamic of angel investing. A possible solution 
would be to use a 100% rule to define the two groups, and all the other cases would be 
hybrids resulting in a categorization with three clusters.  
 
Avdeitchikova (2008) is responsible for the most significant categorization study. Her 
research drew attention to the limitations of previous typology studies, but also suggested an 
alternative way to classify the angel population. The article reviewed the deficiencies of 
previous studies by pointing out three crucial points. The first issue raised concerns to do 
with the reasoning behind the choice of the clustering rules. The author defended three 
justifications for this. The first, scholars have failed to explain the reasoning for previous 
categorizations. Secondly, there is a lack of a strong theoretical background on the clustering 
rules. Lastly, it is inappropriate to use investor-related variables and investment related 
variables at the same time. This creates ambiguity regarding the unit of analysis of the 
classification because the reader does not know if the clusters characterize investors or 
investments.  
 
A second concern raised by Avdeitchikova (2008) was the lack of dynamics in previous 
categorization studies. These studies did not allow investors to adapt and evolve to have 
                                                          
36 An investor is defined as Austrian or Schumpeterian if more than 50% of his investments are of one type. 
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different roles. Hence, she suggested changing the unit of analysis to the investment. The 
lack of theoretical contributions of the classification studies is regarded as a third key 
deficiency. The identification of these limitations had a direct impact on the classification 
used in her research. The classification was built from the two different types of 
contributions an angel investor can provide (financial and non-financial). The use of the 
investment rather than the investor as the unit of analysis was one of the key contributions 
of this study. This opened a new line of research within the classification studies. 
 
Another key contribution of this research is that angel investing is not a static activity, in 
other words, investor behaviour (investor contributions) may change depending on firm 
requirements. However, this study has two major shortcomings. The author did not take into 
account the possibility of business angels investing with others. This has a direct impact on 
the type and level of contributions that a business angel can provide. Additionally, the choice 
of contribution might be investor dependent, that is, the contributions might depend on the 
personal preference of the investor. This might raise measurement problems, since the 
investor characteristics might provide a better justification for this categorization than the 
different types of investments. 
    
The most recent categorization study was conducted by Lahti, (2011). Based on the Finnish 
angel market, the author advocated that investments can be segmented into subgroups, using 
for this, the time spent by the angel investor in pre-investment (due diligence) and post-
investment involvement in the invested companies (value-added activities). This analysis 
created four different “groups” (Gambles; Conventional Angel Investments; Due Diligence 
Driven Investments and Professionally Safeguarded Investments). The theoretical 
background of this research was based on how angel investors can reduce the pre and post-
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investment risks. This risk reduction is understood through the principal agent approach and 
contract theory. The first theory is the same used previously by Landström, (1992) which 
emphasized that the principal (angel investor) will try to align incentives of the agent 
(entrepreneur) with his/her own. Alignment can be achieved through complete contracts. 
However contracts are not complete since it is impossible to include all possibilities in the 
agreement. Therefore, pre and post-investment risk reduction will be a function of the time 
spent in due diligence (pre-investment) and the time spent in active involvement (post-
investment).  
 
At the first glace, the analysis has strong theoretical foundations. However some less 
intuitive results can be seen as the biggest shortcoming. An example of this is the discussion 
regarding the “gambles”. These are investments where the angel has low pre and post 
involvement. The author considered that gambles are investments of speculative nature and 
they have limited emphasis on managing risks, that is, they are just taking a risk without 
trying to minimize it by any means. However, this can be challenged. It is clear that gambles 
have mechanisms of risk sharing; they are the ones that demand the highest investment from 
the entrepreneur. This is a way of aligning incentives between the entrepreneur and the 
business angel. This variable is also statistically significant, reinforcing the conclusion that 
this as a tool used by this type of angel investor to align incentives and prevent entrepreneurs 
from shirking. This is a well-documented point in the literature (Barney et al., 1989; Prasad 
et al., 2000; Wong et al., 2009). 
 
This summarizes the main body of literature on business angels’ typologies. However, it is 
important to acknowledge the existence of other studies that did not focus on developing 
categorizations of angel investors (or their investments). Instead, this body of literature 
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aimed to identify the specificities of certain subgroups within the angel population. One of 
these studies (Erikson et al., 2003) has compared angel investors that mainly invested in 
opportunities in which there were family ties against all other types of informal investors. 
The authors investigated four areas of angel investing (investing stages, number of 
investments, and degree of involvement and exit preferences) and concluded that contrasts 
between ‘family angels’ and other types of angels were significant. Erikson and Sørheim 
(2005) studied the differences between angel investors who invest in technological driven 
opportunities versus all other business angels. The analysis focused on looking at different 
dimensions of angel investing (deal origin, selection, monitoring and exit preferences), and 
concluded that ‘technology angles’ were considerably atypical from other types of business 
angels.  
 
The particular characteristics of female angel investors have been investigated by two 
research teams. Harrison and Mason (2007) conducted their research with individual angels, 
while Sohl and Hill (2007) discussed the differences in a group environment. Visser and 
Williams (2001) looked at a specific type of business angel who invest in very distinctive 
opportunities - take over and turn around businesses in serious financial distress. Another 
study (Festel and De Cleyn, 2013) discussed the particularities of founding angels. The 
authors claimed that this type of investor complements both formal and informal venture 
capital.  
  
5.2.2 Importance of Decision Making Criteria 
 
In her 2008 work, Avdeitchikova claimed that previous typology studies of angel investors 
do not offer enough theoretical considerations to elucidate the reasons for the lack of 
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homogeneity of business angels and the distinctive types of investment behaviour. But is 
this a problem of lack of theoretical contemplations, or is it a problem of insufficient 
understanding of how similar investment decisions are? This research has sought to clarify 
this point by using the investment making criteria as the clustering variable. Previous 
research has not considered the possibility of looking at the investment decision criteria as 
the clustering rule. However, what better way to understand the investment behaviour than 
look at how similar the reasons are to invest? 
 
The dynamic nature of the angel market (Mason et al., 2013) has generated more nuances in 
the angel population that previous studies have addressed. The first stream of categorization 
studies has grouped angels according to individual characteristics. The rational for this was 
to group individuals for what they are - based on previous experiences (investment activity, 
entrepreneurial background, competences and investment motivations). The second stream 
of research has looked at the investment process (contributions, technology preferences; and 
involvement). In either case, scholars did not address the fundamental question of what leads 
an angel investor to undertake an investment opportunity, that is, what was the criterion or 
criteria that motivate this decision. Moreover, are similar decisions taken by different 
angels? Or do different angels have the same motivations? 
 
The investment decision making literature has identified several critical findings in terms of 
the criteria used by angel investors. However, the knowledge about how similar angel 
investment decisions are still remains unknown. Research developed in this area has 
answered two questions. First, how similar are business angels’ decision criteria when 
compared with other investors in the funding escalator. Scholars have acknowledged that 
business angels have a unique attitude in terms of investment criteria. Van Osnabrugge 
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(1998c) identified different approaches to investment appraisal between business angels and 
venture capital fund managers. A following study (Mason and Harrison, 2002b) emphasized 
that angel investors were more likely to undertake an investment opportunity based on ‘gut 
feeling’ when compared to venture capitalists. This was partially as a result of business 
angels being less concerned with the financial outcomes of their investment activity than 
venture capitalists.  
 
Mason and Stark (2004) take this further and showed that angel investors have a different 
approach to formal venture capital, and also to bankers. Second, how much does the decision 
criteria vary across different “types” of angel investors. Two studies have brought some 
insights on the similarities. An introductory study conducted by Van Osnabrugge (1998a) 
identified differences regarding the decision criteria used by ‘serial angels’ and by ‘non-
serial angels’. The most significant difference raised by this work was the fact that ‘serial 
angels’ were more apprehensive about market risks, while ‘non serial angels’ were more 
concerned with agency risk.  
 
An alternative perspective based on the investor experience was raised by Harrison et al., 
(2015). The authors divided the sample into three groups (super angels, novice angels and 
nascent angels) and identified differences in how each group assessed the investment 
opportunities. However, scholars have not drilled down to identify the ways in which 
decision criteria might systematically change to reflect the dynamics of different investment 
propositions, and the investment preferences of angels.  
 
This research has suggested a novel way to cluster business angels based on their investment 
criteria, using seven investment criteria (the people, product/market, attributes of the 
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business, investor attributes, financial attributes, and exit and business plan). Previous 
research has worked on the basis that angels were different based on a specific range of 
characteristics and processes, and then looked how this impacted the decision criteria. This 
research suggests the opposite, to group the investment decisions based on the investment 
criteria used, and then understand how different the angel investors are.  Hence, it is not that 
previous research asked the wrong question, but the way the inquiry was made.  
 
5.2.3 Development of categorizational schema 
 
This is the first research to present an alternative way to categorize the angel population 
based on the investment criteria used by investors. It is a data driven thesis and does not aim 
to answer Avdeitchikova’s (2008) demand for a classification with a stronger theoretical 
basis in the stream of research. The key objective was to assess how similar the investment 
decisions are regarding the investment criteria used. The explorative nature of this research 
reflects the lack of focus of the academic community on understanding how the 
heterogeneity of the angel population affects investment decisions. Nevertheless, this section 
will review the main theories used in business angel decision making.  
 
Maula et al. (2005) applied the social psychological theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 
1991) to explain the susceptibility of individuals to be angel investors. The authors used 
individual characteristics such as: entrepreneurial experience, education and age to test a set 
of hypothesis regarding the likelihood of becoming an angel investor. The study concluded 
that, based on the results achieved, this theory fitted significantly the behaviour of business 
angels. Although this was a clear contribution to the literature, the use of the social 
psychological theory of planned behaviour is restricted to answer what are the characteristics 
that justify an individual to become an informal investor, and not what are the reasons to 
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invest in a specific opportunity. This study also used the economic theory on household 
portfolios developed by Guiso et al. (2000). The approach followed by this theory proposed 
that individuals allocated a part of their wealth to a different class of assets, depending on 
the risk/return relation, and on the individual level of risk aversion. Angel investing is seen 
as a type of risky asset. Maula et al. (2005) concluded that this theory is suitable to explain 
angel investing, particularly regarding tax related reasons. However, the same criticism can 
be made regarding the lack of coverage of each individual investment decision. The 
economic theory on household portfolios is only useful to explain the general reasons to 
become a business angel. 
 
Agency theory has been used by several authors (Landström, 1992; Van Osnabrugge, 2000; 
Lahti, 2011). This theory was developed by Jensen and Meckling (1979) and depicts a 
relation between the principal and the agent, and what problems can arise given the 
separation between ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). These problems are 
commonly known as adverse selection and moral hazard. Van Osnabrugge’s work (2000) 
compared the differences between formal and informal venture capital regarding investment 
decisions. The author identified that business angels have an incomplete contract approach, 
which explains that the principal will put extra emphasis on the post investment relation. 
This will imply that the angel investor will seek to exercise control over the entrepreneur. 
The venture capitalist will have the opposite approach, the principal agent approach. This 
approach explains that the investor will rely on thorough ex ante screening and due diligence 
of the investment opportunity. The application of the agency theory to business angel 
investment decision making has been criticized by several scholars (Landström, 1992; Kelly 
and Hay, 2003; Mason, 2007a) with several limitations being stressed, e.g. the existence of 
distrust, economic reasons driving the motivation to invest, size of the firms and so on. 
Additionally, its focus is on the principal/agent relation and not on the motivations to invest.  
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The sociological theory of social networks was initially applied to business angel decision 
making by Shane and Cable (2002). This theory is particularly useful to explain business 
angel investment decisions, predominantly, regarding the sourcing of opportunities. 
However, the application of this theory goes beyond the pre-investment stage, and can also 
be applied to explain part of the hands-on approach followed by angel investors. This point 
is obvious in recent research (Sørheim, 2003; Herrmann et al., 2015) in that, where the 
structured dimension is important for regional and industry contacts, the relational aspect is 
important in terms of how the angel investor is seen by his/her network. Lastly the cognitive 
element is related to way the business angel is seen by other investors, and by the 
entrepreneur. Although there is a clear contribution of the application of this theory to angel 
research, one needs to recognize the specificity of it. Business angels invest for a set of 
reasons and motivations, and this theory only looks at the social ties of the investor and how 
these connections impact the investment decisions.   
 
In an effort to provide theoretical foundations to the business angel decision making 
literature, Fiet (1991) presented the notion of trust in the context of information sources, 
networks and reliance structures. This was the first attempt to associate trust as a decision 
factor for angel investment. This initial reference to trust regarding business angel decision 
making was further developed by other scholars (Harrison et al., 1997; Dibben et al., 1998; 
Dibben, 2000). A common characteristic of these articles was the use of Lewicki and 
Bunker's typologies (1996) as a theoretical framework. This framework has helped the 
authors to identify a relation between the different criteria used by the angel investors and 
the type of trust and its level. This would impact the levels of cooperation the business angel 
would be willing to have with the entrepreneur. The contributions from applying the Socio-
Psychological Theories of Interpersonal Trust on business angel investment decision making 
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has improved the comprehensiveness of our knowledge. However, its focus is on trust and 
how it impacts the decision making; it is just a part of the several factors impacting the 
investment decision. 
 
The previous section has summarized the key theories used by scholars to explain business 
angel investment decision making. It should be clear by now that there is no perfect fit in 
any of the theoretical applications previously described, with each of them targeting a 
specific approach to the issue. Riding and his colleagues (2007 p.344) suggested that one of 
the key areas scholars should focus is on “the development of a comprehensive model of 
investment decision-making”. For these two reasons, it is fundamental to take a step back 
and understand similarities and patterns in business angel investment decisions that would 
help generalization, and consequently have a theoretical contribution.  
 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
 
5.3.1 Data collection 
 
This research is based on data collected on business angels and their investments from an 
online survey of United Kingdom angel investors that was made available for completion 
from April to July 2014. Harrison and Mason (1992a) suggest three different approaches to 
identify a sample of angel investors: large-scale sample surveys, investee reference and 
“snowball” method. Avdeitchikova and her colleagues (2008) suggest a fourth approach 
which comprises a “snowball” method with members of business angel networks and groups. 
The research design followed in this study could be considered a variation of the first 
approach, a large-scale sample survey with a very specific focus.  
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The research was mainly focused on the visible side of the market. Six reasons can be cited 
to justify this decision. First, the angel market has evolved from individual investing to a 
scenario of collective behaviour (Sohl, 2012a; Gregson et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2013). 
Second, angel groups are recognized as the visible side of the angel market (Sohl, 2007; 
Mason and Harrison, 2013), which clearly identifies who to target. Third, is the importance 
of business angels groups. In a Scottish study (Paul et al., 2003) half of sampled angels had 
previous invested via a business angel group. Fourth, several angels operate in both the 
invisible and on the visible market (Mason and Harrison, 2013). Fifth, the unpredictable size 
of the angel market (Mason and Harrison, 2008) makes it almost impossible to understand 
the population size. Lastly, increasingly business angels start investing within groups. As 
noticed in chapter three, angel groups are linked to the first investment of several investors. 
 
There were two important requirements to be addressed before launching the survey: first, 
to identify the active angel groups investing in the UK; and second, obtain the support of the 
managers of these groups, also known as gatekeepers. The first requisite was solved by 
researching angel groups in several online sources, such as: UKBA Association member 
base, LINC Scotland member base, Syndicate room network directory, as well as personal 
knowledge. This process enabled the identification of 84 business angels networks/groups. 
This number is clearly above the ones reported by EBAN in 200837 (Mason, 2009). Again, 
when compared with USA data (Preston, 2007) these numbers38 of angel groups are above 
what one would expect. The data collection process helped to identify nine additional 
networks/groups raising the total to 93. The second condition involved contacting the angel 
groups/networks to ask them to circulate the survey to their members. This involved an initial 
                                                          
37 EBAN reported that in mid-2008 there were 35 business angel networks in the UK. 
38 Preston reported 250 Business angel organizations; using the 2014 Gross domestic product as a 
comparative measure we find that the USA is approximately 6.5 times bigger than the UK. Hence, using this 
as a reference one would expect to have 38 Business angel organizations in the UK. Source: World 
Economic and Financial Surveys from the International Monetary Fund.  
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contact by email to the group managers also known as gatekeepers (Paul and Whittam, 
2010). This preparatory attempt was pursed by several follow on telephone calls. As part of 
the request, a consultancy report on their members’ views on the group was offered to all 
the groups that achieved five or more respondents. This had the objective to align the 
interests of the gatekeeper to the research in terms of maximizing the number of respondents. 
The survey gave the groups a unique opportunity to have an independent scrutiny of their 
members.  
 
The way the request was communicated to the members of the group differed, depending on 
the normal communication channel used by the gatekeeper and it varied between: a standard 
email, posts on the group private investment forum, communication at the group meeting 
and so on. Additionally, a list of 40 angel investors was contacted. The list was constructed 
in the previous data collection stage. The business angels were identified or by being known 
as an angel investor through the media or by snowball sampling. This multi-sample approach 
is a good solution to deal with bias sampling resulting from non-representative sampling 
methodologies (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008).  
 
Out of the 84 identified groups 32 were willing to support the research and made it available 
to their members. The survey had the participation of 238 business angels. The respondents 
were predominantly members of at least one group. This is the result of the two main factors: 
first, it is virtually impossible to identify angels in the invisible market; second, the growth 
of angel groups and their memberships. This represents weight of 38.10% of the overall 
groups. These 32 groups represented around 1200 individual angels39. On average each 
participant was a member of 2.08 angel groups. This results in an individual response rate 
                                                          
39 Estimation based on the groups information.  
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of 41.13%. Using the suggested framework to assess response rate40 this survey issued an R 
= (38.10%; 41, 13%). The results are much in line with previous studies.  
 
5.3.2 Unit of analysis 
 
Landström (2007) defends that even though 25 years of research has helped scholars to 
achieve a better understanding of business angels there is still space for improvement. He 
suggests that this should focus on both the investor domain and on the dynamics of the 
informal venture capital market. Hence, defining the unit of analysis of a typology can be 
extremely useful to answer this request. The great majority of previous categorization studies 
have used the investor as the unit of analysis. Only three studies did not follow this approach 
(relationship between the informal investor and the portfolio firm - Landström, 1992; 
Investment - Avdeitchikova, 2008; Lahti, 2011). This research advocates the use of the 
investment decision as the unit of analysis. 
  
Four main reasons support this decision. First, the results from the previous chapter show 
variability in the way business angels make decisions. The lack of consistency seen in the 
sample indicates that the same individual might value differently a particular criterion 
depending on what is being asked and how it is being asked. Hence, setting the investor as 
the unit of analysis would not allow variability of the reasons to invest since it would force 
each individual to have the same choice. This variability dimension has been previously 
advocated and developed by Avdeitchikova (2008). Second, the nature of angel investing is 
very dynamic (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008), angel groups have enabled business angels to 
spread their investments across different industries. Collaborating with other angels permits 
                                                          
40 The response rate was calculated according to suggestions made in chapter three. 
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each individual to have different sets of experiences and knowledge that will result in a 
different way to asses an investment opportunity (Carriere, 2006). Again, the reasons for a 
business angel to fund a firm are not always the same and are opportunity dependent. Third, 
as Riding (2005) observes, investment profiles may change over time. Hence, it would be 
impossible to assign an investor to one specific category since individuals can undertake 
different types of investments over time. This argument is directly linked with the last reason 
for this choice, the learning argument. Harrison et al., (2015) have identified that angel 
learning has a direct impact on the way they assess an investment opportunity with less 
experienced business angels acknowledging the contributions of expert investors. Thus, a 
categorization of investors would not allow this dynamic learning component.  
 
The choice fell on the investment decisions, in particular the criteria that justified the investor 
to undertake such opportunity. One consequence of this choice of making the investment 
decision the unit of analysis was the possibility of collecting a wider sample since each angel 
investor could report more than one investment decision. There are obvious trade-offs of 
asking for a single answer rather than several investments. There is no consensus within the 
literature which is the best approach to be used. Looking at the studies that focused the 
analysis on the investments we can observe that Avdeitchikova (2008) asked participants to 
report their three most recent investments, while Lahti (2011) opted to request respondents 
to recall the most recent investment.  
 
In the online survey, respondents were asked to recall their three most recent investments. 
This approach reflects the arguments of variability and inconsistency previously mentioned, 
and the larger sample would allow the identification of different patterns in the data. Lahti 
(2011) was concerned about collecting more than one investment decision for two reasons. 
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First, was the risk of self-selection bias. Investors might choose to report the most lucrative 
investments. This is not a significant problem in this research (i) investors were asked to 
recall the three most recent investments; and (ii) no questions were asked concerning 
investment outcomes, which reduces the incentives for investor to report successful 
investments. Second, there is a risk of skewed distribution, that is, the majority of 
observations belong to a small number of investors. The results of the data collection, shown 
in table 5-2, illustrate that this should not be a concern in this particular study. Out of the 
177 respondents that completed the investment section 137 provided three investment 
decisions, representing more than three quarters of the respondents. 
 
Table 5-2: Number of investments decisions per respondent 
Number of investment decisions Respondents % 
1 30 17% 
2 11 6% 
3 137 77% 
Total 178 100% 
 
Out of the 238 initial respondents only 178 completed the investment decision section. The 
survey collected a total of 463 investment decisions. Table 5.2 depicts the number of 
responses per angel. From these 463 investment decisions 16 were partially completed. 
Hence, the number of investment decisions analysed was 447.  
 
5.3.3 Cluster analysis 
 
As previously mentioned, this chapter aims to categorize the investment decisions made by 
business angels taking into account the criteria used in a positive decision. A list comprising 
seven criteria was used to explore the relative importance of each criterion. This was the 
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same list that was used in chapter four. The main problem with this approach relied on the 
fact that the cluster variables would be specific (investment decision) and unobservable 
(investor preferences). Scholars have identified that groups categorized with the use of 
specific unobservable variables are usually more homogenous (Wedel and Kamakura, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the utilization of these types of variables represented a challenge. The great 
majority of previous angel typologies focused on observable and general variables because 
these variables are easier to identify and to measure. Hence, the survey design was extremely 
important and required external validation. This validation was done with the help of two 
experienced researchers and with three gatekeepers of angel groups. The objective of this 
external involvement was to ensure that participants would clearly understand what was 
asked and that the variables were measured correctly.  
 
A Likert scale was used to investigate angel how the investor gave different weight in an 
investment decision. This follows preceding investment decision studies (Van Osnabrugge, 
2000; Sudek, 2006). The values for each of the criterion ranged from 1 (not important) to 7 
(very important) following Vagias (2006). The list of seven criteria was the result of the 
literature review conducted on investment criteria and it was used in the previous empirical 
chapter. As already mentioned this list was validated in the first stage of data collection. 
Appendix 5 presents a detailed description of the seven criteria used in the study.  
 
Clustering data is a method that enables researchers to form classes of objects with analogous 
characteristics. This is particularly important to understand specific patterns within the data. 
A two-step cluster analysis procedure was conducted. The choice for this technique was 
based on the fact that the algorithm used has two desirable features. First, is the ability to 
automatically choose the best number of clusters (Chiu et al., 2001). The aim of this research 
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was to identify how angel investors weight the different criterion in their decisions and what 
patterns exist. This algorithm is particularly useful for exploratory research since no 
theoretical framework is predefining the number of clusters. This is the most distinctive 
characteristics of this study since previous angel typologies (for example: Sørheim and 
Landström, 2001; Lahti, 2011) use the K-mean algorithm. Second, is the capability to 
analyse significant large data sets efficiently. Contrariwise to Hierarchical clustering 
technique, two-step allows researchers to work with data set with a wide number of 
observations. The analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS statistics. 
 
After depicting the clusters, the clusters centroids were compared using investment aspects 
(e.g. amount invested, stage, sources of due diligence and so on) and investor characteristics 
(age, gender, entrepreneurial experience, investment experience and so on). This procedure 
aimed to assess the solution’s validity of the cluster analysis. Mooi and Sarstedt (2011) 
suggested that this would help to appraise whether the groups are substantially unique 
considering one or more criterion variables. Additionally, it enables a deeper understanding 
of what is more important in terms of an investment decision, the investor characteristics or 
the opportunity features. As in previous studies (Sørheim and Landström, 2001; 
Avdeitchikova, 2008) the group means were compared using Scheffe analysis. This 
procedure is particularly useful when in group comparisons with unequal sample sizes. 
While running this analysis, Levene’s tests of homogeneous variance were conducted 
simultaneously. One of the assumptions of the ANOVA is equality of variance and the 
Levene’s test allows researcher to assess this condition. When the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was violated two tests were applied (i) Welch and (ii) Brown and 
Forsythe test. 
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5.4 Analysis and empirical results  
 
5.4.1 Overview 
 
As noted above, the two-step procedure relies on an auto-clustering algorithm that enables 
the identification of the best solution regarding the number of clusters. This algorithm uses 
a combination of the variation of the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) value and distance 
change. The solution is identified by a sensibly significant value for the Ratio of BIC changes 
and a large value for the Ratio of Distance Measures (see Appendix 6). A three cluster 
solution was the best model found. To assess the goodness of fit an average silhouette 
coefficient41 was calculated and the solution scored 0.1 (see Appendix 7). According to 
Kaufman and Rousseeuw (2009) this result indicates a poor cluster structure. This will be 
further discussed in the limitation section of this chapter. 
 
The first group of investments is a cluster where the centroids indicate that investor consider 
a subset of criteria (5 out of 7 criterion) as being extremely important, scoring the maximum 
value in the Likert scale. Out of these five, the criteria that had the most frequent response 
of 7 was Product/Market, with 85.8% of the categorized investments scoring the highest 
value. The other two criteria (Financial attributes and Attributes of the business) were 
considered as neutral for the decision, scoring on average a 4 in the Likert scale. This is the 
smallest cluster with 120 investment decision which represents 26.8% of the total sample. 
Two additional points can be raised regarding this cluster. First, these are the investments 
decisions which investors scored the highest level of importance of specific criterion (7). 
Second, the investors identify two levels of importance in terms of criteria. This seems to 
indicate that some criteria are very important while others are not that important. This can 
                                                          
41 The Silhouette coefficient combines both cohesion and separation, that is, it measure the distance between 
clusters but also within clusters. 
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be linked with compensatory procedures, since in these decisions five of the criteria were 
extremely important compensating for the two with neutral scores.  
 
The second cluster is a group of investments were the angels had a three level analysis. The 
investments in this class were characterized by classifying the cluster centroids of two 
criteria as very important, two being moderately important and three neutral (6, 5 and 4 
respectively in the Likert scale). Similarly to the previous group of investment, this cluster 
can also be linked with compensatory procedures. The main difference between the first and 
second cluster seems to be the level of detail the latter group of decisions contains, with more 
comprehensive level of preferences between criteria used. This was the biggest cluster with 
200 observations which represented approximately 45% of the sample of investment 
decisions.  
 
The last cluster is characterized investments in which investors considered that all the criteria 
were very important (cluster centroid equal to 6 in Likert scale). Out of the seven criteria, 
the attribute of the business had the most frequent response of very important, with 81.1% 
of the categorized investments having this feature. This is the cluster that reveals least about 
the way the angel investors make a decision. By having all the cluster centroids with the 
same value it is harder to understand what are the trade-offs taken into account while 
deciding. This seems to be a non-compensatory procedure which comprised a larger number 
of criteria that were important. In terms of size, this last cluster was the second biggest, 
representing 28.4% of the sample (127 investment decisions). 
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5.4.2 The importance of the predictors 
 
One of the cluster analysis outputs is the predictor importance view. This feature allows the 
identification of the relative importance of each cluster variable in the estimated the model. 
The predictor importance ranges from 0 to 1 and the higher the value the more the variable 
contributes to the cluster formation. It can be particularly useful when dealing with large 
numbers of variables since it enables the elimination of needless predictors helping to fine-
tune the model. However, this is not reason why it was used in this section. The following 
discussion is centred on the fact that this analysis signifies how well the cluster variable can 
distinguish the different groups. Hence, emphasising which variables were helpful to 
differentiate the clusters. 
 
Of the seven criteria used in this research, the people was the criterion with the lowest 
predictor importance score42 (scored 0.12). This can be seen as a surprise since it means that 
this criterion has almost no effect on the cluster formulation. One possible justification for 
this result could be linked with the idea that the entrepreneur is fundamental in an investment 
opportunity and that business angels are more focused on agency risk (the relation with the 
entrepreneur) than market risk (product and market issues), consequently, it is not the best 
variable to distinguish the investment opportunities that received angel funding. The 
importance of the entrepreneur was highlighted by several research studies (Fiet, 1995a; Van 
Osnabrugge, 2000; Harrison and Mason, 2002; Manigart et al., 2002; Kelly and Hay, 2003).   
 
The financial attributes was the criterion most useful to differentiate the clusters. This was 
closely followed by the product/market (scores of 1 and 0.99 respectively). In the first case, 
                                                          
42 Notice that the people had the second highest mean and second lowest standard deviation. Hence, it was 
not a problem of low scores or low variability.  
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scholars have shown that business angel investors can be differentiated between those with 
financial and non-financial motives (Wetzel, 1986; De Noble, 2001). Hence, it would be 
expected that angel investors with altruistic motivations to put less emphasis on the financial 
characteristics of the investment opportunity. Another possible influence is investor 
background: 37% of the respondents had their main working experience in financial services 
and so would be expected to have distinct capabilities to analyse the financial attributes of 
an investment opportunity.  
 
The majority (73%) of the investment opportunities analysed were made through an angel 
group. This may also have influenced the findings. Typically, these organizations try to 
spread the risk by investing in several sectors (Gregson et al., 2013; Mason et al., 2013). 
Hence, investors did not necessarily have specific knowledge about the product or the market 
they were investing in. This point is closely linked with market risks. Van Osnabrugge 
(1998a) shows that serial angels are more concerned with market risks when compared with 
non-serial angels. Scholars have used different definitions of serial angels (for example: 
Farrell et al., 2003; Capizzi, 2013; Hellmann et al., 2015). However, the focus is always on 
different levels of investment experience measured in number of investments undertaken. In 
this study, approximately half of the respondents had made 7 or more investments. Hence, 
it would be expected that angels with different investment experience to emphasize the 
product/market differently. For a deeper analysis on the predictor importance, Appendix 8 
provides the predictor importance for all seven clustering variables.  
 
5.4.3 Comparison between cluster groups 
 
The comparison between cluster groups has focused on two key indicators (i) the average 
score for each variable analysed (ii) the statistical significance of the differences. This 
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procedure has aimed to identify if the clusters suggested are significantly different, and to 
help profile them. A post hoc comparison was made using the Scheffe test. This test is less 
sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity of variances between groups. The procedure is 
not new to angel research (Sørheim and Landström, 2001; Avdeitchikova, 2008).  
 
Table 5-3: Investor General Characteristics 
  
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
  
Investor Characteristics  
Gender                                       
(1=Male, 2=Female)a 
1.08 1.09 1.06 
Age                                                             
(1=under 35, 2=35 to 44, 3=45 to 54, 4=55 to 64, 
5=65 and above)b 
3.56 3.62 3.64 
Education and Professional Experience 
University Degree                                 
 (1=Yes, 2=No)c 
1.24 1.26 1.23 
Professional Qualification                                  
(1=Yes, 2=No)d 
1.48 1.26 1.31 
Top 5 Industries 
Health Care (6%) Consumer Goods (7%) Industrials (7%) 
Industrials (12%) Telecommunications (7%) Consumer Goods (7%) 
Consumer Goods (13%) Industrials (14%) Health Care (8%) 
Others (28%) Others (27%) Others (24%) 
Financials (32%) Financials (36%) Financials (41%) 
a Differences not significant. 
b Differences not significant. 
c Differences not significant.  
d Significant differences between group 1 and groups 2 and 3. 
 
The first layer of the analysis looked at the investor characteristics, in particular, gender, age, 
education and professional experience (see table 5-3 for more details). There were no 
significant differences between the clusters concerning age, gender43 and university degree. 
                                                          
43 There were not found significant gender differences in terms of the cluster weights. This provides 
additional evidence of the lack of gender inequalities in terms of the investment criteria used. 
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Investors making these types of investments were typically male, aged between 45 and 54 
with a university degree. Having a professional qualification was more frequent for investors 
with investment decisions in the first cluster, when compared with the other two groups. 
When taking into account the professional experience of the investors, it was interesting to 
notice that the first group of investment decisions had the smallest proportion with a financial 
background and the highest of consumer goods background of the three. The second cluster 
had the highest number of investors with previous professional experience in Industrials and 
Telecommunications. The third group of investment decisions had the highest number of 
investors with professional experience in Healthcare and Financial.  
 
The following level of analysis, still looking at investor characteristics, focused on three 
dimensions: entrepreneurial experience, investment experience and syndication. In the first 
case, there were no statistically significant differences. Hence, investors conducting 
decisions across clusters seemed fairly similar in terms of their entrepreneurial experience. 
A completely different conclusion can be reached in terms of the investment experience. 
Typically, investors who made investments in the second cluster were more experienced in 
both the number of investments and the years that they have been investing. This seems to 
indicate that more experienced investors were able to clearly differentiate the importance of 
the investment criteria when compared with unexperienced counterparts.  
 
The last dimension considered was syndication. Again, business angels making investments 
in the second cluster were the most distinctive: (i) they were less likely to be part of a group 
(ii) they took longer to join a group (iii) they has spent a longer time as members of an angel 
group. Regarding the areas of syndication (motivations for joining a group, the number of 
groups and crowdfunding) the investors are reasonably alike across the three clusters. This 
 206 
 
suggested that the investment decisions in the second cluster were conducted by more 
experienced investors. In the opposite direction, investors who had made decisions in the 
first cluster were the least experienced, had fewer years investing and, on average, had a 
smaller amount of investments. This conclusion is also valid regarding syndication. 
Investment decisions in the first cluster were made by business angels who typically belong 
to an angel group, although with a shorter membership.  Table 5-4 depicts these relations. 
Table 5-4: Investor General Characteristics 
  
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
  
Investor Characteristics  
Entrepreneurial Experience 
Involvement in a Management Buyout                                                                 
(1=Yes, 2=No)e 
1.60 1.59 1.67 
CEO of an SME                                  
(1=Yes, 2=No)f 
1.37 1.36 1.41 
Board Member of a median to large company                          
(1=Yes, 2=No)g 
1.46 1.37 1.41 
Investment Experience 
Years investing h 7.85 10.86 8.41 
Number of investments                                                                             
(1 = 0 , 2 = 1 to 3, 3 = 4 to 6, 4= 7 to 10, 5 = More than 10)i 
3.63 3.94 3.83 
Syndication 
Part of an angel group 
(1=Yes, 2=No)j 
1.03 1.10 1.05 
Years in a group k 6.13 7.66 7.01 
Years to join a group l 2.57 4.00 2.19 
Invest with Others                                                                                                              
 (7-point Likert Scale/ Strongly disagree - Strongly agree)m 
4.19 4.21 4.46 
Number of angel groups                                                                                  
(1 = 1 , 2 = 2, 3 = 3, 4 = 4 or more)n 
1.88 1.99 1.74 
Crowdfunding investing                                                                                                  
(1=Yes, 2=No)o 
1.79 1.76 1.82 
eDifferences not significant. 
fDifferences not significant. 
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gDifferences not significant.  
hSignificant differences between group 2 and groups 1 and 3. 
iSignificant differences between group 1 and group 2. 
jSignificant differences between group 1 and group 2. 
kSignificant differences between group 1 and group 2. 
lSignificant differences between group 2 and group 3. 
mDifferences not significant.  
nDifferences not significant.  
oDifferences not significant.  
 
The next level of analysis takes into account the investment characteristics44 and the degree 
of influence of others (leading angel and other angels) in their decision. Investments in the 
three clusters are relatively similar with respect to the amount invested, stage of development 
and the number of due diligence sources. Typically, the amount invested is lower than 
£100,000 at the start-up stage and using an average of four sources of due diligence. The 
investments in the first cluster have a higher level of innovation which suggested that these 
projects were ground-breaking opportunities with a very strong set of attributes (5 out of 7 
criteria were considered very important). Investments in the first cluster were also 
characterised by being the ones where the investor had the lowest industry experience. This 
is consistent with the neutral value of investment attributes given by investors in this cluster. 
This contrasted with the third cluster in which high levels of industry experience were 
associated with investment decisions where the business angel highly ranks the investor 
attributes.  
 
There are no significant differences across clusters in terms of investing to diversify. On 
average, 50% of the investments made across clusters had helped the investor to diversify 
his portfolio. The great majority of the investments analysed were made through an angel 
                                                          
44 Paul et al., (2003) notice that angel groups are allowing business angels to invest away from home (22% of 
the sample would invested away from home). Hence, location of the investment becomes less important. For 
this reason it was not included in this research. 
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group. Consequently, there were no differences across clustered investments in terms of 
being done as a member of an angel group. This was not surprising since the great majority 
of respondents belonged to angel groups. The investments in the second cluster were 
statistically different from the other two clusters regarding IP protection. These investments 
were less protected then investments in other clusters. This finding is associated with the 
fact that these investments were the less innovative ones, and seemed to indicate that 
motivations to invest were driven by the product/market and the people in the project. These 
could be opportunists that target very mature markets. All investments across the different 
clusters were fairly similar in terms of having a ready product and service. One reason for 
this could be the fact that business angels typically invest in very early stages where the 
firms have no product or service to offer. 
Table 5-5: Investment General Features 
  
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
  
Investment Features 
Amount Invested                                 
(1 = <£100.000 , 2 = £100.000 to £250.000, 3 = >£250.000)p 
1.13 1.20 1.18 
Stage of development                                 
(1 = seed , 2 = start-up, 3 = early stage, 4 = later stage)q 
2.38 2.45 2.60 
Number of Due Diligence Sources r 3.79 3.58 4.21 
Level of Innovation  
(5-point Likert Scale/ Very Low - Very High)s 
3.90 3.46 3.56 
Industry Experience  
(years/1 = 0 to 5 , 2 = 6 to 10 to 3, 11 = 14 to 15, 4= 16 to 20, 5 = More than 20)t 
1.88 1.98 2.29 
To achieve diversification                                  
(1=Yes, 2=No)u 
1.47 1.54 1.45 
Angel Group investment                                  
(1=Yes, 2=No)v 
1.26 1.29 1.24 
Intellectual Property Protection                                   
(1=Yes, 2=No)w 
1.35 1.50 1.38 
Existence of a ready Product/Service                                   
(1=Yes, 2=No)x 
1.34 1.28 1.27 
Influenced Decision 
Leading angel influence                                    
(7-point Likert Scale/ Strongly disagree - Strongly agree)y 
4.09 3.90 4.46 
Other angels influence  
(7-point Likert Scale/ Strongly disagree - Strongly agree)z 
3.70 3.32 3.92 
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p Differences not significant. 
q Differences not significant. 
r Differences not significant.  
s Significant differences between group 1 and groups 2 and 3. 
t Significant differences between group 1 and group 3. 
u Differences not significant.  
v Differences not significant.  
w Significant differences between group 2 and groups 1 and group 3. 
x Differences not significant.  
y Significant differences between group 2 and group 3. 
z Significant differences between group 2 and group 3. 
 
 
Lastly, the analysis looked at the extent to which the investment decisions were influenced 
by a leading angel and by other investors. This is particularly important in a group context 
for two reasons (i) the increasing importance of visible site of the angel market (ii) the great 
majority of the investors in this sample were part of at least one angel group. Influence can 
be extremely important since it can create problems in terms of decision making. One of 
these problems is representativeness heuristics, where agents recognize a key feature of a 
category of events and apply it to all examples. Investors could imitate the investment 
decisions of a business angel with a successful track-record of investments without a deeper 
analysis of the opportunity. There are significant statistical differences between the second 
cluster and the third cluster in terms of the degree of influence by others. This suggests that 
there is a negative relationship between the level of influence and the capability to 
discriminate the reasons to invest. Taking the second cluster as a reference, it is possible to 
verify that this is the cluster where the investors were able to better discriminate the reasons 
for investing, and the decisions were less influenced by others. Hence, it seems suitable to 
profile the investment decisions in the second group as the ones where the investors were 
able to perfectly discriminate the reasons to invest. These investments were made by more 
experienced investors with a smaller propensity to be influenced by others.  
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Angel investors in the first cluster applied a moderate discriminatory set of reasons for 
investments. These investors’ had the lower scores in terms of investment experience. The 
most innovative investments were the ones where the angel investors held the lower levels 
of industry experience. Lastly, the investments in the third cluster were defined by the most 
non-discriminatory set of factors. These decisions were made by investors with moderate 
investment experience, investing in projects that were moderately innovative, in which the 
angels had the highest market knowledge. These effects can be seen in table 5-5. 
 
These results indicated that the angels investing in the second cluster were distinctive 
compared to the investors in the other two groups of investment decisions. The level of 
investment experience was the key to these differences. Hence, two direct implications can 
be drawn from these findings. First, there is a “type” of business angel who is able to provide 
a better discrimination of the reasons to invest (2nd cluster) - investors with a higher number 
of investments and with a longer investment history. This seems to indicate a clear effect of 
the learning process associated with angel investing (Harrison et al., 2015). Hence, all other 
investor characteristics do not seem to be useful to explain differences in the investment 
criteria used by business angels. Second, investments in the first and third cluster seemed to 
be made by relatively similar “types” of angel investor. This can indicate that the same 
investor can be in more than one group of investments, which denotes variability in terms of 
the criteria used to invest. Hence, this validates the initial hypothesis that angel investing is 
a dynamic activity which should be acknowledge by scholars and reflected in terms of 
research design.  
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5.4.4 Links with Decision Making Literature  
 
The business angel decision making literature has presented both compensatory and non-
compensatory models to explain these choices. One of the most recent contributions 
(Maxwell et al., 2011) in the decision making literature has claimed that business angels use 
non-compensatory models in the initial stage of the process, more precisely elimination-by-
aspects (Tversky, 1972). This procedure allows investors to reduce the evaluation time by 
looking for one or two reasons to reject an investment opportunity. The authors argued that 
as the investment process unfolds business angels stop using elimination-by-aspects, and 
start using more compensatory models. This research has provided clear evidence of the 
latter. From the 447 investment decisions 44% had a score below four (neutral) for at least 
one of the seven criteria. The results suggest the use of a compensatory model where a 
positive score on one criterion can outweigh a negative score of any other(s). One possible 
reason for this could be recall bias, since participants were asked to reflect on previous 
decisions. However, the high percentage of respondents emphasising this tendency 
diminishes this limitation. This effect is even stronger if the analysis includes neutral 
evaluations, and 75% of the investments had at least one criterion considered neutral or 
below. Hence, highlighting the compensatory nature of business angel’s decision making 
can be considered as one of the theoretical contributions of this chapter.  
 
Business angels’ investment decisions have been studied in terms of an individual decision. 
Previous research has identified a case of external influence in the investment process. 
Business contacts and advisors are particularly important in terms of obtaining new 
investment opportunities (Brettel, 2003; Lahti, 2014). However, with the change in the 
nature of angel investing from individual to collective (Mason et al., 2013), it is important 
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to measure the effect of others (gatekeeper/leading angel, other angels) in the investment 
decision.  
 
This research showed a negative relationship between the degree of influence and the 
discriminatory degree of the decision. In other words, the less influence by others (peers and 
leading investors) on the decision the better is the investor to distinguish between investment 
criteria. This suggests the existence of herd behaviour. The consequences of this type of 
behaviour have been studied in detail by financial literature with the different focuses (banks, 
fund managers, investors and so on). This takes a particular emphasis on the behaviour of 
traders in the financial market, where the effect of “noise” can influence decisions. From the 
several models presented to explain herd behaviour, the most well-known are Banerjee 
(1992; 1993) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). Cont and Bouchaud (2000) described that “in 
these models individuals attempt to infer a parameter from noisy observations and decisions 
of other agents”. A clear analogy can be made to the business angels’ context, in particular, 
in angel groups. This indicates that collective decision making models should be used in this 
new framework. Regarding the findings of this study, it seemed to be clear that the rationale 
behind a decision is weaker the higher the degree of influence. This can have clear 
repercussions for business angel in terms of value added, returns, learning, portfolio 
behaviour, and so on. This is the strongest theoretical contribution of this research.     
 
5.5. Discussion and implications 
5.5.1 Limitations 
 
Two main limitations of this research can be highlighted. Firstly, the low value of the average 
Silhouette coefficient can be seen as the major limitation, as it indicates a poor cluster 
structure. One possible solution is to use the predictor importance to reduce the number of 
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clustering variables. If this approach was followed, the value of the average Silhouette 
coefficient could increase to achieve a fair model (Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2009). 
However, it is important to emphasize the explorative nature of this study. The aim of this 
research was to question if investment criteria are a good method of differentiating business 
angels and their decisions. Hence, the intention of this research was to model the different 
criteria employed in an investment decision, rather than focus on maximizing the goodness 
of fit. The trade-offs of this decision are taken into account in the concluding section.  
 
Secondly, this is an empirical driven classification which can be seen as lacking theory 
development and theoretical concepts. This is one of the few studies (few exceptions: 
Harrison et al., 2015; Mitteness et al., 2012a; Mitteness et al., 2012b) that acknowledges the 
effect of the heterogeneity of business angels on their investment decision. Previous decision 
making research has overlooked the lack of homogeneity in the angel population 
generalizing the results to the entire population. Hence, it is fundamental to start by 
understanding how angel investors make different investment decisions. Only after this 
identification stage is it possible to apply robust theoretical concepts to develop theory. An 
attempt is made to link the results with the decision making process to enable the 
identification of future research areas, for example studies on influenced decisions.   
 
5.5.2 Implications for further research  
 
This chapter has explored the extent to which the heterogeneity of business angels impacts 
their investment decisions. The results have indicated that clustering investment decisions 
based on the criteria applied by angel investors can be explained by both investor 
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characteristics and investment attributes. This study has direct implications for future 
research on two specific dimensions of angel investment. 
 
The first research area is decision making studies. Two points need to be emphasized (i) 
generalization (ii) model. The great majority of previous studies did not take into account 
the heterogeneity of business angels. This study showed that the investment criteria vary 
across the angel population. Hence, scholars need to be careful in how to generalize the 
outcomes of their research. The model used in this study had seven criteria; results showed 
that not all of the criteria were important to predict the cluster structure. Hence, one 
possibility of extending this study is to identify what are the criteria that are more affected 
by homogeneity of the business angels. 
 
This research also called attention to heterogeneity of business angels across the different 
stages of the investment process. Duxbury et al., (1997) described the investment process as 
a multi-stage model. This research found that the heterogeneity of business angels is relevant 
at the screening stage. Hence, it begs the question if this effect is also relevant across the 
other stages. This should not be restricted to the investment decision criteria. Scholars need 
to recognize that although the angel population is heterogeneous, their practices might not 
be. It is important to study to what extent heterogeneity varies across angel practices. For 
example, angel research should study heterogeneity in terms of value added activities, exit 
strategies, valuation models and so on.  
 
The evolution of the angel market has changed the way angel investors’ behave. This 
research has called attention to the influence of others in the investment decision. The results 
showed a significant effect of the gatekeeper and of other investors in the final investment 
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decision. Scholars should consider addressing the notion of influence in angel research, 
possibly applying the theoretical framework of communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 
1991). Wenger (1998) has identified some important consequences of this concept in terms 
of situated learning. The practices of an angel group are directly linked with the three 
dimensions acknowledged as foundations of coherence of a community. First, mutual 
engagement. Typically, angel groups have a clear hierarchical structure, which allows 
members to engage with fellow angels, but also with the gatekeepers. Second, joint 
enterprise. Opportunities are presented to the group members so that they can make a 
decision as to whether to invest or not. All investors want to find a flawless opportunity, 
questioning the entrepreneur to identify any weakness in the investment. This procedure 
helps to build a sense of joint enterprise along the members of the angel group. Lastly, shared 
repertoire. Normally, business angel groups meet regularly45. This generates a set of stories, 
routines and behaviours that are recognized by the group members. Hence, it becomes clear 
that the level of influence identified in this study can be an outcome of communities of 
practice. Therefore, future research should set a discussion on communities of practice and 
test it as a theoretical framework for angel learning.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
Angel research has predominantly focused on the individual, and in this case, on the investor. 
However, not everyone is the same and the level of variability can present big challenges to 
researchers seeking to generalize their findings. This can be particularly demanding when 
modelling the decisions instead of the individuals. This chapter broadens the current 
knowledge on business angel heterogeneity by evaluating to what extent their investment 
decisions are homogenous. The results showed a clear link between the level of investment 
                                                          
45 Once a month, once every three month, it depends on the deal follow and on the group size. 
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experience and the way investors assess the criteria. Additionally, it was found that the level 
of risk undertaken by the investors also has a relationship with the combination of criteria 
important in an investment decision. 
 
This chapter has two implications for entrepreneurs searching for funds. First, it clearly 
identifies what are the key factors in terms in an investment decision. The people and 
product/market are always seen as important factors in a decision. This is much in line with 
previous research. Second, it showed that the number of reasons justifying a positive funding 
verdict will vary across groups of investment decisions. Linking this with the investment 
characteristics, an entrepreneur will know what he/she needs to emphasize during a pitch. 
The angel community can also benefit, particularly gatekeepers of angel groups. The 
importance and popularity of angel groups is increasing among the angel population. Hence, 
managing a group of investors with different decision processes can be extremely difficult. 
 
The results showed that investors with similar levels of investment experience and 
syndication have analogous investment behaviours. Hence, to minimize possible tensions 
arising from the existence of different reasons to invest across the members, it might be 
useful to the gatekeeper to divide the investors into distinctive subgroups. The results also 
showed a clear relation between the degree of influence of others and how well angel 
investors discriminate the criterion used. This has provided first evidence that a proportion 
of the angel market is following others. This is important for both practitioners and policy- 
makers. Another implication for policy-makers concerns designing incentives for angel 
investment. If the objective is to originate incentives for funding new innovative firms, it is 
fundamental that the conditions to access government support are less strict on investment 
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experience, as the findings indicate that the most innovative opportunities were backed by 
less experienced business angels. 
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Chapter 6. Do business angels always use the same criteria? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
From the early attitudes, behaviours and characteristics (ABC) studies, scholars have tried 
to understand the investment decisions of business angels. This is particularly relevant for 
policy-makers since angel investors are a valuable component of any entrepreneurial 
ecosystem, especially in a technological context (Chau, 2015). Scholars’ efforts have 
answered different questions related to the investment process. First, how does the process 
develop? What are the different stages that an entrepreneur needs to go through to raise 
finance? Second, what are the reasons why business angels invest? What criteria do they 
employed to evaluate an opportunity and what is the relative importance of those criteria? 
The answers to these questions have been used in the development of investment readiness 
programs targeting new entrepreneurs needing external funding (Mason and Harrison, 2001; 
Mason and Kwok, 2010). However, one question is still to be answered. Does the investment 
criteria used by business angels’ change over the time? In other words, how consistently do 
angel investors apply the same investment criteria? Is it linked to investor characteristics 
(investment experience, education and so on) or to the investment attributes (stage, amount 
invested and so on)?  
 
From the initial studies where Wetzel (1983) compared the investment procedures of formal 
and informal investors, to  more recently where scholars have tried to model the investment 
process of business angels, there have been different models to explain the investment 
process. From the initial attempt to use institutional venture capital models (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984; Fried and Hisrich, 1994) to developing its own models (Duxbury et al., 1997; 
Haines et al., 2003; Amatucci and Sohl, 2004; Paul et al., 2007; Maxwell et al., 2011) 
scholars have sought to identify the different stages of angel investing. Typically, all of these 
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models have a focus on providing a comprehensive description of what are the different steps 
of an investment opportunity and what characterizes each stage. Small differences can be 
found across these models (number of stages, name of stages and so on). However, the key 
focus is the same - investors need to become familiarized with the investment proposal, then 
they will have to screen the opportunity and finally they will need to negotiate it. Paul and 
his colleagues (2007) called this process the interactive assessment. Some extensions to the 
basic model have looked to the post investment stage and exit. This type of model has been 
particularly useful for the development of stage based research, which in turn, has been 
useful to identify particularities across stages, and how the process unfolds.  
 
Business angels’ investment criteria have also been the object of detailed study. This journey 
has allowed researchers to refine the number of investment criteria under analysis, but also 
enabled the conduct of deeper discussions about their importance. The initial studies 
provided an exhaustive laundry list (Van Osnabrugge, 2000) while the most recent works 
with a “more parsimonious set of criteria” (Maxwell et al., 2011 p.220). Take, for example 
the entrepreneur; research has identified particular attributes of the management 
team/founder such as: competence, trustworthiness, capability, etc. (Harrison et al., 1997; 
Sudek, 2006; Maxwell et al., 2011; Maxwell and Lévesque, 2014). However, scholars have 
taken a very static approach to the discussion. This line of research has not considered the 
possibility of the same investor changing the investing criteria, which would reflect the 
dynamics of angel investing.  
 
The closest scholars have been to addressing the variability of the investment criteria used 
by angel investors can be found in two distinctive types of research. The first stream of 
research has looked at how alterations at the investor level impacted the way decisions are 
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made. Longitudinal studies are a hard option since the possibility of following the investors 
over the years is a very changeling task. Only recently a study has used this approach 
(Carpentier and Suret, 2015); however this research followed a different unit of analysis – 
the investment. Hence, cross-sectional studies have been taken where scholars assess how 
different levels of investment experience impacted the criteria used (Feeney et al., 1999; 
Harrison et al., 2015). The second stream of research has looked at how the investment 
criteria changes as the process evolves (Mason and Harrison, 1996b; Duxbury et al., 1997; 
Maxwell et al., 2011; Mitteness et al., 2012b; Brush et al., 2012). The authors’ review of the 
literature on the investment decision making by business angels (Riding et al., 2007 p.339) 
stressed that the “identification and importance of decision criteria are both dependent on 
the stage of the investment process and the context.” However, these two streams of research 
have not questioned if the investment criteria is investor dependent, that is, if an investor 
always invests for the same reasons.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to develop some understanding of modifications in the investment 
criteria used by business angels. First, it identifies to what extent business angels change 
their investment criteria across investment opportunities. Second, by using investment and 
investors’ characteristics, this study assesses what influences the likelihood of an angel 
investor to change their investment criteria. Lastly, the study has suggested a theoretical 
framework for modifications in investment criteria of angel investors. Relying on data from 
the same investor, this study attempts to introduce a concept of change which can be seen as 
a methodological contribution. Using the cluster analysis suggested in the previous chapter 
as a reference, change is measured for each participant by assessing if all investments 
reported belong to the same cluster. This procedure allows the use of a logistic model to 
assess the prospect of investments from the same angel belonging to different decision 
patterns. Given the novelty and the exploratory nature of this research there is no attempt to 
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test a theory. However, the key aim is to be the first to model change in investment criteria 
in business angel context. The overall fit of the model is maximized, and the “surviving” 
variables are the ones used to model the concept of change.   
 
6.2 Literature Review 
 
This section has the objective to review angel research on change of investment criteria and 
provide sufficient evidence of the existence of a gap in literature. The investment decision 
criteria literature has researched change with two different approaches. On the one hand, 
scholars have looked at the investor level and assessed if investment experience could predict 
the criteria used by angel investors. On the other hand, scholars have focused on 
understanding change of investment criteria as the process evolves. Although these studies 
have improved our understanding on angel investment decision making, no study has 
addressed if the investment criteria is investor dependent.  
 
Much of business angel literature takes a very static approach, which in turn does not reflect 
the dynamics of informal investments (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008). Riding (2005) also called 
attention to the dynamics of angel investing. The author emphasized that angel investors can 
invest in different types of opportunities, simultaneously or across their investment 
experience. The only exception in the literature to the static approach is the work developed 
by Avdeitchikova (2008) which analyses the different investment roles undertaken by angel 
investors. The author assumed that the same investor can alter his/her contributions across 
different projects. The first stream of research completely ignores the underlying assumption 
of dynamic in Avdeitchikova’s research, while the second is stage driven and not investor 
focused. Hence, there is a clear need to assess to what extent business angels’ change their 
investment criteria and what can explain this alteration. 
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6.2.1 Investor characteristics as a predictor of change in investment criteria 
 
A significant part of business angel literature has debated how business angels decide to 
invest. Since the initial findings that have emphasized high rejection rates (Riding et al., 
1993) scholars have tried to broaden our understanding of angel investing. However, almost 
nothing is known about how angel investors change their investment criteria. Angel research 
has identified that decision making criteria is investor dependent, that is, what might be 
important for one investor can be completely irrelevant for other angel (for example: 
Landström, 1998) – the effect of the heterogeneity of the angel population. Hence, the 
challenge has been to comprehend what drives this variety.  
 
The heterogeneity of business angels has led scholars to evaluate how investment experience 
impacts investment behaviour (Freear et al., 1994; Kelly and Hay, 1996, 2000; Van 
Osnabrugge, 1998a).  To evaluate this relationship these studies have looked at a wide range 
of variables (stage of the investment, level of technology, amount invested, investor 
involvement and so on) to understand variability in the investment behaviour. However, the 
research focus was much broader than simply evaluating the investment criteria. Investment 
behaviour is a much more extensive concept that includes, for example: investment 
motivations and investing within a group.  
 
The start of this discussion lays on what makes an individual want to be an angel investor. 
Freear et al. (1994) identified the differences between active angels, interested potential 
investors and uninterested potential investors. The study concluded that only small 
dissimilarities can be found between active angels and interested potential investors. These 
differences are associated with diversification, amounts to invest and disposition to invest 
with others. Much of these can be linked with the drivers of syndication (Mason et al., 2013). 
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Kelly and Hay (1996) examined the differences between solo and syndicated serial angels. 
The results of this study suggested that syndicated angels seem to draw some benefits from 
risk sharing of investing with others. This allows them to do more deals at earlier stages.  
 
Van Osnabrugge (1998b) compared serial and non-serial investors. The author suggested 
that when compared with their counterparts, serial angels tend to put more emphasis on 
market risk and less on agency risks. Kelly and Hay (2000) evaluate whether business angels 
with different levels of investment experience used the same sources of deals. The results of 
this study showed that more experienced angels tended to use ‘private’ sources for leads 
rather than ‘public’. Other investor characteristics have been used to evaluate the impact of 
decision making criteria. For example, Mitteness and her collegues (2012b) found that 
different types of industry experience had an effect on the way angels appraised an 
opportunity. On the one hand, the authors identified that industry start-up was a negative 
moderator between investment criteria and evaluations of funding potential. On the other 
hand, industry operating experience and industry investing experience were positive 
moderators. This body of literature clearly shows the impact of investment experience on 
business angels and their investment behaviour. This suggests that as investor alters their 
experience their investment behaviour would also change.  
 
The natural flow of the previous discussion led scholars to conduct evaluations of the impact 
of investment experience on investment criteria. With the objective to get a deeper 
understanding of informal investors decision making Feeney and her collegues (1999) 
identified that angels with different investment experiences gave different weights to specific 
criteria. The study based on interview data with 115 active angels and 38 occasional 
investors concluded that these two groups differ in terms of “deal killers” and “deal makers”. 
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When compared with active angels, occasional investors give a bigger weight to ‘Good fit’ 
as an essential factor. This type of angel also gave a greater emphasis to the importance of a 
strong business plan and of a reasonable exit plan. Although it is not considered by the 
authors as its most important finding, this study showed that angel heterogeneity is also 
reflected in their investment criteria.  
 
Harrison et al., (2015) presented an analysis of investment criteria under a learning umbrella. 
The study relied on a sample of 12 business angels who were clustered into three groups 
according to their investment experience (experienced angels, novice angels and nascent 
angels). Using a real time methodology, that is, verbal protocol analysis, the authors were 
able to identify differences in the importance of particular criterion. Experienced angels 
tended to give precedence to investor fit while less experienced angels emphasized the 
financial aspect of the opportunity. The business plan was more important for experienced 
angels’ compared to their counterparts. The least experienced group gave more attention to 
marketing issues than both other groups. Although the small sample size can be pointed to 
as a major drawback to generalization of the results, this paper has expanded the literature 
on the links between angel heterogeneity and investment decision making. 
 
The key contribution of these studies is the proof that that business angel heterogeneity is a 
phenomenon that goes beyond the investor and his characteristics. Investment behaviour is 
not the same across the angel population neither is the way they evaluate an opportunity. But 
is it the same for each individual investor? With the aim to identify differences across the 
angel population and achieve generalizable results, scholars have categorized individuals 
according to specific characteristics. However, this does not allow for the possibility that 
individuals change their behaviours and attitudes between investments. The second stream 
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of research that studied criteria alterations did it as the opportunity moved through the 
investment process.    
 
 
6.2.2 Changes in decision making criteria across the investment process 
 
The process by which business angels invest it is well established research topic (Duxbury 
et al., 1997; Haines et al., 2003; Amatucci and Sohl, 2004; Paul et al., 2007; Maxwell et al., 
2011). These studies have helped scholars to understand: the number of stages, the typical 
procedures, outcomes, decision models used and investment criteria employed. Previous 
studies have acknowledged that the investment criteria is stage dependent, that is, the 
importance of some criterion varies as the process develops. This captured some of the 
dynamics nature of angel investing. Nevertheless, it does not capture the lack of consistency 
in decision making criteria the same individual. Previously it has been noticed that different 
investors will evaluate the same opportunity differently (Harrison et al., 2015). Hence, it is 
necessary to know how consistent are business angels in the criteria they use for investment 
decision making. 
 
Research that has identified individual criteria variations in the investment process have been 
divided in two groups. The first category recognizes that the number of reasons given to 
invest or reject varies across the stages of the investment process. This numerical dimension 
is particularly relevant for the discussion of the decision models used by angel investors. 
Mason and Harrison (1996b) highlighted that at the screening stage business angels will be 
less demanding than in later stages. The authors noticed that at an early stage angels will not 
reject an opportunity based on one specific deficiency, while the opposite will happen at a 
later stage. This suggested that, initially, angels use compensatory models, while at a later 
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stage they have a non-compensatory approach. A recent study using data collected in the 
show Dragons’ Den (Maxwell et al., 2011) has investigated the reasons that angel investors 
use to reject investment opportunities. The authors concluded that a non-compensatory 
model, elimination-by-aspects (EBA), has a better fit to explain the decision making at the 
screening stage. The study concluded that, at a later stage, EBA is not suitable to explain the 
decision making process, which could suggest the use of compensatory models. Although 
these studies have contradictory findings, both showed that alterations of the decision models 
occur across the investment process.  
 
The second type goes a step further and distinguishes what are the specific variations with 
the criteria used. Similar to the studies in the previous group, Duxbury and her colleges 
(1997) identified specific variations in investors’ criteria across the investment process. 
After the initial screening stage some criteria turn out to be more important, while others 
become less relevant. On the one hand, the importance of the entrepreneur/management team 
increases significantly. The same effect was verified with financial considerations. On the 
other hand, product considerations become significantly less relevant. Recent research has 
questioned these findings.  
 
A USA study (Mitteness et al., 2012b) has analysed 2,234 investment decisions at the 
screening stage and at the funding stage. The paper identified that angel investors showed 
more interest for the entrepreneur at the screening stage. This interest decreases at the due 
diligence stage. The opportunity strengths go on the opposite direction, that is, they become 
the most significant investment criteria at later stages. A possible justification for these 
disparities might be found in a 2012 study (Brush et al., 2012). The authors noticed that 
quantifiable criteria are more important at earlier stages, while in the later stages the focus 
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turns to less quantifiable, intangible criteria. For example, the size of the top management 
team was found significant on both the screening stage and at the group presentation but 
with different effects, positive at an earlier stage and negative at a later stage. Hence, the 
importance of the criteria will be depend on the measurement used. The authors inferred that 
as the process unwinds angel investors become more and more stringent and start assessing 
very specific characteristics of the entrepreneur, such as: the trustworthiness, commitment, 
persuasiveness and passion. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that these two groups of 
studies have robust findings, highlighting the dynamics of angel investing while showing 
that variations occur.  
 
To some extent, the two approaches identified in the literature were able to introduce the 
concept of change in business angel investment decision. While the first approach looked at 
variability across different “types” of investors, the second evaluated variations across the 
investment process. Either approaches failed to evaluate the investment criteria used by the 
same investor across different opportunities.  This can be seen as the major gap that can be 
found in this body of the literature.  
 
6.3 Data and Methodology 
6.3.1 Data sources 
 
The data for this study was collected through an online survey that targeted business angels 
from the United Kingdom (UK). The period of data collection lasted from April to July 2014 
and the recorded data covered three areas (i) investor characteristics (ii) investment features 
(iii) investment decisions. To enable respondents to report their investment decisions, a list 
with seven investment criteria was provided. The choice for this design ensured a closed set 
of investment criteria which enabled comparison between decisions. The initial data set 
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consisted of a total of 463 investment decisions from 178 investors. For purpose of the 
analysis, 16 incomplete decisions were excluded. Hence, the final data set consisted of 447 
investment decision of 172 investors. 
  
The data were then classified using a categorization scheme suggested in chapter 5. This 
procedure resulted in three clusters with the following weights 26.9%, 44.7% and 28.4%. 
Table 1 depicts the number of different investment criteria, clustered by investors; 54% of 
the investors (79) always use the same investment criteria when making decisions. Each 
participant was asked to report on the latest three investment decisions. Hence, each 
respondent would have a maximum of three pairwise comparisons and a minimum of zero46. 
This resulted in 405 pairs of decisions made by 145 angels’ investors (15 with just one pair 
and 130 with three). A total of 27 investment decisions were eliminated from the analysis 
because they were the only information provided by that specific respondent. The data had 
no temporal dimension, that is, participants were not asked to order the investment decisions 
chronologically. Hence, it was possible to evaluate all pairwise combinations that would not 
repeat observations. Lastly, 71 observations were eliminated due to missing values. Table 6-
1 provides a detailed explanation of the number of changes of investment criteria found per 
investor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Three investment decisions would allow three comparisons, two would correspond to one evaluation and 
one response would not permit to assess change.  
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Table 6-1: Investment decisions categorization 
 n % 
Business angels that had investment decisions in the same cluster 79 54% 
Business angels 
with different 
66 
1 change 3 2% 
2 two changes 56 39% 
3 changes 7 5% 
  Total number of business angels 145 100% 
 
From the 79 investors who reported investment decisions in the same cluster, 14 only 
provided information on two deals while 65 recalled three opportunities. This has two clear 
implications. First, the number of reported opportunities seemed to have an impact on 
change, which is expected since more data will allow more comparisons47. Second, the angel 
market might be more dynamic than was initially expected. There is a limitation on the 
amount of information scholars can request from the angel population. Hence, it is possible 
that by not having the complete investment history of each participants that some variability 
is lost.  
 
6.3.2 Construct of change 
 
Scholars have identified that angel research needs to reflect the dynamics of the investment 
activity (Riding, 2005; Avdeitchikova, 2008). Hence, new studies need to challenge the 
assumptions that reduce variability of investor behaviour. Following a similar approach to 
Avdeitchikova work (2008), this study verified if the investment decision reported by each 
investor followed the same pattern. Using a typology ruling on combination of decision 
making criteria for the fifth chapter, this research verified if investment decisions made by 
the same investor belong to the same cluster. In other words, a business angel will change 
                                                          
47 With three investment decisions there are three opportunities for a change occurring, a ratio of 1 to 1. 
While with two investment decisions there is only one opportunity for a change occurring, a ratio of 2 to 1. 
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the criteria if the two decision do not belong to the same cluster. The clustering rule 
suggested in the previous chapter identified that investment decisions could be classified 
into three clusters. The main difference between the three groups was how much the 
investors were able to discriminate the seven investment criteria. The variation ranged from 
three levels of importance (second cluster) to a single level of significance. Hence, when 
comparing two investment decisions made by the same investor, the construct of change is 
defined as:  
{
𝑥 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
𝑥 = 1     𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
This is a simple way to measure change since it evaluates the variations in an objective index 
(cluster membership) without forcing any subjective judgment of the researcher. The 
construct of change used in this study provided a clear image of the dynamics of business 
angels’ investment activity. Approximately, half of the sample (46%) of investment 
decisions used different weightings of investment criteria. The variability found in this study 
is extremely similar to the finding of Avdeitchikova (2008) where out of 213 investment 
situations only 91 changes occurred (43%). Hence, this seems to indicate that the way change 
is measured in this study is valid and supported by previous research. This result reinforces 
the claims made by Avdeitchikova (2008) on the dynamics of angel investing.  
 
The preceding analysis focused on the investor. This is particularly relevant because of the 
unequal weight of cases provided by respondents. However, if the focus is the pairwise 
comparison of investment decisions then the results are slightly different. From the 405 
pairwise decisions 269 belonged to the same group of investment decisions, while in 136 
there was a change in cluster membership. When compared with the investor reference, this 
represented a smaller weight for change. Only 34% of the pairwise decisions did not belong 
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to the same group. Hence, it is safe to say that no matter how change is assessed, the 
dynamics of angel investing exists and needs to be studied.  
 
6.3.3 Variables used in the study 
 
The variables used in the model tried to reflect both the investor and the investment 
dimension. In terms of investor characteristics, the study included the typical demographic 
issues such as gender, age, education, entrepreneurial experience and investment experience. 
Variables on syndication were also included to reflect the importance that groups have in the 
angel market (Mason et al., 2013). These variables cover a wide spectrum of areas, such as 
length of time in a group, number of groups and motivations to syndicate. This enabled an 
assessment of the different components of syndication that can help to explain variations in 
the investment criteria used. Mason and Botelho (2014) identified several advantages and 
disadvantages of being part of an angel group, which shows that the views on angel 
syndication are not unanimous. Hence, it is reasonable to evaluate to what extent syndication 
impacts investment criteria and what components of syndication are significant in 
contributing to investment decision variability. 
 
The data in this study compares pairwise decisions made by the same investor. Hence, the 
variables under discussion did not require any transformation since only decisions by the 
same investor were assessed. Table 6-2 provides a deeper description of the variables used 
in the model. 
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Table 6-2: Investor characteristics. 
Variable Description 
Gender (1=Male, 2=Female) The members of one or other sex 
Age 
(1=under 35, 2=35 to 44, 3=45 to 54, 
4=55 to 64, 5=65 and above) 
 The length of time that a person has existed 
Education (1=Yes, 2=No) If the investor had an university degree 
Professional (1=Yes, 2=No) If the investor had a professional degree 
MB (1=Yes, 2=No) If the investor has be involved in a management buyout 
SME (1=Yes, 2=No) If the investor has be a CEO of a SME 
Board (1=Yes, 2=No) If the investor has hold a position in a medium to large business 
First_Inv Numerical variable Years investing 
N_Inv 
(1 = 0, 2 = 1 to 3, 3 = 4 to 6, 4 = 7 to 10, 
5 = More than 10) 
Number of investments 
Syndicated (1=Yes, 2=No) If the investor belongs to an angel group 
When_syn Numerical variable Years in a syndicate 
YTI (0 = group, 1 = individually) Angel origin (visible, invisible) 
Investing with 
Others 
(7-point Likert Scale/ Strongly disagree - 
Strongly agree) 
Wiliness to invest with others 
DE (0 = just one, 1 = if both experiences) Group experience and individual experience 
N_Synd (1 = 1 , 2 = 2, 3 = 3, 4 = 4 or more) Number of angel group  
Crowdfunding (1=Yes, 2=No) If the investor has invested through crowdfunding platforms 
 
Some categorical variables from the list above were substituted with dummy variables. The 
objective was to gain further understanding of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. Exploratory analysis helped to identify which variables were 
statistically significant, and this in turn led to the creation of dummy variables. For example, 
from the initial categorical variable age, four dummy variables were created for each of the 
four categories of the original variable. The new variables created can be seen in Appendix 
9. 
 
During the survey, participants had reported features of the investments they had funded, 
and some additional motivations for the investment. These attributes covered a wide range 
of topics: amount invested, stage of investment, due diligence sources, level of innovation, 
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industry experience, diversification, intellectual property (IP) protection, syndicated 
investment, level of readiness of the product/service. The aim of using a wide range of topics 
was to capture what are the key aspects behind the modification of investment pattern. The 
investment variables had to be modified. As it was previously mentioned, the study analysed 
pairwise decisions. Hence, each combination of two observations could have different levels 
of investment features. Therefore, each investment feature variable was transformed and 
new dichotomy variables were created. These new variables measured if a change of the 
investment feature had happened or not. It followed a similar approach of the dependent 
variable (change in cluster membership). In some particular cases48, an alternative to creating 
binary variables would be to generate categorical variables that measured if the variation 
was positive or negative. However, the lack of research about change in investment criteria 
justified this choice for a more conservative approach. Hence, the choice was just to evaluate 
if a change in the investment features would impact the probability of a change in investment 
criteria happening. Table 6-3 provides a description of the new variables created. 
 
Table 6-3: Change variables 
Variable Description 
CAI (0=No change, 1=change) Change on the amount invested 
CS (0=No change, 1=change) Change in Stage of investment 
CNDD (0=No change, 1=change) Change in the number of Due Diligence sources 
CI (0=No change, 1=change) Change in the level of Innovation 
CIE (0=No change, 1=change) Change in the level of Industry Experience 
CD (0=No change, 1=change) Change in the Diversification rational 
CSY (0=No change, 1=change) Change in the level of Syndicated investment 
CIPP (0=No change, 1=change) Change in the level of IP Protection 
CRPS (0=No change, 1=change) Change in the level of Product/Service Readiness 
 
 
                                                          
48 For example: amount invested 
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The list of variables covers a wide range of topics with several dimensions of the investor 
and of the investment being studied. Hence, by not focusing on a single driver for change in 
the investment criteria, this study is trying to include both sources of potential explanations. 
This procedure follows the tradition of exploratory research.  
6.3.4. Choice of the regression and regression method  
 
A logit model was developed to explain what can influence the probability of an angel 
investor changing their investment criteria. Logistic regression is used when the dependent 
variable is categorical. Logistic regression is regularly used when there are only two 
categories of dependent variable. This is exactly the case in this research. The investment 
decisions were classified into three clusters, and the dependent variable was defined by 
fixing the respondent and looking at their investment decisions. Another reason to use 
logistic regression is the fact that the independent variables are a mix of continuous and 
categorical variables.  
The two main contributions of the logistic model are: 
1. Since the logistic regression calculates the probability of changing occurring, it 
enabled researchers to predict group membership; 
2. The model highlights the associations and strengths between variables. 
All the assumptions are satisfied and the model used as predictors both investor 
characteristics and investment attributes. The set of assumptions satisfied was: 
 Not a linear relation between Dependent Variable and Independent Variable 
 Dependent variable must be a dichotomy 
 No requirement for Independent variable (normality, etc.) 
 The categories were mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
 A minimum of 50 cases per predictor 
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As it was previously mentioned, this study has no preceding research. Hence, this is an 
exploratory research were is not hypothesis to be tested. Additionally, the aim of the study 
is not to test a specific theory (Agresti and Finlay, 1986; Menard, 1995). This method can 
be extremely valuable to uncover relationships that have not yet been under scrutiny. The 
findings can lead the researcher to raise questions about the rationality of some relationships. 
The goal of this research was to set a new discussion and to highlight that variability exists 
within the same individual. Hence, scholars should acknowledge individual variation when 
addressing the dynamics of angel investing. As a consequence, the choice of regression 
method was stepwise backward Likelihood Ratio method (probability for stepwise entry 
0.05 and removal 0.10).  
 
The backward method is preferable to forward method because it has a lower chance of 
making a type II error (Field, 2009). The initial model of this method included all of the 
predictors. Then tests were run to remove the variables that have the smallest effect on how 
well the model fitted the observed data. This iterative process started by removing the 
predictor with the least impact, and stopped when it minimized the likelihood ratio. This 
method is particularly useful when a small number of predictors are used. The choice of a 
Likelihood Ratio method was based on the objective of fitting the overall model to the 
observed data, which is considered to be the criterion least prone to error (Field, 2009). This 
choice can also be justified by the lack of research on criteria change. Hence, the method is 
suited for the exploratory research of criteria change. Osborne (2014) defended the use of 
this method as an exploratory technique. 
 
This method does not come without criticism. It is extremely dependent on statistical 
significance, which can be seen as putting the important decisions on the software instead 
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on the researcher. Additionally, this approach can generate unstable models that are hard to 
replicate in other studies (Pett, 1997). Osborne (2014) emphasized that one of the features 
of this approach is the possibility of reaching unexpected results, which can be extremely 
useful to develop an understanding of a specific phenomenon since it can identify relations 
that otherwise would not be identified. One of the possible applications suggested by 
Osborne (2014) is in data mining. This is consistent with the aim of this study of finding 
relationships that have not previously been discovered between investment/investor 
characteristics and changes in investment criteria. All analyses were performed using SPSS 
v.22 (IBM Corp, 2013). Three levels of individual significance were used 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10. This procedure is in line with Labovitz (2006) suggestion for exploratory research. 
6.4 Analysis and empirical results 
6.4.1 Overview 
 
As it was previously mentioned, the model was run using a stepwise backward method with 
the Likelihood Ratio as criteria. After the elimination of the missing values, four variables 
were automatically excluded from the model for being constants (synd1, Syndicated, INV1 
and DE). This indicated that, in this study, all participants were: (i) in an angel group for a 
longer period than a year; (ii) investing for more than one year; (iii) had both individual and 
collective investment experience. The iterative process of elimination had 20 steps and, 
ultimately, resulted in the elimination of 19 variables. Appendix 10 provides additional 
information on each of the 20 elimination steps. 
 
The last interaction is taken as the reference model. The backward stepwise process 
eliminated both investor characteristics and investment features. There is a clear propensity 
for the variables that measured investor characteristics not to be removed from the model, 
particularly, the ones associated with investment experience. Half of the variables in the final 
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model (5) measured investment experience. Out of the initial nine variables that measured 
changes in the investment features, only two were not eliminated, which represents just 22% 
of the total number of variables linked with investment features.  
 
Table 6-4: Logistic regression outcome 
  95% CI for Odds Ratio 
Variable B(SE) Lower Odds Ratio Upper 
CNDD -1.1(0.31)*** 0.181 0.332 0.609 
CIE -0.48(0.28)* 0.354 0.618 1.078 
CIPP -0.73(0.3)** 0.269 0.484 0.869 
Age1 -1.53(0.82)* 0.043 0.217 1.083 
Age3 1.15(0.37)*** 1.530 3.161 6.529 
Age4 -1.05(0.37)*** 0.169 0.350 0.722 
INV10 -1.61(0.49)*** 0.077 0.199 0.518 
NINV1 -1.63(0.61)*** 0.060 0.197 0.645 
Synd10 -1.27(0.54)*** 0.097 0.282 0.819 
YTI 1.84(0.4)*** 2.903 6.313 13.727 
Education 0.6(0.35)* 0.924 1.823 3.600 
When_Syn 0.18(0.05)*** 1.075 1.197 1.332 
Invest_Others ***       
Invest_Others(1) -0.85(0.61) 0.128 0.425 1.418 
Invest_Others(2) 0.004(0.53) 0.353 1.004 2.857 
Invest_Others(3) -1.81(0.72)** 0.040 0.164 0.676 
Invest_Others(4) 0.12(0.53) 0.402 1.124 3.149 
Invest_Others(5) -1.12(0.52)** 0.117 0.327 0.913 
Invest_Others(6) -1.2(0.51)** 0.110 0.301 0.820 
Constant -359.15(109.46)***   0.000   
Note: 0.241 (Homes and Lemeshow), 0,216 (Cox and Snell), 0,299 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2 = 10.360 
*** significant at p<0.01; ** significant at p<0.05 * significant at p<0.10 
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The classification table enables a comparison of the null model (block 0), only with the 
intercept, and the last step of the backwards process. The final model correctly classified the 
outcome for 74.3% of the cases. This represented an improvement of 8.6% percentage 
points. Through the iterative process, the prediction accuracy ranged from 73.7% to 76.1%. 
Although it is not the model that maximized the predictive power, the increase of 8.6 
percentage points can been seen as a positive outcome. The suggested model is able to 
predict correctly 46.4% of the cases where a change occurred and 88.8% of the situations 
where the criteria were the same. Table 6-4 provides the outcome of the logistic regression. 
Although the criterion used was to minimize the Likelihood Ratio, all the variables that 
survived the elimination process are statistically significant.  
 
The variables in the model represented both angel characteristics and investment features. 
The results are slightly surprising since investment features seemed to explain less of the 
change in investment criteria. Only three variables associated with the investment features 
were included in the model. Changes in the level of IP protection, the number of due 
diligence sources and industry experience are able to explain the probability of an investor 
modifying his/her investment criteria. On the investor side, the variables of the suggested 
model can be divided in two groups. The first block has a strong link with the experience of 
the investor. Variables measuring age, education, years investing and number of investments 
are included in the model while the second block of variables can be associated with 
syndication. Motivation to invest with others when joining an angel group, angel origin and 
years in a syndicate are the variables included in this latter group. The next section presents 
the analysis of the odds ratio to verify how plausible the solution presented is. Figure 6-1 
provides a representation of the different groups of variables. 
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6.4.2 Interpretation of the odds ratio 
 
In the investment features the reference class chosen was not altered in the pairwise 
comparison. That is, the analysis of the odds ratios took into account the same level of 
investment attributes between the two deals. The odds of a change in the investment criteria 
occurring when the number of due diligence sources remained the same are about 0.332 
smaller than when they differ. A similar result is found for the industry experience of the 
angel investor. The odds of a change in the investment criteria occurring when the industry 
experience is the same are about 0.618 smaller than when differences took place. Lastly, the 
odds of a change in the investment criteria when the level of IP protection did not vary are 
about 0.484 times smaller than when a variation occurred. For these variables, the three odds 
ratio indicated that variability between projects increased the odds of a change in the 
investment criteria. Hence, the likelihood of an angel investor changing the weights of the 
investment criteria increases if projects have different levels of IP protection, differ in years 
of industry experience and use unequal numbers of sources of due diligence..  
 
Investments where the business angel used different numbers of due diligence sources were 
most likely to be accepted for different reasons. This can be associated with the type of issue 
being researched. An investor might have to use a high number of sources to evaluate a 
nascent entrepreneur, while the opposite might occur if the market is being investigated. A 
similar result was found for the level of IP protection. This can be explained with the strong 
link IP protection has with technology and with the product/market. Hence, it is expected 
that projects with IP protection might lead the business angel to invest due to 
product/market49. The last reason was the industry experience of the investor. Again, 
investments in different industries increased the likelihood of a change in the investment 
                                                          
49 A positive and significant correlation was found between IP protection and the product/market score at 
0.01  
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criteria occurring. This finding can be related to the importance of specific criterion, such 
as: product/market or even the business plan. It would be expected that investors with a long 
experience in a specific industry would put less emphasis on the business plan since most of 
the information would be known50. 
 
Regarding investor characteristics, as it was previously mentioned, the ten variables included 
in the model can be divided into two groups. The first group of variables that survived the 
elimination process and were statistically significant are associated with experience. Four 
variables are included in this group, three associated to age and one to education. Interpreting 
the odds ratio of the first variable associated with age (Age1), it was possible to conclude 
that the odds of a change in the investment criteria for investors younger than 35 years are 
about 0.217 smaller than for their counterparts. Analysing the next variable (Age3), it was 
possible to state that the odds of a change in the investment criteria for investors younger 
than 54 were 3.161 greater than investors older than that age. From the last variable that 
measured age (age4), it was possible to acknowledge that the odds of a business angel older 
than 65 changing his/her investment criteria were 2.859 greater than those investors younger 
than 65. These last two effects could be associated with the learning process, older investors 
have experienced a wider range of situations which enable them to be more “flexible” 
regarding what “works for them”. 
 
The three variables measuring age are statistically significant and provided an interesting 
mapping of age in terms of the likelihood of change. Older investors were more likely to 
change their investment criteria. Two reasons can justify this effect. First, typically, younger 
                                                          
50 A negative and significant correlation was found between industry experience and the business plan score 
at 0.05 
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investors will have made fewer investments51. Hence, there are fewer opportunities to 
identify a change in investment criteria. Second, younger investors will have learned less 
from their investment experience, which can result in a smaller propensity to change their 
investment approach. These arguments can also be used for the older investors, but with 
opposite effects. An interesting effect was that investors younger than 54 had greater odds 
of a change in the investment criteria than their older counterparts. This result is slightly less 
intuitive. One possible justification for it could be associated with investment returns. 
Investors might find a specific “type” of investment that provided satisfactory returns, and 
which would make them less inclined to change their approach.  
 
The last variable to be included in the personal experience group measured education, more 
precisely, if the angel investor had a university degree. The odds of a business angel with a 
university degree changing in the investment criteria were 1.823 higher than those who did 
not have a degree. This result seems very intuitive and can be associated with the intellectual 
development of achieving a university degree (Król and Dziechciarz-Duda, 2013). Investors 
with a university degree might have an additional set of skills compared to those who did 
not have a degree. This finding might not be particularly important since the great majority 
(75%) of angel investors have a university degree (Ramadi, 2009)52. However, it is important 
to identify which investors are more likely to change their investment criteria. 
 
The following set of variables were also grouped under experience. However, contrarily to 
the previous subset measuring personal experience, this group is associated with investment 
experience. The first variable measured if the investor had made more than three 
                                                          
51 From the five age groups, the class with the smallest number of investments was the under 35 group.  
52 A similar result was found for this sample – 76% of the investors had a university degree. 
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investments. The odds of an investor who made three or less investments changing their 
investment criteria were 0.197 smaller than those business angels who had made four or 
more investments. This seems to indicate that if an investor has made four or more 
investments, the likelihood of a change in the investment criteria is greater. This is a very 
intuitive result, and it reinforces the findings of previous research on the effect of investment 
experience in the weights given to specific criteria (Feeney et al., 1999). The other variable 
that was labelled under investment experience measured if an investor had been investing 
for more than ten years. The model suggested that the odds of an investor who had less than 
ten years of investment experience, changing the investment criteria were 0.199 smaller than 
those of an angel who has ten years or more of investing experience. This finding is 
consistent with the previous result on number of investments. These two odds ratios 
therefore provide clear evidence that the level of investment experience impacts the 
likelihood of different criteria weights being given across investment opportunities. This was 
initially identified by Feeney et al. (1999). The novelty of these findings is in providing a 
threshold level for both the number of investments and for the years investing.   
 
The four remaining variables that survived the elimination process were labelled under the 
subgroup Syndication. Sequentially, the variables were organized as follows: three under the 
label of Time and one under Motivations. Within the first sub subgroup (Time) is a variable 
that evaluated the origin of angel investing (YTI). This variable assessed whether an investor 
started on their own or with an angel group. The odds of a change of the investment criteria 
were about 6.313 greater for investors that started investing with an angel group than those 
that made the initial investment on their own. Two reasons can explain this result. First, one 
of the benefits of being in an angel group is an increase in the quality and quantity of the 
deal flow (Mason and Botelho, 2014). For this reason, angels in groups will be exposed to a 
wider number of opportunities, which can result in a greater likelihood of changing the 
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weight of the investment criteria. Second, solo angels have different investment approaches 
to syndicated angels (Kelly and Hay, 1996; Van Osnabrugge, 2000). Kelly and Hay (1996) 
show that solo angels have closer relationships with the entrepreneurs when compared with 
syndicated angels. This could lead to solo angels having a specific set of criteria that 
syndicated angels do not have. Therefore, syndicated angels would be flexible while making 
investment decisions.   
 
The second variable labelled under Syndication time is Synd10. This variable measured if 
an investor has been part of a group for more than ten years. The results indicated that the 
odds of an investor changing their investment criteria that has been part of an angel group 
for less than ten years were 0.282 smaller than those who have been part of one for ten or 
more years. An equivalent result can be found with the last variable in this group - the 
number of years in a syndicate (When_synd). An additional year as a member of an angel 
group increased the odds a change of the investment criteria. Both results denoted the 
positive effect of being in an angel group on alterations in the investment criteria. The first 
finding emphasized that investors with ten or more years investing in a group were more 
likely to change their investment criteria. The second finding identified that the longer an 
investor stays in an angel group the more likely a change of investing criteria will become.  
 
Previous research has identified the learning advantage of being part of an angel group (San 
José et al., 2005). Hence, one of the learning outcomes could be flexibility in terms of the 
weights of the investment criteria. This could be the result of the pool of experience and 
knowledge that exists in an angel group (Mason and Botelho, 2014). Members of angel 
groups share their experience and knowledge for the common benefit. Additionally, being 
part of an angel group allows business angels to see a greater variety of deals (Mason et al., 
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2013) which would make investor to have to keep adjusting their investment criteria. Hence, 
one would expect that this two effects would result in a greater propensity for changing the 
investment criteria used across different investment opportunities.  
 
The last subgroup, Syndication motivations, has only one variable – Invest_Others. 
Participants were asked to rank the statement “I only became a business angel because of 
the opportunity to invest with others” in a Likert scale (1- strongly disagree to 7 – strongly 
agree). The objective was to capture if the motivation to be a business angel was associated 
with joining a group and consequently, if this motivation would have any impact on the 
likelihood of a change in the investment criteria occurring. Before stating the interpretation 
of the odds ratio for this variable, it is important to highlight that not all categories were 
statistically significant. Hence, the interpretation will only be made for the three cases where 
statistical significance was found.  
 
The odds of a change in the investment criteria were about 0.301 times smaller for angels 
that agreed with the phrase (6) compared with investors that strongly agreed with it (7). A 
similar interpretation can be made for investors that somewhat agreed with the statement (5). 
In this case, the odds of an investor who ranked the sentence as five, changing the investment 
criteria were about 0.327 times smaller than those that strongly agreed with it (7). These two 
results indicated that the propensity of changing the investment criteria is associated with 
joining a group to become a business angel. This is further supported by the odds ratio for 
the somewhat disagree ranks. That is, the odds of an angel who somewhat disagreed with 
the statement, changing their investment criteria were about 0.164 smaller than those of an 
investor who strongly agreed with it (7). These results presented clear evidence that joining 
an angel group has a significant effect on the likelihood of changing the investment criteria.  
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The results are extremely intuitive both for investment features and investor characteristics. 
All reported effects occur after controlling for the other predictors. However, some of the 
variables excluded from the model can be seen as a surprise, e.g. amount invested or stage 
of investment. The findings emphasized the impact of three areas in the likelihood of a 
change in the investment criteria occurring. First is an area related to the investment features. 
This can be seen as the specificities of the investment opportunity and the impact on the 
weight given to the investment criteria. Second is an area associated with the investor 
experience. This area can be seen as the individual effect on change. Decisions are personal 
and have a strong link with the system of beliefs of an individual. Hence, this can be 
considered as an expected result. The last area is associated with investing within an angel 
group. This could be seen as the group effect on change, in particular, to the effect of others 
on the way individuals decides on their investments.  
 
The first area that is associated with the investment features can be seen as the dimension 
that is project specific. The results are slightly surprising, particularly with respect to the 
variables excluded from the model. Variables that measured the stage of investment or the 
amount invested were not included in the model. On the one hand, this can be seen as very 
intuitive – business angels typically invest in an early stage. Regarding the amounts invested, 
it is known that angel investors only invest a small portion of their wealth (Gaston, 1989). 
This would result in a lack of variation, which would lead to a small capability to explain 
the variations in the investment criteria. On the other hand, it would be acceptable to assume 
that investing within an angel group would increase the variability of the investment 
approach. Nonetheless, this area represents the specific associations to the investment 
opportunity. 
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The second area is associated with individual experiences. This dimension is strongly linked 
with the experience as an angel investor and prior to the first investment. It can be seen as 
the individual characteristics that make an investor more open to change their investment 
criteria. An alternative way to read this finding is to identify which investor characteristics 
will make his/her investment approach more flexible. On the one side, there is the impact of 
personal experience with age and education. On the other side, there is the effect of 
investment experience with the number of investments and years investing. The significance 
of this area is noteworthy, since these variables measured investors’ investment and personal 
experience, which can be associated with a learning process. In particular, the investment 
experience results have indicated that from a point onwards, angel investors are more likely 
to change their investment criteria, which in turn, can be seen as an outcome of the learning 
process.  
 
The last area represents the collective nature of angel investing. This dimension captures the 
motivations and the length of time as a member of an angel group. Additionally, the 
investment experience can also be included in the group area of the model. The rationale for 
this decision rests on the increased importance of the visible side of the angel market53. 
Investing in groups can have a positive effect on the number of projects an investor has in 
the portfolio. This area can be strongly associated with learning with others and with 
improved deal flow. As it was previously mentioned, angel groups are very important 
instruments for nascent and novice angels willing to learn from more experienced investors 
and see different opportunities.  
 
                                                          
53All the participants in this study were part of an angel group.  
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6.4.3 Overall fit of the model 
 
This subsection will report the statistics that were calculated to assess (i) the goodness of fit 
of the model (ii) how useful the independent variables are in predicting the dependent 
variable (effect size) (iii) how well the model was able to discriminate between the two 
outcomes of the dependent variable. In terms of goodness of fit, chi square test and Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test were calculated. To evaluate effect size, two R2 were calculated: Cox 
and Snell and the Nagelkerke R2. The last procedure was to plot a receiver operating 
characteristic curve.  
 
The first test completed was the chi-square test. At each step this test evaluates the difference 
between the -2 Log Likelihood of the previous model and the next step with one less variable. 
The model chi square has 13 degrees of freedom, a value of 79.736 and a probability of 
p<0.000. This has indicated that the model is statistically significant because the p-value is 
less than .05 or .01. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the final model has improved 
significantly over the previous model.  Appendix 11 gives further details.   
 
The following calculation conducted was the Hosmer and Lemeshow test of the goodness of 
fit. In this particular case, the final model has a good fit to the data as p=0.241 (>.05). Hence, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the model predicted 
values and the observed values. This has indicated that the numbers of changes of investment 
criteria do not differ from those predicted by the model. This denotes that the overall fit of 
the model is good. It is important to notice that this test is extremely dependent on the sample 
size. Hence, this result cannot be interpreted in isolation from the size of the sample. 
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The second set of tests evaluated the effect size. Contrary to the linear regression, the logistic 
regression does not have an equivalent to the coefficient of determination R2. This study has 
used two pseudo-R2 statistics to evaluate the effect size. The first, the Cox and Snell’s R2, 
calculated the proportion of unexplained variance that is reduced when new variables are 
added to the model, and it ranges from zero to less than one. The value obtained was of 
0.216. The Nagelkerke R2 is a transformation of the Cox and Snell’s R2 with the advantage 
that values obtain range from 0 to 1. This model achieved a value of 0.299. These statistics 
were reported on according to Hoetker (2005) recommendations.  
 
These measures are not easy to be interpreted and have several limitations (Maddala and 
Lahiri, 1992). The analysis of values obtained for the pseudo R2 should not be done on their 
own, that is, these measures are specific to the model. Hence, to achieve a better 
understanding of these values, one should compare them with other pseudo R2 of the same 
class, keeping the same dataset and trying to model the same dependent variable. While 
comparing models, the higher pseudo R2 the better – it implies better ability to predict 
outcomes.  
 
The stepwise procedure enabled an easy comparison between models. The final model did 
not maximize the pseudo R2. It is important to emphasize that the criteria used did not 
maximize the pseudo R2 but minimized the likelihood ratio. Hence, by excluding variables 
from the model, one expected result would be a decrease in the pseudo R2 value. Osborne 
(2014, page 258) suggested that “depending on your goal, it might be more important to have 
good classification than strong R2 analogues”. Appendix 12 provides additional details of 
the pseudo R2 result for each step of the estimation. 
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The discrimination of the final model was also evaluated. The analysis allowed the 
evaluation of how well the model was able to distinguish investment decisions with the same 
criteria from pairwise comparisons that belong to the same cluster membership. The 
accuracy of the model is measured by the area under the receiver operating characteristic 
(AUROC) curve. The value of the AUROC curve ranges from 1 (perfect discrimination) to 
0.5 (worthless test). The area under the curve of the suggested model was 0.673 with a 95% 
confidence interval (C.I.) of 0.6085 to 0.738. This suggested a poor model with the 95% C.I. 
indicating a model situated between fair and poor. This can be seen as a reasonable result 
given the exploratory nature of this study. This information is shown in Appendix 13. 
 
To summarize, the tests performed have addressed different considerations. The model 
selected using the stepwise backward Likelihood Ratio achieved satisfactory results in terms 
of the goodness of fit tests. Both tests presented did not raise any apprehension. In terms of 
effect size, the other model evaluation did not maximize the pseudo R2. However, part of 
this is a result of variable reduction. Lastly, with 95% of confidence the model achieved a 
classification between poor and fair in terms of discrimination. Given the exploratory nature 
of this research, it is important to emphasize that these results should not be a cause for 
concern.  
 
6.5. Discussion and implications  
6.5.1 Limitations  
 
Angel research is constrained by the lack of datasets which, in turn, limits the depth of the 
analysis conducted. Data collection can generate several problems that have been widely 
documented by scholars. In what respect these issues are a major limitation of this research 
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regards the fact that all investments were made by members of angel groups. This could be 
considered as a potential biases since it would not reflect the visible and the invisible 
markets. However, it is important to acknowledge that there is a high level of complementary 
between both markets. Typically, business angels operate simultaneously in the visible and 
the invisible market54. This can minimize the impact of having a sample that comprises only 
participants that belong to angel groups.   
 
The previous limitation can generate a second issue. The importance of syndication to the 
likelihood of a change in investment criteria might be seen to some extent an artificial result, 
since the sample consists only of investors that are members of angel groups. As it was 
previously mentioned, 73% of the investments reported were conducted through angel 
groups. Although the variable measuring variations in the level of syndication was excluded 
from the model, a possible solution would be to have investors that would not be involved 
with a group. However, there is no clear notion of how both markets (visible and invisible) 
overlap. 
 
A slightly less significant limitation is related to the amount of information collected. The 
results showed that when more information was reported by participants, a higher proportion 
of investors changing the investment criteria was found. Hence, future studies should try to 
focus on the entire investment history, rather than just a limited number of deals or period 
of time. This would enable scholars to fully assess to what extent business angels change 
their investment decision.   
 
                                                          
54 From the initial data set 27% of the investment decisions reported were made in the invisible market.  
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The exploratory nature of the research can also been seen as a limitation. The use of a 
criterion (stepwise backward LR) that is strongly computer dependent can be criticized. 
However, the advantages and disadvantages of this procedure were evaluated versus the 
alternative model. The lack of previous research on changes in investment criteria of 
business angels did not help in the definition of the variables to include, neither in which 
would be the best criteria do use. Two additional limitations can be drawn from the choice 
of the criteria used. The first is the surprise of the elimination of some investment feature 
variables. The second is that the results for the Pseudo R2 can be considered as low which 
can be seen as a drawback.  
 
Only 38% (three out of eight) of the initial variables that measured investment features were 
included in the model. Some of the eliminations could be seen as an unexpected result, in 
particular, in terms of the variables that measured the amount invested and the stage of the 
investment. Previous research has identified that business angels typically invest in a wide 
range of stages and different amounts. Hence, one would suppose that these variables would 
be included in the model. The exclusion of such variables may be seen as a limitation of this 
study.  
 
As it was previously mentioned, the results for the Pseudo R2 are low. Although the 
importance of such indicators can be questioned, the reality is that higher results would be 
considered better. However, depending on the goal of the research, these indicators may not 
be fundamental. For example, achieving a good classification might be more relevant than a 
higher R2. Osborne (2014) suggested that one alternative is to report the -2 log likelihoods 
and chi-square change statistics. In terms of these indicators the results are satisfactory and 
would not generate any apprehension.   
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This research opened a new area of discussion in terms of decision making criteria of 
business angels. Consequently, it has presented a wider set of limitations when compared 
with other studies in extensively examined fields. As a result of the exploratory nature of 
this study, the likelihood of identifying limitations is higher. Although the limitations 
recognized do not represent significant concern, they should be acknowledged and the results 
should be viewed with caution. Future research should acknowledge the shortcomings of 
this study and try to improve them.  
 
6.5.2 Implications for future research  
 
This chapter has explored the extent to which business angels change their investment 
criteria and what influences the likelihood of this change occurring. The results have 
indicated that angel investing is a dynamic activity no matter what is the measurement used 
(investor or investment). The likelihood of a change of investment criteria is both dependent 
on investor characteristics and investment features. By being the first study on changes in 
investment criteria, this study aimed to motivate future discussion on this topic. Four direct 
implications can be emphasized. 
 
First, this research has presented clear evidence that angel investing is not a constant 
practice. Riding (2005) was the first to call attention to the dynamic nature of angel investing. 
Avdeitchikova (2008) substantiated this point by demonstrating that business angels change 
investment roles. The results of this study have demonstrated that future research needs to 
take caution in the categorizations used. Previous research has heavily relied on the investor 
characteristics as control variables to understand particularities of business angels. However, 
if investors change their behaviour, then these studies are not capturing variations within the 
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same “class” of angels. Hence, one of the implications of this study for future research 
concerns the unit of analysis. It has become clear that scholars should focus their attention 
on the investment rather than on the investor. This is particularly important for typology 
studies where the great majority of research has been on the investor characteristics.  
 
Second, the likelihood of a change occurring is significantly influenced by the investment 
experience. This result can be separated in two different components. The first is an 
individual component and it is mainly linked with the length of the investment experience 
and with the number of opportunities invested, while the second element is associated with 
the interaction with an angel group. On this topic, the stronger effect is related with the time 
investing with a group. While the effect of the motivations to invest with others is not 
conclusive, this raises important implications on how business angels make decisions. It has 
become clear from the results that there is a learning ingredient involved in angel investing. 
Harrison et al., (2015) have suggested that business angels learn from the experience of 
others, in particular in their investment approach. The results of this study have validated 
this claim and take it a step further. The longer an angel investor is in a group the more 
flexible would be his/her approach to invest. This has raised important questions regarding 
the impact of group learning/thinking. Future reach should question to what extent this effect 
is significant in terms of performance, rejection rates, yield rates and so on. 
 
Third, the results show that the quantity of data collected has an impact on the level of 
variability. This is not a surprising result. If more data are collected on an investor history 
the greater the chances of variations to occur. However, scholars do not know to what extent 
increasing the amount of data collected per participant could influence the results. This 
research has showed that variability in investment behaviour is considerably underestimated 
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when less information is collected. An example where the participant only reported two 
observations showed a much lower level of variability (7%) than when three investment 
decisions were apprised (35%). Hence, it becomes clear that there is a need to collect richer 
data on investment decisions which should include the whole set of opportunities invested. 
This would enable scholars to fully map the variations occurred, which would result in a 
correct understanding of the dynamics of the angel market. 
 
Lastly, the variables included in the model can be grouped under three distinctive areas. The 
three areas are: investment specific area (ISA), angel specific area (ASA) and group specific 
area (GSA). Different implications can be drawn from each of the three areas. The ISA is 
related to the direct features of the investment project. The ASA is the strongly linked with 
the investor experience. Lastly, the GSA is associated with the collective nature of angel 
investment. Future research should acknowledge this model and further develop these areas. 
This links with the learning process and whether the influence of others can be raised from 
model.  The model is depicted in figure 6-1. 
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Figure 6-1: Map of the suggested model 
 
 
6.6. Conclusions 
 
The results of this research have highlighted the importance of the dynamics in angel 
investing. This research was able to expand the literature on angel investing by providing 
additional understanding of variations in the investment criteria used by business angels. 
Relying on a decision criteria categorization suggested in the fifth chapter of this thesis, this 
study has provided clear evidence that the angel investors change their investment criteria 
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across investment opportunities. The results showed that 43% of the investors gave different 
weights to the set of investment criteria. This is particularly important since it gives an 
additional dimension to the dynamics of the angel market. Scholars have focused on 
discussing variations across the angel population assuming that a specific ruling would be 
enough to explain the heterogeneity of business angels. However, scholars also need to 
recognize that although individuals might have static characteristics (education, 
entrepreneurial experience, number of investment, and so on), this does not mean that their 
behaviour will not change. Hence, research needs to reflect this variability. 
 
The second contribution of this research has been to present a model that explained 
alterations in investment criteria. The model showed that angel investors will use different 
investment criteria and the probability of changing is dependent on investment and investors’ 
characteristics. On the investor side, two subgroups can be identified - the first represented 
the experience (personal and investment), while the second represented syndication 
(motivations and time). The probability of changing investment criteria is explained by the 
age of the business angel, university degree, the number of investments made, years 
investing, the way the angel started investing (in a syndicate or by him/herself) and the 
motivations to invest with others. These findings have a clear link with investment 
experience. On the investment features, changes in the level of IP protection, the number of 
due diligence sources and the industry experience can help to explain the probability of a 
change occurring. This result seems institutive. The first effect is directly linked with 
characteristics of the product, while the second is associated with the investment process.  
 
This research is the first to open the “black box” of changes in investment decisions. Scholars 
should acknowledge that more needs to be done to fully understand what influences 
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variations in the investment behaviour of business angels. The results showed that change 
can be associated with investment experience. This finding supports previous research that 
has shown that the investment decision can be associated to a learning process (Harrison et 
al., 2015). However, more needs to be done to address the particularities of different learning 
processes. The results showed that variables measuring syndication (time and motivations) 
can help to explain change in investment behaviour. Hence, scholars should focus more on 
understanding the learning process of business angels and how this impacts their investment 
decisions.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion and discussion of results 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This final chapter summarizes the key contributions of this research. It reviews the empirical, 
methodological and theoretical based findings, with the aim of highlighting the implications 
for the academic community and practitioners. Additionally, the limitations and 
delimitations of the research are discussed with the aim of presenting the research trade-offs 
that were encountered during the several stages of this thesis. The final two section discuss 
the policy implications and make suggestions for further research for how the study might 
be extended 
 
7.2 Aims of the thesis  
 
Wetzel’s (1983) pioneering study identified the heterogeneity of the angel population. 
However, this has not been fully addressed in subsequent angel research. Few exceptions 
have been made. The only research area that has fully acknowledged this characteristic has 
been the categorization studies. However, the great majority of categorization studies have 
suggested topologies that are focused on a static approach, and so do not fully reflect the 
dynamic nature of angel investing. Recent research has introduced a more dynamic approach 
by concentrating the discussion on the investments rather than on the investor. However, 
neither approach has looked at the decision making criteria. This is surprising, since scholars 
have made considerable efforts to identify what makes a business angel invest or reject an 
investment opportunity. 
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The investment criteria literature has developed significantly since Wetzel’s (1981) study. 
Initial studies, (Mason and Harrison, 1996a; Mason and Harrison, 1996b; Mason and Rogers, 
1996, 1997) did not take into account the heterogeneity of the angel population when 
studying business angel decision making. However, this has been recently acknowledged 
with scholars including this characteristic in the research design (Harrison et al., 2015; 
Mitteness et al., 2012a). This later approach allowed scholars to highlight the criteria 
variations across the business angels’ population. However, these studies have not fully 
addressed the heterogeneity dimension in terms of the investment criteria. First, no 
categorization studies have differentiated the angel population in terms of the investment 
criteria used. Second, just a few of the decision studies have acknowledged the heterogeneity 
of the angel population. These have been investor rather than investment driven. However 
they do not fully represent the dynamics of angel investing because these studies do not 
address investment criteria variations by the same investor. To address this omission it was 
necessary to take a more dynamic approach to understanding how heterogeneity affects the 
criteria used by angel investors. 
 
This thesis started by showing that the decision making literature has conflicting results. The 
relative importance of the investment criteria, at the screening stage, has varied across the 
different studies. Some criterion are more susceptible to variation than others. Two possible 
justifications are suggested: (i) methodological differences; (ii) heterogeneity – impact on 
sampling. The review of investment criteria studies allowed the identification of the different 
methodologies used by scholars. This enabled the research to identify two trends across that 
literature which provided additional understanding of the differences. First, some criteria are 
more significant in some methodologies than in others. For example, the entrepreneur is not 
highly scored in studies based on real time methods, while in interview based studies it 
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obtains some of the highest scores. Hence, the method used has an impact on the relative 
importance of the criteria.  
 
Second, studies that have used the same methodologies have provided comparable results. 
This indicates that when the methodology is fixed, sample composition has less impact on 
the results obtained. For this reason the forth chapter applied four methodologies commonly 
used to study decision making to a fixed sample of 51 business angels. The findings of this 
chapter helped to understand that the results are methodologically dependent. However, the 
research is not able to explain if the source of the inconsistencies is solely attributed to the 
methodological differences or cognitive limitations of the participants. This has had further 
implications on the approach taken in subsequent chapters. A decision was made to focus on 
the investment rather than on the investor because in the presence of cognitive limitations it 
is better to focus on the decision rather than on the decision maker.  
 
The remainder of the thesis addressed the question whether the weights given to investment 
criteria followed a specific pattern. That is, can investment decisions be grouped by the 
combination of weights given by investors? This debate is particularly important for an 
understanding of type of decision model that angel investors use. The fifth chapter concluded 
that some of the decisions used compensatory models, while others non-compensatory 
models. This is not surprising, since these models are complementary. Additionally, this 
chapter highlighted the effect of investment experience in business angel investment 
decision making. This extends the findings of Harrison et al. (2015) by stressing that 
experienced investors have a more discriminatory decision model.  
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The study also identified the importance of influence on the decision making process of 
business angels. There is a clear negative relationship between the way the investor 
discriminates the investment criteria and the level of influence of others in the investment 
decision. The more an angel investor is influenced by others in their choice, the less he/she 
is able to differentiate the investment criteria supporting the decision. This is one of the key 
findings of this thesis. It has been suggested that the nature of angel investing is becoming 
more speculative, with indications of herd behaviour (Banerjee, 1992, 1993; Bikhchandani 
et al., 1992).  
 
The vast majority of studies conducted in angel research has assumed a static approach in 
terms of investment behaviour. In particular, categorization studies have assumed that there 
is no possibility that investor might change their approach over time. The only exception 
was the study by Avdeitchikova (2008) which showed that depending on the investment, the 
role of the investor changed. All other studies classified investors at a specific moment in 
time without acknowledging that the same business angel could belong to a different group 
under other conditions, e.g. time, investment, solo vs syndicated among others. The sixth 
chapter questioned this key assumption of previous studies by developing Avdeitchikova’s 
(2008) work further. The study used the cluster membership of the groups identified in the 
fifth chapter and examined what can impact the likelihood of an investor changing their 
investment criteria. The study showed the need for a dynamic approach when conducting 
research on business angels. Almost half (46%) of the investors invested for a different 
combination of investment criteria. The chapter suggested a model to explain what impacts 
the likelihood of this change occurring. Three key areas explain the likelihood of a change 
occurring: investment specific area (ISA), angel specific area (ASA) and group specific area 
(GSA). Within each area several variables were found to be statistically significant, with the 
odds ratios providing foreseeable relations. However, the most surprising result was that one 
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group specific area was associated with investing with others. As in the previous chapter, 
the model suggested that being part of an angel group has significant repercussions on the 
way investors make decisions. 
 
A simple way to summarize this thesis is to understand that it links two important areas of 
business angel research. The thesis sought to reinforce the need of extending the 
heterogeneity discussion while at the same time analyzing the decision making criteria 
employed by business angels. The key contributions will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next section. However, at this moment, the reader should have a clear notion that this thesis 
has been able to highlight several factors that can impact scholars understanding of the 
heterogeneity of the angel population. This is particularly evident in the case of business 
angels investing with angel groups.  
 
7.3 Contributions of the thesis 
 
The following sections review the key findings of this thesis. This will begin with a focus 
on the three methodological contributions, followed by the empirical contributions that cover 
the findings from the three empirical studies. Lastly, the theoretical contributions will be 
highlighted, in particular, the suggestions for the use of new theoretical frameworks.  
 
7.3.1 Methodological contributions 
 
The study makes three methodological contributions. The first is provided in the third 
chapter. This is based on the review of the business angel literature since 2008. The 
following contribution results from the fourth chapter. This can be easily understood since 
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this chapter was mainly focused on the use of different methods while studying the 
investment criteria of an angel investor. The last methodological contribution can be found 
in the sixth chapter which suggests a method to measure variation in terms of behaviour. The 
following paragraphs will review these contributions in detail.  
 
Business angel literature has changed across the years. The initial angel studies relied on 
very small samples while the most recent research has used larger ones that are typically 
recruited with the use of syndicates. The third chapter reviewed the business angel literature 
since 2008 and presented a discussion on how scholars have ignored the sampling 
suggestions previously mentioned in earlier research (Avdeitchikova et al., 2008; Farrell et 
al., 2008; Harrison and Mason, 2008; Mason and Harrison, 2008; Riding, 2008). Recent 
research has used business angel groups as the key approach to collect data. This is clear 
evidence that scholars are not overly concerned with convenience samples. However, this is 
not the only problem associated with this approach. When this approach is followed, how 
can response rates be calculated?  
 
The first methodological contribution called attention to the different ways that response 
rates have been measured in angel research. Scholars have used two distinct approaches. 
First, they have calculated response rates based on the number of groups that decided to 
support the research (Sohl, 2006). Second, the calculation represented only the number of 
members of the angel groups supporting the research (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007). This has 
presented two key limitations. On the one hand, the use of different procedures to measure 
response rates has reduced the likelihood of comparing studies regarding sampling bias. On 
the other hand, either of the measures can provide misleading representations of the angel 
population. Hence, it is necessary to have a standardized procedure to calculate response 
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rates when the recruitment process involves angel groups. A suggestion is to calculate 
response rates more accurately which takes into account the particularities of group 
membership. The chapter defended the use of such procedure in future research when studies 
target angel groups. 
 
The second methodological contribution is found in the fourth chapter. This chapter is based 
on a study that used a sample of fifty one angel investors. It has provided insights related to 
the methodologies used to evaluate the decision making criteria of business angels. Two 
methodological findings from this chapter can be considered. First, and possibly the most 
surprising result, is that different methodologies do not provide the same results. Hence, it 
is possible to state that the results are methodologically dependent. This has a direct 
implication in terms of research design and literature reviewed. The second finding has 
highlighted methodological similarities in terms of the results produced. Methodologies that 
did not present a list of investment criteria produce similar results when compared with other 
methods that did not restrain participants to a fixed set of options. Future research also needs 
to take this finding into account when designing research instruments. Using a fixed list of 
options not only restrains participants’ choices, but it can also bias the results. However, not 
doing so might also constrain the information collected. 
    
The third methodological contribution can be found in the sixth chapter. The study evaluated 
if business angels invest in different business proposals for the same reasons, that is, whether 
the weights given to the list of investment criteria by investors do not vary across 
investments. The study used the cluster membership for investment decisions, generated in 
the fifth chapter to evaluate the variation in investment patterns. Hence, the methodological 
contribution is associated with the way the variation is measured. A change occurs if for the 
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same investor, two investment decisions have different cluster membership. This suggestion 
to measure pattern variation is particularly useful when it is not possible to have a time series 
database.  
 
As it was previously mentioned, throughout this thesis, data is one of the key issues in angel 
research. Hence, finding alternative ways to understand investment behaviour is important. 
This is not a new way to measure variation. Avdeitchikova (2008) had previously used a 
similar approach using the variation of resources provided in each of the investor roles. 
However, that study is not using the cluster membership to measure change. It did not reveal 
how many times the same investor was observed, neither how the variation in the investment 
variables were calculated. In this study it was possible to verify that the likelihood of an 
angel investor changing their criteria increased with the number of investments reported. 
Hence, it is possible to conclude that richer data sets are required since more information 
allows researchers to better identify patterns within the data. 
7.3.2 Empirical contributions 
 
This discussion highlights what this research has been able to add to the literature in terms 
of what is known about business angels and their investment behaviour. This will cover the 
three empirical chapters - from the fourth to the sixth chapter. The fourth chapter of this 
thesis evaluated the use of different methods to study decision making criteria. As it was 
previously mentioned, the study showed that the results are methodologically dependent. 
However, the findings go beyond the inconsistent results across methods. The sample of the 
study consisted of two sub-samples. A first sub-sample comprised twenty one gatekeepers, 
and the second sub-sample consisted of thirty individual business angels. Both samples 
presented very similar results in terms of inconsistency across the methodologies used. One 
can see this as a less intuitive result, since gatekeepers are perceived as more experienced 
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investors, which in turn could result in a lower propensity for methodological variation. This 
indicates that even if a control variable is used, in this case the level of investment 
experience, the results are still going to be methodologically dependent.  
 
According to some practitioners and scholars (Gray, 2011; Mason and Botelho, 2016; Mason 
et al., 2015; Waddell, 2013), achieving an exit is becoming one of the key problems for 
business angels. Hence, it would be expected that angel investors would consider the exit to 
be an important investment criteria. Contrary to what Sudek (2006) identified, UK business 
angels do not rank the exit as a central criterion. The study in chapter four has showed that 
in all the methods used the exit always ranks below the fifth position for both sub-samples. 
This somewhat surprising result is further developed in Mason and Botelho (2016). The 
authors found that whereas in discussions gatekeepers emphasized that they take into 
account the exit while investing, this is not supported in the results of the real time 
methodology (VPA). Hence, the chapter in this thesis showed that although angel investors 
mention the exit as a key issue, this does not appear to influence their investment decisions.   
 
The fifth chapter has provided three key empirical findings. It is the first study to highlight 
the impact of the heterogeneity of the angel population in terms of the decision making 
criteria. The great majority of business angel investment decision literature has not taken 
this characteristic into account. In particular, this research focused on the investment 
decision rather that the investor. This emphasis on the investment decision was to enable 
further evaluation of individual (investor) decision making variations. The study showed that 
the weights of the investment criteria are different across investment opportunities. The key 
contribution of this finding is that business angels do not always invest for the same reasons. 
The heterogeneity of the angel population therefore needs to be acknowledged by scholars 
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in future business angel decision making research. The importance of this finding can also 
be reflected in entrepreneurial training. Entrepreneurs are given a list of do and do nots in 
terms of business angels investment criteria which varies across investment opportunities. 
 
A second finding is related to the decision models used by business angels. The three clusters 
of business angel’s investment decisions suggested that investors use both compensatory and 
non-compensatory decision models. One cluster consisted of decisions where all the 
investment criteria were scored as important. This finding is consistent with previous 
research (Maxwell et al., 2011) that supports a non-compensatory decision model, 
elimination by aspect (Tversky, 1972) as a reasonable approach to explain the investment 
decision process of business angels. In the remaining two clusters angel investors classified 
specific criterion as important, while other criteria were considered as less significant. One 
characteristic of compensatory models is that, “a shortfall on one attribute may be 
compensated by a good rating on another attribute” (Avery et al., 2013, p. 270). Hence, this 
highlights that business angels might use compensatory models while in other situations they 
will use non-compensatory models.  
 
A third empirical contribution, also reported in the fifth chapter, has provided additional 
insights into one of the key implications of the transformation of the angel market (Mason 
et al., 2016). Business angels are increasingly investing within angel groups and/or networks. 
This change in the investment behaviour of angel investors was discussed in the second 
chapter of this thesis. However, scholars have not acknowledged the implications of this new 
investment context. Previous research had noticed that business angels could be influenced 
by business acquaintances (Stedler and Peters, 2003) in terms of deal flow. However, to a 
large extent, until this research, scholars have ignored the importance of others in the 
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investment decision process of business angels and how the group interactions could 
influence a decision, which until now, was seen as individual. In a group setting, other factors 
can influence individual decision making. The results indicate that a business angel 
investment decision can be influenced by peer investors and/or by the gatekeeper or leading 
investor. This finding can be directly associated with two theoretical suggestions that will 
be discussed in the following subsection. Additionally, the results have also indicated that 
the group of investment decisions with the highest level of influence by others are those in 
which the investors considered all criteria as important. One of the consequences of being 
influenced by others may therefore be that investors are not able to recall the reasons why 
they have invested. 
 
The final two empirical contributions can be found in the sixth chapter and emerge from the 
discussion on the heterogeneity of business angels and their investment decisions. The study 
built on the findings of the previous chapter and evaluated to what extent angel investors 
change the investment criteria, and modeled what can impact the likelihood of this occurring. 
The first contribution concerns the dynamics of angel investment activity. The construct of 
change used in this study provided a clear notion that business angels are not static in terms 
of the investment criteria they use. Approximately, half of the sample (46%) used different 
weights of the investment criteria when undertaking different funding opportunities.  
 
This is the first study that evaluates investment criteria dynamics in business angel decision 
making literature. There is only one prior study that has evaluated the dynamics of angel 
investing. Avdeitchikova (2008) presented a similar approach to evaluate whether the post-
investment contributions provided by angel investors would vary across investment 
opportunities. The last empirical contribution of this thesis regards what impacts the 
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likelihood of a change of the investment criteria occurring. The results have indicated that 
the likelihood of a business angel changing their investment criteria between investments 
depends on three key areas: investment specific area (ISA), angel specific area (ASA) and 
group specific area (GSA). The first two areas are not surprising. One would expect that 
individual characteristics and attributes of the investment opportunity to play a role in terms 
of the reasons to invest. However, the last area raises the importance of others in the 
investment process. Again, the importance of angel investors acting within a group context 
has an impact on the way in which they make their decisions. This contribution is consistent 
to one of the findings of the fifth chapter. While investing with others, business angels may 
be influenced by peers and by the gatekeeper which can encourage them to change the 
reasons why they invest.  
 
7.3.3 Theoretical contributions 
 
The great majority of the contributions of this thesis are empirical. Two of these empirical 
contributions have suggested that the investment decisions of business angels are no longer 
an individual activity and it is becoming a collective exercise. The findings have indicated 
that this is happening in two dimensions (i) in the way angel investors’ weigh the investment 
criteria (ii) in how they can change the weights of investment criteria. Of course, these 
findings are natural implications of the rise of angels groups. However, recent business angel 
literature has not reflected this new dimension. Hence, it has become clear that a theoretical 
framework that could reflect this new reality should be suggested.  
 
The first theoretical contribution is associated with the suggestion to use herd behaviour as 
a framework to model the influence that others have on the reasons why business angels 
invest. Herd behaviour (Banerjee, 1992, 1993) has been widely used in the financial 
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literature, particularly in terms of investors in publicly traded firms. However, this type of 
behaviour has not been discussed in a business angel context, where investments are made 
in unquoted companies and the level of asymmetries of information is higher. In an angel 
group context, herd behaviour can be identified in two situations. First, in the group 
meetings, after the entrepreneurs pitch, during the questions and answers section, the desire 
of some investors to know more about the investment opportunity can influence others. In a 
very similar way to that identified by Cont and Bouchaud (2000), business angels may 
observe the interactions of other investors with the entrepreneur to infer their thoughts about 
that opportunity. Second, the interactions between investors (peers and/or gatekeepers) can 
reveal additional information that can be used by some regarding their investment decisions. 
Shiller (1995, p. 181) observed that “people who interact with each other regularly tend to 
think and behave similarly”. This effect is also reflected in the second theoretical suggestion 
provided in this thesis. 
 
Business angel groups are promoting higher levels of interactions between investors. This 
can have an impact in terms of investment practices and learning processes. This thesis has 
highlighted that the interaction between investors can impact (i) the investment criteria used 
in investment decisions; (ii) by changing the reasons to invest. This suggests that the use of 
communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991) may be an appropriate theoretical 
framework to explain investment decisions made within a group context. At the first glance, 
the fit of this theory with the reality is high. Wenger (1998) suggested that a coherent 
community of practice should hold on three foundations: mutual engagement, joint 
enterprise and shared repertoire. All of these are identified within the angel group context. 
It is therefore clear that the rise of angel groups and networks creates a new context for the 
investment process this will require different theoretical frameworks to be used. 
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This thesis therefore highlights the need for new conceptual frameworks to research the 
investment decision making of business angels in a group context. The previous decision 
making literature used a conceptual framework that mainly focused on explaining: (i) the 
relationship between the entrepreneur and the investor (e.g. social capital, agency theory and 
signaling theory); (ii) how the business angel made his investment decision (e.g. investment 
process model and decision making models). However, this conceptual framework has to be 
revised to include the contextual effect of investors interacting with others. First, at the more 
broad level, the conceptual framework should include the effect of the interactions between 
group members and the gatekeeper. These interactions can reflect how members sustain 
relationships, how members identify themselves with the group and how members learn 
from each other. Hence, the suggestion made is to use the theory of communities of practice 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991). Second, at the decision making level, the conceptual framework 
needs allow for individual investment decision to be impacted by others (e.g. 
gatekeeper/leading angel and/or other business angels). The impact of others in this context 
can lead less informed decisions resulting from herd behaviour (Banerjee, 1992, 1993). 
Figure 7-1 depicts the suggested conceptual framework. 
 
Figure 7-1: Conceptual Framework 
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7.3.4 Overall contributions summary 
 
This thesis aimed to study to what extent the heterogeneity of the angel population impacted 
the investment decision criteria. This was largely achieved and the key contributions will be 
summarized in the following paragraphs. However, this research has also discussed the 
phenomenon of business angels investing alongside one another in groups. The effect of 
angels groups in the investment decision is present throughout the thesis and has also been 
highlighted in the section on the theoretical contributions. This research highlights the 
importance of adding the effects of angel syndication to the conceptual model of business 
angel investment decision. On one hand, the findings supports Sohl (2012a) concerns on 
how syndication would lead to business angels acting venture capital funds. Investors are 
less in control of their investment decisions, there is a set of rules, following a fix procedure, 
with less hand-on contributions and a much more professionalized context. On the hand, the 
thesis is also able to highlight that several investment decisions are highly individual, that 
is, are not significantly influenced by others. Hence, although the intention of the thesis was 
not to examine the impact of syndication on the investment decision criteria, it has emerged 
as an important feature of angel investing. 
 
Table 7-1 summarizes the contributions of this thesis. These contributions enrich three areas 
of business angel research. The first is associated with research methodologies for business 
angel decision making. The findings help to understand the level of comparability across the 
most common methodologies used in the business angel decision making literature. The 
second is directly related to the heterogeneity of the angel population. The focus of the 
research was to study how much variability there is in the business angel’s investment 
decisions. The last area of research that this thesis has contributed to is the implications of 
business angels investing in a group context. This is evaluated in terms of the decision 
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making criteria. To summarize, this thesis has brought new insights on angel research by 
linking two key areas of the literature: (i) decision making (ii) heterogeneity of the angel 
population. By doing so, this research is able to conclude that the investment criteria 
employed by angel investors is a valuable option to analyse the lack of homogeneity of the 
angel population.  
 
Table 7-1: Thesis contributions 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 
Type of 
contribution Description of the contribution 
Chapter 3 Methodological 
Measure to evaluate response rates when groups are involved in 
the recruitment process. 
Chapter 4 Methodological 
The results in decision making studies are methodologically 
depend.  
Chapter 4 Methodological 
In decision making studies some methods provide closer results 
than others. Hence, easier to be comparable. 
Chapter 6 Methodological 
How to measure variations of changes in investment criteria using 
the results of cluster analysis. 
Chapter 4 Empirical 
Investment experience does not impact how consistent are the 
results across different methodologies. 
Chapter 4 Empirical The exit is not consider an important investment criterion. 
Chapter 5 Empirical 
Heterogeneity of the angel population needs to be recognized in 
decision making studies. 
Chapter 5 Empirical 
Business angels used different decision making models 
(compensatory and non-compensatory). 
Chapter 5 Empirical 
In a group context, business angels can be influence by other 
investors (peer and gatekeeper/lead) 
Chapter 5 Theoretical 
Evidence of Herd behaviour (Banerjee, 1992, 1993) can be found 
in angel investments. 
Chapter 6 Empirical 
The reasons to invest can change across different investment 
opportunities. 
Chapter 6 Empirical 
In interaction within the group can change the way a business 
angel evaluates an investment opportunity. 
Chapters 5 and 
6 
Theoretical 
Communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991) should be 
applied in business angel research as a theoretical framework to 
explain the interactions of group members. 
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 7.4 Limitations and Delimitations  
 
The aim of this section is to discuss the limitations and delimitations of this thesis and what 
is its impact on the contributions. The first part of this section will focus on the key 
limitations, while the second part will discuss the delimitations of this research. Typically, 
research limitations are associated with potential weaknesses of the research that are to a 
great extent out of the control of the researcher. Delimitations, in contrast, are under the 
control of the researcher and reflect the characteristics of the research that defined the scope 
of the study. In a simple way, when a researcher defines the boundaries of their study they 
are limiting the scope of the research by delimitating the findings.  
 
The limitations of this thesis can be structured into two types: (i) empirical (ii) statistical. In 
terms of the empirical limitations, this research has not been able to explain if the 
inconsistent results are the result of cognitive limitations of the investors or of 
epistemological differences of the methods under analysis. This limitation has impacted on 
the choice of the unit of analysis in the second and third empirical studies. The reason for 
modifying the unit from the investor to the investment decision was to allow for variability 
in the results per investor. This has enabled the thesis to evaluate variations of investment 
decision across the same investor. The second empirical limitation is associated with the 
generalization of the results. The great majority of participants were members of angel 
groups. This raises the question whether the findings of this research can be applied to the 
whole of the angel population. Are angels who are members of angel groups distinct from 
solo angels? To a large extent, business angels operate both in the visible and invisible 
markets; this behaviour is confirmed in this research. Although the vast majority of 
participants belonged to angel groups and/or networks (94%), they also invest independently 
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of these organizations (27%). This could be seen as a strength of the research rather than a 
shortcoming. 
 
The final limitation of this research is associated with statistical issues. According to the 
measures of goodness of fit used in the fifth and sixth chapters, the models are considered 
poor or fair. The values obtained for the average Silhouette coefficient in the fifth chapter is 
considered low and indicated a poor cluster structure. The values of the Pseudo R2 in the 
sixth chapter are also considered low. In this particular case, the low results of the Pseudo 
R2 can be overlooked by the -2 log likelihoods and chi-square change statistics which have 
presented satisfactory results. Additionally, the exploratory nature of the research with no 
preceding support can help to counter balance the poor goodness of fit results. 
 
This thesis has five key delimitations that should be highlighted. First, it only takes business 
angels as object of study. However, several funding sources can be found in the alternative 
finance context. The choice to only study the decision making of business angels reduced 
the capability of this thesis to explain the interaction between the several funding sources in 
the funding escalator. This decision was based on the importance of business angels in the 
alternative finance context55, and in the level of literature development. Additionally, the 
decision making process of other funding agents are significantly different, which would 
create problems in terms of research design and comparability of findings.  
 
The second delimitation is associated with the lack of a theoretical approach, undertaken in 
this thesis. The theoretical delimitations of this thesis are less to do with a lack of theory 
                                                          
55 According to EBAN (2016), business angels represented 71% of the total European early stage investment. 
The values for equity crowdfunding are considerably lower, representing only 5%. 
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testing, but rather, that theoretical frameworks could support the findings. Although this 
approach might be seen as moving backwards rather than progressing forwards, this is not 
the case. Just a small number of decision making studies have acknowledged the 
heterogeneity of the angel population. Hence, one needs to take a step back to understand to 
what extent this heterogeneity is also reflected in the investment decisions, in particular, in 
the criteria used to invest. The lack of an initial theoretical framework was subsequently 
offset by the suggestion of a number of theories that could help interpret the findings of this 
thesis.  
 
Third, this thesis did not include any link with financial outcomes. This point can be seen as 
the third delimitation. When the research was initially designed there were no objectives to 
evaluate whether the variability of the decision making criteria would imply better or worse 
financial outcomes. With the lack of research on the heterogeneity of investment decision 
making of business angels, it was more important to identify the phenomenon. Subsequently, 
the thesis aimed to understand what could influence the variations in the investment criteria 
used by the same investor. Previous research has identified that asking angel investors for 
financial information can be something very problematic (for example: Mason and Harrison, 
2004). This was the key driver for not studying how the variations on decision making were 
linked with financial outcomes. With the benefit of hindsight, asking for portfolio behaviour 
and financial returns could have generated valuable insights for practitioners and scholars. 
However, the risk of deterring participants by asking these types of questions could have 
jeopardized the quality of the survey responses.  
 
Fourth, the focus of study of this research is the angel investor. This has downgraded the 
importance of the investment opportunity, particularly in terms of the data collected. The 
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vast majority of variables focused on the investor characteristics rather than the investment 
features. The thesis could have given more emphasize to a wide set of investment features 
such as location, size and shareholder structure to enable an understanding of other 
dimensions of angel investment. However, this information is not always easy for 
participants to recall, particularly in syndicated investments where the business angel is more 
likely to have a low level of interaction with the investee venture. Hence, the decision was 
to focus on firm features that would be easier to recall. 
 
The last delimitation is associated to how angel syndication is evaluated in the thesis. The 
research was designed to evaluate how the lack of homogeneity of the angel population 
impacted the decision making criteria. There was an assumption that the rise of angel groups 
could have an impact on the way investment decisions were made. Hence, several variables 
were included to try to understand the impact of syndication in terms of the investment 
decision. However, there was no attempt to try to evaluate the effect of syndication on the 
heterogeneity of the angel population. The research is able to show that there is an impact in 
terms of investment decision, but to what extent this effect increases or decreases the 
heterogeneity of the angel population is not clear.  
 
7.5 Practical implications 
 
This section will cover the different stakeholders who might be interested in the practical 
implications of this thesis. The discussion will start by looking at how policy makers can be 
influenced by this research. Then, it will discuss the implications for entrepreneurs, followed 
by an overview of the contribution for angel groups/networks. The section will finish by 
highlighting the practical implications for entrepreneurial teaching.  
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7.5.1 Policy-making  
 
It was in the 1990s that the academic community first raised awareness of the importance of 
business angels. Scholars have argued that policy-makers should help promote business 
angel activity (some examples: Aernoudt, 2005; Lerner, 1998; Mason, 2009; Mason and 
Harrison, 1997, 2008, 2015; Mason et al., 2015; Murray, 2007; Sohl, 2007). In a similar 
tradition, this section will highlight the two findings of this thesis that are particularly 
important in terms of policy. First, the research reinforced the idea that business angels are 
not a homogenous population. Notably, in terms of the investment decisions or the criteria 
used. Hence, policy-makers need to acknowledge this when designing incentives to attract 
angel investment. The range of incentives to invest need to be wide-ranging to be able to 
attract the whole angel population. In particular, the reasons to invest vary. Hence, tax 
incentives are an effective way to directly create a general encouragement due to its 
monetary nature. However, more specific incentives will have to be tailored to the specific 
“type” of investment. 
 
The second policy implication is associated with the levels of influence identified in chapters 
five and six. The proliferation of angel groups/networks across the UK has led to collective 
thinking and investment decisions being influenced by others. However, it is not clear if this 
level of influence improves the screening quality of angel investors and enables them to 
make better investment decisions. The findings in the fifth chapter indicated that the less an 
investor is influenced by others, the more he/she is able to differentiate the reasons to invest. 
If business angels are influenced by others then it is important that policy-makers support 
the training of investors. This would increase the pool of knowledge of the angel community. 
This could lead to two effects. On the one hand, it would increase the critical thought across 
the investment community, which possibly could result in more independent investment 
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decision makers. On the other hand, it would reduce the heterogeneity of the angel 
population, leading to more predictable investment behaviour. 
   
7.5.2 Entrepreneurs 
 
Entrepreneurs looking for angel funding can find three valuable lessons from this research. 
The initial advice that entrepreneurs can take from this thesis is the identification of what 
are the key investment criteria of angel investors. The fourth chapter raised uncertainty about 
the validity of previous research on the investment decision making of business angels by 
indicating that they were influenced by the methodology used. Chapter five showed that in 
all three clusters of investment decisions, two criteria (the people and product/market) were 
consistently scored as very important. By looking at the investment rather than the investor, 
the fifth chapter produces important findings for entrepreneurs. This allows a deeper 
understanding of the investment decision making criteria of business angel since it allows 
for opportunity specific reasons rather than a very general criteria ranking.  
 
Second, the findings highlight that the level of heterogeneity of the angel population creates 
variety in the nature of their investment decisions. Hence, entrepreneurs need to recognize 
that there is no fixed combination of investment criteria that they must satisfy to guarantee 
angel investment. It therefore follows that being rejected by one angel investor does not 
mean that another business angel will also reject the opportunity. Moreover, the sixth chapter 
shows that the same investor can change the relative weights of their own investment criteria 
across different opportunities. Entrepreneurs need to be aware of this variability and should 
not believe there exists a “golden role” in achieving angel funding.  
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The third contribution for entrepreneurs identifies contextual factors in terms of the business 
angels’ decision making. The rise of business angel groups and networks has direct 
implications in terms of investment decision making. This is reflected in the weights 
business angels give to investment criteria and how they change these weights from one 
investment to another. Entrepreneurs need to recognize that when pitching to a group of 
angel investors they need to be able to identify who are the “leading” members driving the 
investment process and potentially influencing other investors in the group. Getting a 
positive response from them will increase the likelihood of being successful in raising 
finance. Although each angel investor will make his/her own decisions, they are subject to 
the influence of others and this is an additional element that entrepreneurs need to take into 
account.  
 
7.5.3 Angel groups/networks 
 
This thesis has also provided important insights into the investment process of business angel 
group and networks. The research has shown that investors in groups and networks interact 
with each other influencing decision patterns. To create sustainable angel groups/networks 
the managers of such organizations, also known as gatekeepers, need to acknowledge the 
importance of this effect. Gatekeepers should reflect on the findings of this thesis in three 
areas: (i) the membership recruitment/composition; (ii) managing member’s personalities 
and expectations; (iii) facilitating less experienced members to learn from more experienced 
angel investors in the group. Groups and networks need to recruit experienced investors to 
ensure high quality of the comments, discussions and investment decisions. If the 
membership of such organizations lack experience and knowledge, then it might result in 
deficient investment decisions or a low number of investments. This in turn could lead to the 
loss of members, or in the limit, the cessation of the group/network. 
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With respect to the way that gatekeepers manage their group/network, the findings 
highlighted that angel investors can be influenced by others. Hence, it is important for 
gatekeepers to ensure that the views of strongly “opinionated” investors do not dominate 
discussions and allow a diversity of views to be expressed. This is a particularly important 
at the screening stage. However, gatekeepers need to acknowledge this throughout the 
investment process. One can speculate the extent of group interaction. Members can disagree 
in terms of managerial issues, e.g. recruitment strategy, level of visibility of the group, 
number of members and so on. Divergences can also occur in terms of the investment 
portfolio, e.g. timing to exit a specific investment, who should be the non-executive board 
member, how much diversification in necessary and so on. All of these issues can create 
conflicts that could ultimately result in members leaving the group/network.   
 
Additionally, this thesis has highlighted the variability of the investment criteria used by 
business angels. Gatekeepers should acknowledge that being part of an angel group has a 
significant impact on members in terms of changing the reasons why they invest. Hence, 
gatekeepers should take this into account while evaluating the likelihood of an investment 
proposal to be fully funded. Accepting this can speed the investment process. Regularly, 
gatekeepers have to bring in additional co-investors to be able to complete the deal. 
Typically, this type of behaviour increases costs, both measured in time and money. Hence, 
gatekeepers should be more conservative while evaluating the likelihood of an investment 
opportunity being funded. An alternative solution would be to recruit experienced angels 
who act as “lone wolfs” or that have been part of angel groups for less than 10 years. As 
noticed in chapter 6, these investors with these characteristics are less likely to change their 
investment criteria and can be considered more predictable. In therefore allow gatekeepers 
to better predict the likelihood of an investment opportunity to be funded and reduce the 
costs previously mentioned.   
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7.5.4 Entrepreneurial teaching 
 
Teaching materials on entrepreneurial finance need to incorporate and reflect the 
heterogeneity of the angel population. Normally, entrepreneurial finance courses present 
entrepreneurs and students with a fixed set of “best practices” when searching for angel 
investment. This is a very simplistic way of looking at angel investing. Typically, business 
angels give significant importance to issues associated with the entrepreneur and the 
product/market. However, in some cases, other criteria are equally important. This thesis has 
called attention to the heterogeneity of the angel population in terms of decision making. 
This needs to be reflected in teaching.  
 
Entrepreneurial teaching should also incorporate the results of this thesis that have 
highlighted the changes in terms of context of business angel investment decisions. Much of 
what is taught reflects the era of the solo angel making individual investment decisions rather 
than the result of a group discussion. The popularization of angel groups has brought a new 
contextual reality that is not reflected in teaching materials. The investment process of angel 
groups is distinctive with their roles being played by gatekeepers and leading investors. The 
findings of this thesis showed that these actors can have a significant influence on the 
investment decision making of other group members. Students need to be alert to this 
specificity in business angel groups/networks. In summary, entrepreneurial teaching needs 
to reflect this new reality by emphasizing the importance of gatekeepers/leading investors 
and exploring their decision making and influence effect.   
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7.6 Suggestions for further research 
 
The three empirical chapters have provided new insights to business angel literature. 
However, there are still questions that scholars could address in future research. The fourth 
chapter has highlighted that the weights of the investment criteria given by angel investors 
vary across different methodologies. One of the findings of this study is that some 
methodologies provided closer results than others. However, the research was not able to 
identify what is the source of the inconsistent results. Hence, future research should try to 
identify and evaluate what is the source of the variations across the methodologies used in 
business angel decision criteria. Are the differences a result of cognitive limitations of the 
participants? In particular, is this the reflection of bounded rationality? Or, are the 
inconsistencies due to the epistemological differences of the methodologies used?  
 
The fifth chapter presents a discussion of the heterogeneity of the angel population. The 
study has expanded both the categorization research as well as the decision making literature 
by identifying three different clusters of investment decisions. The findings have highlighted 
important effects (i) investment experience (ii) influence of others. Further research should 
expand this discussion by trying to identify if the variability of decisions depends on the 
level of investment experience. This would enable scholars to understand if, as an investor 
becomes more experienced, the closer his/her decisions would be from others with the same 
investment track record, implying that, the population would be more homogenous with 
higher levels of investor experience. This could provide additional insights to support the 
use of communities of practice as a model to explain the business angel investment process, 
to explain the investment process of business angel groups. This can be associated with the 
levels of influence identified in this thesis. However, there are still questions to be answered 
regarding the effect of others in terms of business angel decision making. First, what causes 
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an angel investor to have a higher propensity of being influenced by others? To what extent 
does investment experience play a role in this? Second, what causes an angel investor to 
have a higher propensity of influencing others? Is this an issue of the investment process 
(deal flow), or is it linked with specific industry knowledge? Or even with reputation.  
 
The sixth chapter investigated the variation of the investment criteria used by angel 
investors. The research has two important implications that should be further pursued by 
scholars. Business angel investment activity is not static, rather it changes and evolves. This 
initial implication can be divided into two parts. The first part evaluates the development of 
the angel investors. Scholars need to understand what the key drivers of this evaluation are. 
Do business angels learn on their own? Does the group context play an important role? The 
second part evaluates the dynamic argument across the investment process. Only two studies 
have looked at how business angels change their approach at a specific stage of the 
investment process. Hence, future research should assess which stages are more susceptible 
to behavioural changes. Additionally, scholars should identify what impacts variability 
across the investment process. The study has also shown that the likelihood of change is 
impacted by individual characteristics of the investors and the investment features. Further 
research should try to identify and evaluate the importance of all investment features. 
Additionally, this work should be linked to returns. Scholars should explore the link between 
the investment criteria and the financial return. Is the use of some investment criteria more 
likely to be associated with a superior investment performance? 
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Appendix 1: Tests of proportions for all methods – gatekeepers (n = 
21) 
Test 
Business 
Plan 
The people Product/Market 
Financial 
Attributes 
Attributes of 
the Business 
Investment 
Attributes  
Exit 
Interview vs VPA -117311.10 -144913.80 -75907.21 -124211.80 -131112.50 -103509.80 -144913.80 
Interview vs RP -131112.5 -82807.87 -82807.87 -124211.8 -124211.8 -138013.1 -138013.1 
Interview vs Pairwise -144913.8 -75907.21 -96609.18 -131112.5 -117311.1 -131112.5 -117311.1 
VPA vs RP -117311.1 -138013.1 -89708.52 -124211.8 -131112.5 -124211.8 -110410.5 
VPA vs Pairwise -110410.5 -144913.8 -103509.8 -124211.8 -117311.1 -138013.1 -124211.8 
RP vs Pairwise -75907.21 -69006.55 -82807.87 -89708.52 -103509.8 -62105.9 -96609.18 
Each cell ij is the Z-statistic for the comparison of tests in row i and factor in column j 
 
 
Appendix 2: Tests of proportions for all methods - angels (n = 30) 
Test 
Business 
Plan 
The people Product/Market 
Financial 
Attributes 
Attributes of 
the Business 
Investment 
Attributes 
Exit 
Interview vs VPA -138564.1 -138564.1 -80829.0 -144337.6 -144337.6 -144337.6 -173205.1 
Interview vs RP -144337.6 -103923.0 -138564.1 -138564.1 -144337.6 -161658.1 -150111.1 
Interview vs Pairwise -132790.6 -80829.0 -138564.1 -155884.6 -144337.6 -161658.1 -121243.6 
VPA vs RP -132790.6 -144337.6 -127017.1 -138564.1 -144337.6 -155884.6 -144337.6 
VPA vs Pairwise -115470.1 -132790.6 -98149.5 -150111.1 -138564.1 -155884.6 -150111.1 
RP vs Pairwise -69282.0 -63508.5 -63508.5 -103923.0 -92376.0 -63508.5 -80829.0 
Each cell ij is the Z-statistic for the comparison of tests in row i and factor in column j 
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Appendix 3: T-tests for equality of means for all methodologies for 21 
gatekeepers 
Each cell ij contains the lower and upper bound of the CI for the comparison of tests in row i and factor in column j 
Appendix 4: T-tests for equality of means for all methodologies for 30 
business angels 
Each cell ij contains the lower and upper bound of the CI for the comparison of tests in row i and factor in column j 
  
Business Plan The people 
Product/Mark
et 
Financial 
Attributes 
Attributes of 
the Business 
Investment 
Attributes  
Exit 
Test 
CI_L
B 
CI_U
B 
CI_L
B 
CI_U
B 
CI_L
B 
CI_U
B 
CI_L
B 
CI_U
B 
CI_L
B 
CI_U
B 
CI_L
B 
CI_U
B 
CI_L
B 
CI_U
B 
Interview vs VPA 0.158 1.651 2.136 3.293 -
0.382 
0.668 -
0.619 
1.000 -
1.029 
0.934 0.356 2.025 2.469 3.721 
Interview vs RP 1.019 2.791 -
0.613 
0.232 0.384 1.140 0.548 2.214 1.079 2.730 0.364 2.303 1.216 2.594 
Interview vs 
Pairwise 
0.873 2.555 -
0.473 
0.283 0.442 1.558 0.816 2.803 0.105 1.705 0.606 2.441 -
0.315 
1.744 
VPA vs RP 0.124 1.876 -
3.594 
-
2.216 
0.017 1.221 0.448 1.933 0.797 3.108 -
1.064 
1.350 -
1.947 
-
0.434 
VPA vs Pairwise -
0.119 
1.738 -
3.447 
-
2.172 
0.092 1.623 0.681 2.557 -
0.139 
2.044 -
0.839 
1.506 -
3.393 
-
1.368 
RP vs Pairwise -
0.479 
0.860 -
0.500 
0.309 -
0.616 
0.140 -
1.127 
0.270 0.161 1.839 -
0.637 
0.256 0.420 1.961 
  
Business Plan The people Product/Market 
Financial 
Attributes 
Attributes of 
the Business 
Investment 
Attributes  
Exit 
Test CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB CI_LB CI_UB 
Interview vs VPA 0.723 2.077 1.528 2.938 -0.821 0.088 -0.265 1.199 -0.302 1.035 0.454 1.746 2.044 3.289 
Interview vs RP 1.228 2.438 -0.340 0.407 0.179 1.287 0.492 1.774 0.689 2.178 1.709 3.358 1.162 2.305 
Interview vs 
Pairwise 
1.161 2.572 -0.150 0.817 -0.102 1.102 0.690 1.777 0.337 1.730 1.687 3.313 0.907 2.159 
VPA vs RP -0.331 1.197 -2.853 -1.547 0.597 1.603 -0.049 1.383 0.276 1.857 0.515 2.352 -1.576 -0.291 
VPA vs Pairwise -0.364 1.297 -2.538 -1.262 0.350 1.383 0.009 1.524 0.044 1.289 0.525 2.275 -1.832 -0.435 
RP vs Pairwise -0.39 0.327 -0.729 0.129 -0.056 0.522 -0.508 0.308 -0.023 0.823 -0.299 0.366 -0.159 0.559 
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Appendix 5:  List of seven criteria 
CRITERIA DESCRIPTION 
THE PEOPLE Entrepreneur, Management team, etc... 
MARKET/PRODUCT  Sector, Scale of the Market, Technical aspect of the product, IP aspects, etc... 
BUSINESS PLAN Quality of the written document 
EXIT  Exit Value, Exit plan, Time to exit, Potential buyers, etc...  
FINANCIAL 
ATTRIBUTES   
Valuation, Funding requirements, Equity structure, etc... 
INVESTOR 
ATTRIBUTES  
Investment fit, Ability to add value, etc... 
ATTRIBUTES OF THE 
BUSINESS  
Business model, Strategy, Operations, Stage of development, etc... 
Appendix 6: Results of auto-clustering 
Auto-Clustering 
Number of Clusters 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) BIC Changea 
Ratio of BIC 
Changesb 
Ratio of Distance 
Measuresc 
1 10029.010    
2 9509.697 -519.313 1.000 1.498 
3 9246.177 -263.520 .507 1.452 
4 9142.695 -103.482 .199 1.232 
5 9105.804 -36.892 .071 1.279 
6 9131.569 25.765 -.050 1.137 
7 9184.332 52.763 -.102 1.000 
8 9237.143 52.812 -.102 1.132 
9 9312.957 75.814 -.146 1.024 
10 9392.922 79.964 -.154 1.026 
11 9477.172 84.251 -.162 1.178 
12 9586.449 109.277 -.210 1.014 
13 9697.612 111.163 -.214 1.176 
14 9829.591 131.979 -.254 1.030 
15 9964.973 135.382 -.261 1.002 
a. The changes are from the previous number of clusters in the table. 
b. The ratios of changes are relative to the change for the two cluster solution. 
c. The ratios of distance measures are based on the current number of clusters against the previous number of 
clusters. 
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Appendix 7: Outcome of the two-step cluster analysis 
 
Appendix 8: Predictor Importance  
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Appendix 9: Dummy variables created 
Variable Description 
Age1 (0 = 35 or younger, 1 = older than 35) Dummy variable for Age 
Age2 (0 = 44 or younger, 1 = older than 44) Dummy variable for Age 
Age3 (0 = 54 or younger, 1 = older than 54) Dummy variable for Age 
Age4 (0 = 64 or younger, 1 = older than 64) Dummy variable for Age 
NINV1 (0 = less than 4 investments, 1 = 4 or more investments) Dummy variable for Investment experience 
NINV5 (0 = less than 7 investments, 1 = 7 or more investments) Dummy variable for Investment experience 
NINV10 (0 = less than 10 investments, 1 = 10 or more investments) Dummy variable for Investment experience 
INV1 (0 = investing for less than 1 year , 1 = Investing for 1 year or more) Dummy variable for Investment experience 
INV5 (0 = investing for less than 5 years , 1 = Investing for 5 years or more) Dummy variable for Investment experience 
INV10 (0 = investing for less than 10 years , 1 = Investing for 10 years or more) Dummy variable for Investment experience 
Synd1 (0 = In a group for less than 1 year , 1 = In a group for 1 year or more) Dummy variable for Syndication 
Synd5 (0 = In a group for less than 5 years , 1 = In a group for 5 years or more) Dummy variable for Syndication 
Synd10 (0 = In a group for less than 10 years , 1 = In a group for 10 years or more) Dummy variable for Syndication 
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Appendix 10: Elimination process 
  Variables not in the Equation 
  Score df Sig. 
Variables 
CAI 1.234 1 0.267 
CS 0.197 1 0.657 
CI 0.527 1 0.468 
CD 0.585 1 0.444 
CSY 0.048 1 0.826 
CRPS 0.362 1 0.547 
Age2 1.685 1 0.194 
INV5 0.291 1 0.59 
NINV2 0.421 1 0.516 
NINV3 0.56 1 0.454 
Synd5 0.398 1 0.528 
Gender 1.424 1 0.233 
Professional 0.013 1 0.909 
MB 1.068 1 0.302 
SME 0.244 1 0.622 
Board 1.178 1 0.278 
First_inv 0.111 1 0.739 
N_Synd 1.864 3 0.601 
N_Synd(1) 1.552 1 0.213 
N_Synd(2) 0.153 1 0.696 
N_Synd(3) 1.104 1 0.293 
Crowdfunding 1.294 1 0.255 
Overall Statistics 16.552 21 0.738 
a. Variable(s) removed on step 2: CSY. 
b. Variable(s) removed on step 3: Professional. 
c. Variable(s) removed on step 4: Synd5. 
d. Variable(s) removed on step 5: SME. 
e. Variable(s) removed on step 6: CS. 
f. Variable(s) removed on step 7: CRPS. 
g. Variable(s) removed on step 8: Gender. 
h. Variable(s) removed on step 9: CI. 
i. Variable(s) removed on step 10: N_Synd. 
j. Variable(s) removed on step 11: First_inv. 
k. Variable(s) removed on step 12: INV5. 
l. Variable(s) removed on step 13: CD. 
m. Variable(s) removed on step 14: Crowdfunding. 
n. Variable(s) removed on step 15: Board. 
o. Variable(s) removed on step 16: MB. 
p. Variable(s) removed on step 17: Age2. 
q. Variable(s) removed on step 18: CAI. 
r. Variable(s) removed on step 19: NINV2. 
s. Variable(s) removed on step 20: NINV3. 
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Appendix 11: Chi-square test - Block 1: Method = Backward Stepwise 
(Likelihood Ratio) 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 
Step 96.453 39 0 
Block 96.453 39 0 
Model 96.453 39 0 
Step 2a 
Step -0.001 1 0.978 
Block 96.453 38 0 
Model 96.453 38 0 
Step 3a 
Step -0.001 1 0.976 
Block 96.452 37 0 
Model 96.452 37 0 
Step 4a 
Step -0.001 1 0.97 
Block 96.45 36 0 
Model 96.45 36 0 
Step 5a 
Step -0.026 1 0.871 
Block 96.424 35 0 
Model 96.424 35 0 
Step 6a 
Step -0.092 1 0.762 
Block 96.332 34 0 
Model 96.332 34 0 
Step 7a 
Step -0.156 1 0.693 
Block 96.177 33 0 
Model 96.177 33 0 
Step 8a 
Step -0.294 1 0.588 
Block 95.883 32 0 
Model 95.883 32 0 
Step 9a 
Step -0.502 1 0.479 
Block 95.381 31 0 
Model 95.381 31 0 
Step 10a 
Step -2.706 3 0.439 
Block 92.675 28 0 
Model 92.675 30 0 
Step 11a 
Step -0.433 1 0.511 
Block 92.242 27 0 
Model 92.242 27 0 
Step 12a 
Step -0.887 1 0.346 
Block 91.355 26 0 
Model 91.355 26 0 
Step 13a 
Step -1.101 1 0.294 
Block 90.255 25 0 
Model 90.255 25 0 
Step 14a 
Step -1.421 1 0.233 
Block 88.834 24 0 
Model 88.834 24 0 
Step 15a 
Step -1.628 1 0.202 
Block 87.205 23 0 
Model 87.205 18 0 
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Step 16a 
Step -1.3 1 0.254 
Block 85.905 22 0 
Model 85.905 17 0 
Step 17a 
Step -2.02 1 0.155 
Block 83.885 21 0 
Model 83.885 16 0 
Step 18a 
Step -1.719 1 0.19 
Block 82.166 20 0 
Model 82.166 15 0 
Step 19a 
Step -1.871 1 0.171 
Block 80.295 19 0 
Model 80.295 14 0 
Step 20a 
Step -0.559 1 0.455 
Block 79.736 18 0 
Model 79.736 13 0 
a. A negative Chi-squares value indicates that the Chi-squares value has decreased from the previous 
step. 
Appendix 12: Pseudo R2 for the 20 steps. 
             Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 4.752 8 0.784 
2 4.566 8 0.803 
3 4.568 8 0.803 
4 4.339 8 0.825 
5 8.402 8 0.395 
6 9.734 8 0.284 
7 11 8 0.202 
8 6.642 8 0.576 
9 3.395 8 0.907 
10 7.256 8 0.509 
11 2.977 8 0.936 
12 13.187 8 0.106 
13 7.015 8 0.535 
14 7.291 8 0.506 
15 8.278 8 0.407 
16 6.075 8 0.639 
17 8.723 8 0.366 
18 8.526 8 0.384 
19 9.817 8 0.278 
20 10.36 8 0.241 
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Appendix 13: Roc Curve and Area Under the Curve statistics
 
Area Under the Curve 
 
Area Under the Curve 
Test Result Variable(s):   Predicted group   
Area Std. Errora Asymptotic Sig.b 
Asymptotic 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
.673 .033 .000 .608 .738 
The test result variable(s): Predicted group has at least one tie between the positive 
actual state group and the negative actual state group. Statistics may be biased. 
a. Under the nonparametric assumption 
b. Null hypothesis: true area = 0.5 
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